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Abstract
Over the last few decades world securities markets have become significantly more
sophisticated in terms of how securities are traded as well as the variety of securities traded.
My hypothesis is that the ability of securities regulators to take enforcement action against
market abuse has not kept pace with the level of sophistication of the markets and, in
particular, the way in which trading can take place across borders and the manner in which
market related information can spread rapidly across the world. I argue that that regulators
need to do more to protect the integrity of the markets by improving their efforts to initiate
action against market abuse. Furthermore, given the global nature of the problem I argue
that the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) should be more
proactive in coordinating the activities of securities regulators in this regard.
I commence with an analysis of why the integrity of securities markets is critical to the
economy of a country and why it is necessary for regulators to enforce laws prohibiting
market abuse in order to protect market integrity. I then move on to identify the changes to
securities markets, the regulatory responses to these changes, trends in the types of market
abuse which is taking place across borders and how those responsible for taking
enforcement action against such market abuse have responded. Finally I consider IOSCO,
its history, how its role has evolved, its impact to date and how IOSCO could build upon its
success in terms of improving the enforcement outcomes of securities regulators in relation
to market abuse. I conclude that the transformation of the markets have presented
opportunities to engage in market abuse across borders and that, while some positive steps
have been taken to address this issue, more could be achieved. Finally I discuss and make
recommendations about what might be done to improve the ability of securities regulators to
take successful enforcement action.
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Ontario Securities Commission
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Pump and dump

A common form of market manipulation scheme. Usually in such a
scheme the perpetrator acquires a large number of securities in a
particular entity. False or misleading information is then published
and/or wash sales and matched orders utilised to artificially inflate
the price of the securities. When the price of the securities has
become artificially inflated the perpetrator sells the securities.

Quote stuffing

Also called ‗Spoofing‘. A manipulative practice where a series of
orders are placed by a trader to give the impression of activity or
price movement in a security but the orders are withdrawn before
they are executed.

SEC

United States Securities and Exchange Commission

Spoofing

Also called ‗Quote Stuffing‘. A manipulative practice when a series of
orders are placed by a trader to give the impression of activity or
price movement in a security but the orders are withdrawn before

xvii

they are executed.
Wash sale

A manipulative practice whereby the same beneficial owner of the
security is both the buyer and the seller of the securities. The
purpose of a wash sale is to give the appearance of active trading in
the security.
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INTRODUCTION

Two related factors that have recently been changing the nature of insider trading enforcement
are technology and globalization. The old assumptions about the logical places to look for
connections — neighbors, family, co-workers — may not always bear fruit in a world where you
can whisper to someone a half a world away and equally easily trade in a market just as far away.
L C Thomsen, Former Director of Enforcement at the SEC

1

The trading of securities in world markets has changed dramatically over the last few
decades. Innovations in securitization have led to a vast array of new forms of securities that
can be traded and the volume of securities traded has grown five fold since 1990.2 There
has also been a significant increase in market capitalizations and the variety of markets for
trading securities has multiplied as new trading platforms have appeared. At the same time
the larger and more established stock exchanges have expanded into new regions and
markets and some have become global conglomerates. New players in the markets, such as
hedge funds and ‗high frequency‘ (or algorithmic) traders have also emerged to have
significant influence. 3 As a result of these changes markets are becoming truly global
thereby allowing traders to trade almost instantly across a wide variety of products and in
markets around the world.
Such innovations have been driven by the benefits global markets provide investors and
enterprises. Investors now have access to a diverse array of investment opportunities and at
1

LC Thomsen, Former Director of Enforcement at the SEC ―US experience of Insider Trading Enforcement
actions‖ Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks before the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2008
Summer School, Melbourne, February 19, 2008, online:
<http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch021908lct.htm>.
2
From US$11 trillion in 1990 to US$54 trillion in 2010, see McKinsey Global Institute ―Mapping global capital
markets 2011‖, August 2011, online:
<http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/Mapping_global_capital_markets/index.asp> at 13.
3
Further details on these changes are set out in Chapter 2.

2

the same time enterprises can issue a variety of securities in different markets which may
have the effect of lowering their cost of capital to expand.4
However there can be negative ramifications on markets as they become more international
in scope. For example, the Global Financial Crisis clearly demonstrated that problems in
markets cannot now be easily quarantined and troubles in one market can now rapidly
spread to other markets around the world.
This dissertation seeks to investigate another issue which may have emerged in the wake of
these dramatic changes to the markets. This is whether these changes have resulted in a
weakening of the system of enforcing regulations which protect the integrity or fairness of the
markets. This dissertation argues that the changes to the markets have weakened the ability
of regulators to take action against unfair trading practices, such as insider trading and
market manipulation, and as such this threatens the integrity of the markets as a whole.
Securities regulators protect the integrity of the markets through laws and regulations.
Importantly such laws prohibit unfair trading practices, such as insider trading and market
manipulation. When such unfair trading practices are detected, securities regulators can take
enforcement action against those that violate these laws and thereby hopefully deter others
from engaging in such practices. Given the changes to the markets and the increased
capacity to trade across borders, the question becomes whether this has given rise to new
forms of insider trading and market manipulation? Furthermore, are there now greater
opportunities to engage in insider trading and market manipulation spanning jurisdictions in
order to avoid detection and/or prosecution? If these questions are answered in the
affirmative, how have regulators responded? Is that response sufficient? Has the integrity of
the markets been preserved?
In exploring these issues this dissertation seeks to obtain answers to a number of related
questions. First and most fundamentally why is preserving market integrity important?
4

For example the level of holdings of foreign equities has increased from approximately US$1 trillion in 1990
to $14 trillion in 2010. Purchases of foreign equities were $670 billion in 2010, see McKinsey Global Institute,
supra, note 2 at 6 and 31-33.

3

Second what are these changes to the markets and have these changes altered the types of
unfair practices which could threaten the integrity of the markets? In other words have new
and different types of market manipulation and insider trading conduct appeared in the wake
of these changes and do such violations now more frequently straddle jurisdictional
boundaries? Third if such changes have occurred, how are securities regulators responding
to them and to the new threats they pose? Do they have the capacity in terms of detection,
investigation and enforcement tools to robustly tackle securities offences which extend
beyond their jurisdiction? Can the effectiveness of such regulators be improved? If so does
this require a global approach to the problem and how will such an approach be
implemented?
Market Integrity
A key concept in this dissertation is that of market integrity. This is because if it is in fact true
that the changes to the markets have increased the threat of insider trading and market
manipulation, these forms of misconduct would present a challenge to capital markets if not
effectively addressed. This is due to the fact that any increase in unfair trading practices
may, over time, cause a reduction in market integrity and thereby decrease investor
confidence with the effect that the flow of capital into those markets will be reduced.5 As
such any assault upon market integrity has a direct impact upon investors and listed entities.
However the impact of threats to market integrity is not limited to investors and listed entities.
Securities markets are vital mechanisms by which companies can access finance to grow
and develop and therefore absolutely critical to the economic and therefore social
development of a country or even a region.
Because of the importance of capital markets to the economy and a nation generally, there
is a strong public interest in maintaining the integrity of securities markets. As such most
5

Previous instances of disclosed market abuse have impacted upon markets, reducing market valuations and
shaking investor confidence. For example there was manipulation and insider trading associated with the
collapse of Enron in 2001, see generally Paul M Healy and Krishna G Palepu "The Fall of Enron" (2003) 17:2
Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 and William W Bratton "Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value"
(2002) 76 Tul L Rev 1275.

4

regulators of securities markets around the world have as a key objective a requirement to
work towards the protection of market integrity or market fairness.6 This, coupled with the
goal of promoting efficient capital markets, are the two core functions of securities
regulators. However these two goals are, to at least some extent, linked. This is because
some studies have shown that markets which lack integrity may not be as efficient as those
which have a high level of market integrity.7 It appears that this may be because a deficiency
in market integrity in turn reduces investor confidence in the market, investors being wary of
investing in a market which is not considered fair for all participants with the result that the
liquidity of the market concerned is reduced. Inefficient markets also have the effect of
raising the cost of capital of listed entities.
Market Abuse and Market Integrity
One of the main ways in which securities regulators seek to comply with their core function
of protecting the integrity of the markets is to eliminate, or at least supress, market abuse.
Market abuse refers to actions which unfairly take advantage of other participants in the
market or actions which give a false appearance of the price or trading of securities. It
consists first of insider trading, also known as insider dealing. In brief, insider trading can be
defined to encompass the actions of a person or entity in taking advantage of their access to
non-public information by either trading on the basis of that information, or passing it on to
others who in turn trade on that information.8 Market abuse also encompasses various acts
designed to mislead or manipulate the market with the effect that the market no longer
properly reflects the genuine forces of supply and demand. Collectively these acts to mislead
or manipulate the market are known as market manipulation.9 Market manipulation occurs

6

The concept of market integrity is explored more fully in chapter 2.
These studies are discussed in chapter 2.
8
The breath of use of inside information which may be prohibited differs between jurisdictions. See generally E
Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse, A Legal and Economic Analysis (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005).
9
See Avgouleas, supra note 8 at 4 and P Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing and Market Abuse
(Farnham, Surrey, GBR: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2009) at 9.
7

5

when a person engages in misconduct which leads to false impressions about the price of
securities which could lead to distorted valuations or artificially inflated or deflated prices.10
Although market abuse incorporates both insider trading and market manipulation, it is not a
term of art and could also be more broadly defined to include a wide range of dishonest or
fraudulent practices which may in some way have a negative impact upon investors.
However, the definition of market abuse which will be used in this dissertation is limited to
insider trading and market manipulation because these are the actions which impact directly
upon the integrity of the markets.11 This definition is also consistent with the definition of
market abuse as set out in first European Union Directive on Market Abuse.12
In their role of protecting markets from market abuse, securities regulators are charged with
taking enforcement action against such abuse. Although there is debate about how rigorous
and punitive such enforcement has to be to achieve compliance, there appears to be a
growing consensus, based upon empirical evidence, that at least some level of enforcement
is necessary.13 As such, the G20 group of countries has listed effective enforcement of rules
surrounding the financial markets as one aspect of strengthening global financial stability.14
Cross Border Market Abuse
This dissertation will seek to explore the question of whether the changes to the markets that
have taken place over the last few decades have created new avenues to engage in market
10

Avgouleas, supra note 8 at 4.
Other types of dishonest behaviour involving securities are not considered as part of this dissertation because
they do not directly mislead or affect the market for securities. For example one dishonest practice associated
with securities, but not considered here, is the practice known as ‗churning‘. This consists of excessive trading
in a client‘s account by a broker wishing to maximize commissions regardless of the client‘s best interests.
While this type of activity is dishonest and impacts upon the broker‘s client, this practice does not directly
impact upon the integrity of the market. Similarly the dishonest activity when persons are contacted, usually
‗cold called‘, and sold securities not listed on any exchange is not included within the definition of market abuse
in this dissertation. However, where persons are sold securities on an exchange and the price is manipulated this
is included.
12
EU, Commission Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on
insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) [2003] OJ, l96/16. This directive states (at (12)):
―Market abuse consists of insider dealing and market manipulation. The objective of legislation against insider
dealing is the same as that of legislation against market manipulation: to ensure the integrity of Community
financial markets and to enhance investor confidence in those markets.‖
13
For further details see discussion contained in Chapter 2.
14
See G20 Working Group 1 ―Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency Final Report‖, 25
March 2009, online: < http://cdm16064.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p266901coll4/id/2932 > at 45.
11
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abuse that straddles international boundaries and whether this can result in opportunities to
avoid detection, investigation or prosecution.
Insider trading and market manipulation straddling such international boundaries will be
referred to in this dissertation as ‗cross border market abuse‘. This comprises instances of
market abuse where all of the acts, events or activity that constitute the market abuse do not
take place within just one jurisdiction but rather spans two or more jurisdictions. This could
involve, for example, a person with material insider information in one jurisdiction placing an
order on an exchange in another jurisdiction. It could also involve improperly exploiting
markets located in different jurisdictions. For example market manipulation of cross listed
securities in the form of wash sales taking place across different markets.15
National Securities Regulators but International Markets
Despite the changes to the markets and the trading of securities, the regulation of securities
markets is still discharged at the national or even provincial level. The enforcement of
serious market abuse offences is also still undertaken by national securities regulators,
sometimes with the assistance of self-regulatory bodies. 16 This status quo is likely to
continue because the establishment of a global body to regulate and supervise the markets
would require nations to surrender regulatory and/or enforcement powers to some form of
supranational body. It is highly improbable that most countries would agree to such change
because of political and constitutional considerations.
Yet the supervision of the markets by the regulators of individual countries gives rise to
potential difficulties if those regulators detect an increasing frequency of cross border market
abuse but in circumstances where their detection, investigation and enforcement powers are
limited to their home jurisdiction. In some cases there may not be a sufficient jurisdictional
connection to allow the regulator to take action or the regulator may not be able to obtain the
15

See D Cumming and S Johan ―Global Market Surveillance‖ (2008) American Law and Economics Review
454 at 464 for some examples of cross-market manipulation.
16
In Canada securities are regulated at the provincial or territorial level, although many market regulatory
functions are delegated to a national self- regulatory body, the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of
Canada (IIROC).
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required evidence and testimony to complete the investigation from outside of the
jurisdiction. 17 Furthermore cross border market abuse may prove more difficult for a
country‘s securities regulator to detect than market abuse that takes place solely within the
confines of its own jurisdiction. This is because constraints in the scope of regulator‘s
powers may result in the investigation not making the necessary links between, for example,
an insider and the person who eventually trades on the basis of that insider information.
Some of these difficulties may be able to be addressed by enacting legislation to extend the
extraterritorial reach of the securities regulator‘s jurisdiction and powers. But this, by itself, is
unlikely to be enough. The involvement and cooperation of other agencies in foreign
countries will almost certainly be required to effectively tackle many cases of cross border
market abuse. In addition, despite the fact that countries are unlikely to surrender powers to
a supranational body, an international organization, such as the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) may be able to play an important role in coordinating the
international enforcement activities of securities regulators.
Methodology – researching cross border market abuse
As referred to above this dissertation seeks to examine how the markets have become more
sophisticated and whether, because of these changes, there has been a transformation in
the types and instances of market abuse and, in particular, cross border market abuse. This
dissertation also considers whether or not regulators enforcement efforts are keeping pace
with these changes.
In relation to the changes to the markets and the regulatory response to such changes,
documentary and archival research was undertaken to identify the main developments that
have occurred to securities markets over the last few decades. Similarly documentary
research was undertaken to detail the principle changes that have been made in relation to

17

See for example R v Libman [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 which delineates limits of the jurisdiction of Canadian
Courts in relation to criminal offences where part of the activity took place outside of Canada.
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laws, regulations and policy which may impact upon the securities regulators ability to stop
market abuse and cross border market abuse.
Determining what is occurring in relation to cross border market abuse in the face of the
changes to the markets presented the most challenging aspect of this research. Obviously
no one who has successfully engaged in market abuse without detection is likely to disclose
this to anyone, including those conducting research in this area. As such currently
information in relation to what is occurring in relation to cross border market abuse can only
be gleaned from two sources. First instances of cross border market abuse that have been
detected and reported by securities regulators and second, unusual activity that is detected
in markets which is not explained by the ordinary forces of supply and demand. Both
methods have their limitations.
Attaching significance to the number of matters detected by securities regulators is
problematic because the cases detected may not be a true reflection of the actual extent of
market abuse. One concern is that current detection methods may not be sophisticated
enough to detect such abuse. In addition, for those conducting research into this area,
information on matters detected may not be available for analysis due to privacy constraints
and also because regulators generally do not report on cases detected but ultimately not
pursued. Information on the number of reported cases may also be misleading as such
cases may just reflect cases that are selected for investigation rather than all those that are
detected. Case selection may in turn be affected by considerations such as the priorities of
the regulator, the likelihood of success and/or the investigative and prosecutorial resources
available. Furthermore it could be hypothesised that a regulators‘ response could also be
manipulated if, for example, there is a temptation for it to artificially inflate the problem to
increase its resources and power. Alternatively a regulator may decide to downplay the
problem in order to avoid criticism that it is not effectively addressing the issue.
The second source of information on cross border market abuse, that is unusual activity
detected in markets, also has a number of shortcomings. These include the fact that the
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detected unusual activity may not be an indication of illegal activity. For example unusual
price increases before a takeover announcement may indicate insider trading but may
equally indicate that market participants merely accurately identified this company as a
takeover target. This data may also not indicate the source of the market abuse or whether it
is limited to one jurisdiction.
Despite its limitations, the focus of this dissertation is the first source of information, that is,
market abuse reported by regulators. However some reference is made to current research
in relation to the second source, that is, measured unusual activity. Mindful of the limitations
of drawing conclusions from this first source of information, this dissertation seeks to only
ascertain if regulators are detecting more cross border market abuse, not if there is an
increase in the overall level of cross border market abuse. In addition to ascertaining
whether regulators are detecting more cross border market abuse this dissertation attempts
to identify what barriers may still obstruct the detection of cross border market abuse.
In considering the information reported by regulators, this dissertation draws upon a
combination of methodologies. In this way it is hoped that a more accurate picture of what is
occurring in relation to cross border market abuse and its detection and enforcement has
emerged, first by an examination of the different legislative frameworks and second by way
of interviews conducted with enforcement staff from securities regulators in each of these
five jurisdictions namely Canada, UK, USA, Australia and Germany. These countries are
home to 50% of the world‘s capital markets in terms of market capitalization.18 The principal
securities

regulators

interviewed

in

these

countries

are

Bundesanstalt

für

Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) in Germany, the Financial Conduct Authority (the
FCA, formally the Financial Services Authority (FSA)) in the UK, the Australian Securities
and Investments Commission (ASIC) in Australia and the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (the SEC). In Canada securities regulation is undertaken by provincial
18

All of these jurisdictions are in the top eight in the world in terms of market capitalization. Specifically the US
makes up 36% of the world capital markets, the UK 6 %, Canada 4 %, Germany 3% and Australia 2%, see The
World Bank, ―The World Data Bank - Market Capitalization of listed companies‖, online:
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD >.
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securities regulators. However the largest of these is the Ontario Securities Commission (the
OSC). It was this regulator which was interviewed. In addition because of the importance of
self-regulatory organizations in Canada and the USA, staff from the two primary selfregulatory bodies in these jurisdictions were also interviewed. These organisations are the
Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) and the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA). The results of these interviews were subjected to a
comparative analysis with a view to identifying common themes
To reinforce this analysis documentary and archival material published by the securities
regulators from Canada, UK, USA, Australia and Germany was reviewed. The material
analysed in relation to these securities regulators consisted of annual reports for the 10
years from 2004 to 2013 together with, where available, individual case reports on
enforcement action taken in relation to cross border market abuse. In Canada the reports
reviewed were from the OSC, the British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) and the
Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) 19 In addition to collating and analysing this
information this material was also subjected to a comparative analysis with a view to
identifying common themes.
Finally an examination was undertaken of the main international organization involved in
assisting securities regulators coordinate their activities to take action against cross border
market abuse, namely IOSCO. IOSCO has developed a framework for securities regulation
and is also involved in developing policy which can be adopted by securities regulators to
address emerging issues in securities regulation. In addition IOSCO has developed a
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU) which is proving to be a key tool which
can be utilized by securities regulators to exchange the information required for their
enforcement activities. Documentary and archival research was undertaken on this
organization and the MMoU and supplemented by an interview with staff from the IOSCO
General Secretariat.
19

See Chapter 4 as to the exact material that was examined from Canadian Securities Regulators.

11

Structure and Organization of Chapters
This dissertation is divided into the following six chapters:
Chapter 1
This chapter consists of a review of the existing literature pertaining to key issues discussed
in this dissertation. As such this chapter explores what is meant by market integrity or market
fairness, the importance of these concepts to capital markets as well as the elimination of
market abuse. In addition, as this dissertation is premised upon the basis that securities
regulators should take enforcement action against market abuse, the literature in relation to
the importance of public enforcement for the enhancement of market integrity is also
examined in detail.
Chapter 2
This chapter surveys the changes to securities markets that have taken place over
approximately the last two decades. It considers why these changes occurred and how
these changes may have impacted upon market abuse and its frequency. It also considers
the difficulties these changes may have caused for securities regulators in terms of the
detection, investigation and prosecution of market abuse and cross border market abuse.
Finally this chapter considers the regulatory responses of certain governments to the
changes and how these new laws may prevent market abuse as well as assist regulators in
their efforts to detect, investigate and prosecute market abuse.
Chapter 3
This chapter is an analysis of the issues in this dissertation from interviews conducted by the
author with senior personnel employed by securities regulators involved in the conduct of
investigations into possible market abuse. The impact of these changes to detection,
investigation and enforcement of cross border market abuse is considered further along with
the challenges faced by securities regulators in terms of their investigative methods and how
they have adapted to these challenges. This chapter also endeavours to analyse these
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responses in relation to whether it appears that such regulators detection and enforcement
methods are satisfactory in light of the complexity of the markets.
Chapter 4
This chapter builds on the analysis in chapter 3 from a review of publically available material
published by the principal securities regulators of Canada, UK, USA, Australia and Germany.
This chapter examines trends in the types of cross border market abuse cases that have
emerged over the ten years from 2004 until 2013. The chapter concludes by making some
recommendations about strategies which might possibly be adopted to improve the
prospects of regulators successfully meeting these challenges.
Chapter 5
Because of the key role the IOSCO now plays in the investigation and enforcement of cross
border market abuse, this chapter examines IOSCO in depth. It sets out how IOSCO rose in
prominence as a global network of securities regulators and how the IOSCO MMoU was
formed. The terms and conditions of the MMoU are considered together with how this MMoU
is being utilized by securities regulators in their investigations. This chapter also considers
how the MMoU is being utilized by IOSCO in its efforts to move towards global convergence
of securities regulation.
Chapter 6
Given the success of IOSCO, particularly with respect to the MMoU, this chapter considers
how IOSCO might build upon that success as well as possible challenges that may arise
with respect to the MMoU going forward. In addition this chapter suggests other ways in
which IOSCO could further assist in coordinating the activities of securities regulators in
terms of tackling cross border market abuse by way of specific policies that might be
developed.
In the absence of supranational global securities regulator, this chapter also reflects upon
how IOSCO might work to fill this gap and, in particular, what other roles it could play beyond
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the expansion of the MMoU and policy development. In particular, given its success with
respect to the MMoU, this chapter suggests other systems and tools which IOSCO could
possibly develop which could be used by securities regulators in their efforts to detect,
investigate and prosecute market abuse. Finally, this chapter also considers whether, if such
systems could be developed, they could be used by IOSCO as a lever to work towards the
convergence of securities regulation around the world.
In the conclusion I reflect upon the findings that flow from the previous chapters. This
analysis reveals that the changes in the markets over the last decade do appear to have
given rise to new avenues to engage in cross border market abuse. Securities regulators are
detecting more complex instances of cross border market abuse and have taken some steps
to address this issue. It will be argued that there is more that can be done to confront this
issue. As such I conclude this dissertation by making suggestions about how this might best
be achieved.

14

CHAPTER 1

THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKING ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST MARKET ABUSE

Economic theory suggests that financial markets play a prominent role in the efficient allocation of
capital resources and constitute the steam-engine of economic growth in the modern world. They
are also, more than ever before, a very significant mechanism in the distribution of wealth
between different social classes and countries. In this capacity, financial markets have acquired,
for some commentators, the (often undesired by its actors) status of a social institution. The
orderly operation of any social institution entails not only that it functions legally and all those
involved with it uphold the law and engage in lawful practices, but also that it is vested with a
certain degree of legitimacy. The occurrence of market abuse make financial markets look like a
‗crooked crap game‘, diminishing their legitimacy and harming, in the process, the way investment
is channelled to productive uses on an international scale.
E Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse, A Legal and Economic Analysis

20

The following chapters consider how securities markets have changed over the last few
decades and what has been the impact of these changes on the nature of market abuse that
is now occurring in these markets. The response of securities regulators, in terms of how it is
now detecting, investigating and prosecuting market abuse, is also considered. However the
importance of such an examination is premised upon the basis that it is necessary for
regulators to eliminate, or at the very least, reduce market abuse by deterring market
participants from engaging in market abuse, ensuring that the markets are monitored for
market abuse and taking enforcement action against market abuse that is detected. This
chapter examines this underlying foundation, namely, why protecting markets from market
abuse is important and why taking enforcement action against detected instances of market
abuse is necessary.
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Avgouleas, supra note 8 at 4-5.
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As will be explored in this chapter, the main rationale for eliminating market abuse is that it is
necessary to preserve the integrity of the markets. However this in turn raises the issue of
what is exactly is market integrity and why is it important. This issue, namely what is market
integrity, will also be considered in this chapter. Market integrity lies at the very foundation of
securities regulation. Securities regulations have been enacted in most countries with a view
to promoting and protecting the integrity of the securities markets. Securities regulators are
in turn charged with the responsibility for administering and enforcing these regulations.
Whilst securities regulations restrain the activities of individuals and enterprises such
regulations are believed to be in the public interest to protect the overall integrity of the
markets.
In examining these issues Part 1 of the chapter outlines the goals of securities regulators in
relation to promoting market integrity or market farness. These goals are described together
with an examination of the literature that seeks to define what is market integrity or market
fairness. This part then moves on to establish the link between market integrity and the
elimination of market abuse. Part 2 considers the rationale behind the prohibition of market
abuse practices such as insider trading and market manipulation. Part 3 analyses whether
merely outlawing market abuse is sufficient, or whether it is necessary that such laws be
enforced and, if so, whether public enforcement is more important than private enforcement.
Part 4 then looks at the difficulties of enforcement of market abuse for regulators, and starts
to consider how enforcing prohibitions against market abuse across borders may pose
particular challenges for securities regulators.
Part 1 Market Integrity and Market Abuse
What is Market Integrity?
Most securities regulators of developed capital markets assert that protecting the integrity of
the markets (or ‗market Integrity‘) is a key component of an effective capital market. Yet a
review of the literature shows that although this term is often used as an important
component of a capital market, its actual meaning appears to be somewhat fluid. The Oxford
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dictionary defines ―integrity‖ as ―honesty‖ or ―soundness‖. In terms of capital markets and
what is required to protect the soundness of those markets, the concept of ‗market integrity‘
seems to have acquired a meaning that ranges along a spectrum. This extends from the
mere elimination of identified dishonest practices in the market at one end to ensuring the
market is fair for all participants at the other. Furthermore, arriving at a fixed definition is
made more complex by the fact that another key goal of securities regulators, that is, the
goal of ‗investor protection‘, may be a stand-alone objective, or may form part of what is
required to protect market integrity.
Despite the fluidity of this term, most securities regulators, either expressly or implicitly, have
the protection of the integrity of the capital markets as one of their key objectives. However
not all refer specifically to ‗market integrity‘ as the goal. Instead their objectives are often
framed as maintaining market fairness or maintaining market confidence, or these objectives
are somehow combined.
For example, in the United States the emphasis is on the protection of market ‗fairness‘. The
Securities and Exchange Commission‘s (SEC) stated mission is ―to protect investors,
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.‖21 The Securities
Act22 and the Securities Exchange Act23 (Exchange Act) form the framework for regulation of
markets in that country. The Securities Act provides that the SEC, in exercising its powers
under that Act, should consider ―in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action
will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.‖24 The Exchange Act sets out the
reasons for the legislation, including that:
transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-thecounter markets are affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide
for regulation and control of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto,
21

Securities and Exchange Commission, ―The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation‖, online: Securities and Exchange Commission
<http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml>.
22
Securities Act, 15 USC § 77 (1933).
23
Securities Exchange Act, 15 USC§ 78 (1934).
24
Securities Act, 15 USC § 77b at (b) (1933).
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including transactions by officers, directors, and principal security holders, to require appropriate
reports, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanisms of a national market system for
securities and a national system for the clearance and settlement of securities transactions and
the safeguarding of securities and funds related thereto, and to impose requirements necessary
to make such regulation and control reasonably complete and effective, in order to protect
interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect and make more
effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve System, and to insure the
maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions.

25

[Emphasis added]

The Securities Act and the Exchange Act were first introduced as a response to the stock
market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed. Congress had two key
concerns necessitating the need for this legislation. First, investors had been cheated
because of market abuse, namely, widespread manipulation of stocks in the markets. 26
Second, the Great Depression had been exacerbated by a lack of investor confidence in
returning to the markets after the stock market crash, hindering the capacity of corporations
to raise capital.27
Similarly, regulators in Canada do not specifically have the preservation of market integrity
as a required objective. Rather, the emphasis in Canada is on fostering market ‗fairness‘.
For example, in Ontario, the purposes of the Ontario Securities Act28 are:
(a) to provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices; and
(b) to foster fair and efficient capital markets and confidence in capital markets.

29

The Ontario Securities Commission, which administers and enforces this Act, is directed in
the Act as to how to achieve the purposes of the Act. It is directed to set requirements for
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Securities Exchange Act, 15 USC§ 78b.
The House Report accompanying the Securities Act of 1933 examined the decade after World War I and
concluded: ―Fully half or $25,000,000 worth of securities floated during this period have been proved to be
worthless. These cold figures spell tragedy in the lives of thousands of individuals who invested their life
savings, accumulated after years of effort, in these worthless securities.‖ H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1 st Sess.
2 (1933) as quoted in John C Coffee Jr & Hilary A. Sale, Securities Regulation Cases and Materials, 11th ed.
(New York: Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press 2011) at 2.
27
Ibid.
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Ontario Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S.5.
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Ibid at s 1.
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timely, accurate and efficient disclosure of information, to restrict fraudulent and unfair
market practices and procedures and to set requirements for the maintenance of high
standards of fitness and business conduct in order to ensure honest and responsible
conduct by market participants.30
The objectives of the securities regulator for the United Kingdom, the Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA), also do not specifically include the protection of market integrity. Rather, the
Act that it administers and enforces requires it to work towards maintaining confidence in the
UK financial system, protecting consumers and reducing financial crime. 31 However, the
United Kingdom has incorporated the Market Abuse Directives (MAD) of the European
Parliament and Council32 within in its legislation. The first MAD set out a framework whereby
each country in the European Union was required to legislate to prohibit market abuse,
encompassing insider trading, market manipulation and front running. It also made specific
reference to market integrity, and linked this to the elimination of market abuse and market
confidence. The preamble of the MAD provided that:
An integrated and efficient financial market requires market integrity. The smooth functioning of
securities markets and public confidence in markets are prerequisites for economic growth and
wealth. Market abuse harms the integrity of financial markets and public confidence in securities
and derivatives.

33

Further on in the preamble, however, the MAD indicated that market integrity and enhancing
investor confidence are separate goals, although the elimination of market abuse is relevant
to both:
Market abuse consists of insider dealing and market manipulation. The objective of legislation
against insider dealing is the same as that of legislation against market manipulation: to ensure
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Ibid at s 2.1.
Financial Services and Markets Act (UK), 2000, c 8, ss 3-6.
32
MAD, supra note 12.
33
Ibid at (2).
31
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the integrity of Community financial markets and to enhance investor confidence in those
markets.

34

The stated objectives of Germany‘s securities regulator, BaFin, more closely follow this
directive. BaFin frames its objective as ―to ensure the transparency and integrity of the
financial market and the protection of investors.‖

35

Specifically, the Act that BaFin

administers and enforces gives BaFin wide powers. This includes the power to issue orders
that are appropriate and necessary to eliminate or prevent undesirable developments that
may be detrimental to the stability of financial markets or undermine confidence in the proper
functioning of financial markets.36
The principles promulgated by IOSCO in its key policy statement, the Objectives and
Principles of Securities Regulation, also only mentions market fairness. The principles are:


The protection of investors;



Ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent;



The reduction of systemic risk.

37

IOSCO sees fairness and investor protection as separate goals, although fairness is linked
to investor protection by the elimination of market abuse. In 2011, the IOSCO Technical
Committee defined ―market integrity‖ as ―the extent to which a market operates in a manner
that is, and is perceived to be, fair and orderly and where effective rules are in place and
enforced by regulators so that confidence and participation in the market is fostered‖. 38
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Ibid at (12).
BaFin, ―Securities Supervision‖, online: BaFin
<http://www.bafin.de/EN/BaFin/FunctionsHistory/SecuritiesSupervisionAssetManagement/securitiessupervisio
nassetmanagement_node.html>.
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Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHG, Securities Trading Act], 9 September 1998 (Federal Law Gazette I, p
2708), as amended by Article 3 of the Act of 22 June 2011 (Federal Law Gazette I, p 1126) at s 4, online:
<http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Aufsichtsrecht/EN/Gesetz/wphg_101119_en.html>.
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See IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (June 2010), online: IOSCO
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difficulties in deciding on a regulatory solution; see Chester S Spatt, ―Regulatory Conflict: Market Integrity vs.
Financial Stability‖ (2009-2010) 71 U Pitt L Rev 625.
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IOSCO Technical Committee, ―Regulatory Issues Raised by the Impact of Technological Changes on Market
Integrity and Efficiency‖, Final Report, (October 2011), online: IOSCO
<http://iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD361.pdf> at 9.
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IOSCO seems to view fairness as a broad concept, incorporating not only the elimination of
dishonest practices but also encompassing a need to promote equal access to markets:
The regulator‘s approval of exchange and trading system operators and of trading rules helps to
ensure fair markets.
The fairness of the markets is closely linked to investor protection and, in particular, to the
prevention of improper trading practices. Market structures should not unduly favor some market
users over others. Regulation should detect, deter and penalize market manipulation and other
unfair trading practices.
Regulation should aim to ensure that investors are given fair access to market facilities and
market or price information. Regulation should also promote market practices that ensure fair
treatment of orders and a price formation process that is reliable.

39

Market Integrity, Market Confidence and Market Fairness
As the above review demonstrates, there is little in the objectives of securities regulators
which consistently delineates the meaning of market integrity, market confidence and market
fairness, or how and if they are linked. This is probably deliberate to enable regulators the
flexibility to tackle new problems that may arise. This flexibility enables them to justify that
these problems fall within their domain, allowing them to take action.
It may also be that these three concepts, protecting market integrity, market confidence and
ensuring that the market is fair, are just normative goals of securities regulators and there is
no real distinction between them. Certainly it seems that in practice that these concepts
would be closely linked and there may be no need to delineate them when a regulator or a
legislature considers how these concepts should be reflected in the laws and practices
applicable to a particular market. All three concepts would seem to require the elimination of
market abuse, such as market manipulation and insider trading. Market fairness is, perhaps,
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IOSCO ―Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation‖ (May 2003), online: IOSCO <
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf > at 6.
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the broadest concept and may require, in addition to the elimination of these practices, the
promotion of disclosure, transparency and equal access to markets.
There also appears to be no precision in the literature as to what is encompassed within the
concept of ‗market integrity‘. Finance academics tend to refer primarily to the concept of
market integrity, rather than fairness, although market integrity is rarely defined or given a
precise definition.40 However conceptually it is linked with efficiency, in that a market of high
integrity should also be efficient because prices will reflect their fundamental value. To
finance scholars, the influence of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) leads to ―a prediction that, in a[n] ‗informationally
efficient‘ market, prices will reflect as closely as possible the asset‘s ‗fundamental value‘.‖ 41 If
prices reflect an asset‘s fundamental value, this will result in the most efficient allocation of
capital, as investors will pay no more for securities than their inherent value. As such, market
integrity seems to mean eliminating practices that may interfere with the ability of prices to
reflect the asset‘s fundamental value. If all material information in relation to a security has
been publically disclosed, prices should reflect the asset‘s fundamental value incorporating
all this information.
Using CAPM and ECMH, finance academics construct ‗event‘ studies, the difference
between the price of a security that has been the subject of an abnormal occurrence and
what it would have been without such an event.42 For example, as insider dealing is illegal, in
theory prices before significant announcements should reflect their fundamental value
incorporating all publically available information. After the announcement, the prices should
almost immediately reflect their fundamental value incorporating this new information. If price
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One exception is Utpal Bhattacharya, Hazem Daouk, Brian Jorgenson and Carl-Heinrich Kehr, who, writing
in the Journal of Financial Economics in 2000, gave the definition of market integrity as ―the disadvantages
outsiders face vis-a-vis insiders when trading in the market. We expect that market integrity changes over time.‖
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event is not an event: the curious case of an emerging market‖ (2000) 55(1) J Fin Econ 69 at 72, n 4.
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movements are ‗abnormal‘ before significant announcements, this may be an indication of
insider trading.
However, there is another body of literature, developed primarily in the legal discipline, which
appears more concerned with the normative concept of ‗fairness‘, independent of any issues
of economic efficiency. The argument is that fairness is a necessary component of the
capital market, either morally, or based on the concept that fairness is necessary for an
effective market:
[M]arkets contain an internal morality, which both supplies the normative justification for market
transactions and suggests that a successful market will be characterized by fair ground rules.
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As such, perhaps there is a distinction between market integrity and market fairness, if
'market integrity‘ means the elimination of practices which interfere with the accuracy of the
prices of securities and market fairness is the set of rules of a market which reflect what is
culturally acceptable. The practical impact of the difference is that it may dictate whether or
not certain practices should be prohibited. If our only concern is whether the markets are
‗fair‘ for participants and that the laws and procedures reflect this as a norm, it does not
matter whether or not these laws and procedures make the market more efficient. However,
if we are concerned with market integrity, in the sense that prices in the market fully reflect
information and thereby contribute to efficient capital markets, then the whole issue of the
impact of certain laws and procedures on market efficiency does become a concern.
Part 2 The Rationale behind Prohibiting Insider Trading and Market Manipulation
Notwithstanding whether a narrow definition of market integrity suggested by the finance
literature is adopted, or a broader definition suggested by the legal literature is adopted,
there is a strong case to eliminate market manipulation in the interests of maintaining the
normative concept of fairness in the markets, as well as ensuring prices reflect their
fundamental value. In relation to insider trading, the case is less clear, however, it would
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seem now that the preponderance of the literature supports the proposition that insider
trading damages the fairness of the markets as well as its efficiency.
Market Manipulation
The regulation of market manipulation and the rationale for why it is prohibited is not
controversial. Clearly manipulation, such as making false statements or engaging in fictitious
trades, are normatively ‗unfair‘ as they mislead market participants as to the genuine forces
of supply and demand. Nor does market manipulation contribute to efficient capital markets
as these practices interfere with proper price formation of securities, which can result in
inefficient allocation of resources.44 Losses incurred by investors from market manipulation
are also relatively easy to determine.45 Furthermore from a cost/benefit standpoint, public
regulation of market manipulation can be supported because, absent perhaps serious
violations, it is usually not feasible for the victims of market manipulation to take private
action due to the difficulties and costs involved in the detection and enforcement of such
securities violations.46
The main area of controversy seems to be in relation to how market manipulation should be
defined and, accordingly, the breath of the prohibition. 47 Should it, for example, extend
beyond fictitious trades to actual trades where the trade was made with manipulative intent?
Insider Trading
However, the debate is less clear in relation to insider trading and whether it should be
prohibited. Some argue that insider trading operates against market efficiency and should
not be prohibited. This debate has been captured succinctly by Lawrence Ausubel:
The classic law-and-economics view on insider trading can be briefly summarized as follows.
Insider trading is banned today out of considerations of fairness. In an unregulated environment,
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insiders might be able to earn trading profits by utilizing information that outsiders cannot legally
obtain. Out of some sentimental attachment to fairness, we enact insider trading regulations in
order to level the securities market playing field, so that all traders have relatively equal access to
information. Unfortunately, considerations of economic efficiency work in the opposite direction as
those of fairness. First, if insiders are permitted to trade freely on their private information, then
information becomes more rapidly reflected in securities prices. Insider trading thus contributes to
efficient markets and so to allocational efficiency, as proper capital-asset pricing leads to the
optimal allocation of capital resources.

48

Most of the arguments in favour of allowing insider trading can be traced back to Henry
Manne‘s seminal writings in 1966.49 Since that time, these theories, sometimes referred to
as ‗Coasian theories‘,50 have developed such that those law and economics scholars who
argue against regulating insider trading can be divided into two categories:
Law and economics theories about insider trading fall into two main categories: agency theories
and market theories of insider trading. Agency theories of insider trading analyse its effect on the
classic corporate agency problem, the manager-shareholder conflict of interest. These theories
consider whether insider trading ameliorates or worsens this conflict, and therefore whether it
increases or reduces firm-level efficiency. In contrast, market theories of insider trading address its
broader ramifications for market efficiency.

51

The basic premise of the agency theories is that insider trading could act as an efficient
compensation mechanism for managers.
In their view, relying on capital and product markets to properly incentivize managers is insufficient
because these managers work imperfectly, making it relatively difficult to remove poor performing
managers. Ex ante compensation contracts are inadequate because they would require costly
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―periodic renegotiations ex post based on (imperfectly) observed effort and output....‖ In contrast,
insider trading enables managers continually to update their compensation in light of new
information without incurring renegotiation costs. Insider trading thus increases manager‘s
incentives by linking their ―fortunes more closely to those of the firm‖.

52

Yet, critics of the agency theories disagree. Such critics point out that current compensation
mechanisms, whilst by no means perfect, are superior to compensation based upon insider
trading which would distort the motivations of managers to the detriment of shareholders and
the market. Allowing insider trading by managers could motivate mangers to manipulate the
firm‘s disclosure practices to accommodate their own self-interest.53 In addition it would allow
managers to profit from good or bad news, so allowing insider trading would not solve the
agency problem, as the interests of the managers and the outside owners would not be
aligned.54 It is also doubtful that mutually advantageous contractual arrangements allowing
for insider trading could be made between managers and owners. This is because of the
difficulty of quantifying the costs and benefits of insider trading, the benefits of insider trading
to a manager being limited perhaps only by the personal wealth of the manager who could
use leverage and derivatives to amplify their profits. Furthermore, there are inherent
problems with requiring large numbers of (often passive) owners to constrain their
managers‘ insider trading successfully by way of contract alone.55
For those who argue that insider trading may be economically efficient (market theories), the
hypothesis is that if insider trading is allowed, prices will be more accurate, in the sense that
they will more quickly reflect information about a particular stock. This, in turn, improves
economic efficiency:
More accurate prices can increase the amount of value added by firms as they use society‘s
scarce resources for the production of goods and services. In a competitive economy, the increase
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in the value added will generally increase both the level of firm cash flow ... and returns to other
factors of production ... by improving the quality of [capital allocation across] investment projects in
the economy and by improving the operation of existing real assets.

56

Nevertheless some empirical evidence seems to show that, even when systematic insider
trading does occur prior to announcements, there is often still a significant change in the
stock‘s price after the announcement. This suggests that insider trading is an imperfect price
adjustment mechanism.57
However the main criticism levelled at market theories is that insider trading is not conducive
to efficient markets as, if outsiders expect that insiders will take advantage of them, outsiders
may choose to invest less or not at all. 58 As articulated by John Shad, a former Chairman of
the SEC, ―if people get the impression that they‘re playing against a marked deck, they‘re
simply not going to be willing to invest‖. 59 An extension of this argument is that insider
trading increases transaction costs and reduces liquidity as investors demand compensation
for the risk of possibly trading with an insider.60
Up until recently those who argued that insider trading should not be prohibited could also
point to the fact that there was no empirical evidence which showed that insider trading was
actually harmful to efficient markets. Certainly individual instances of insider trading are
difficult to detect within a market and, at a theoretical level, Manne argued that persons
trading with insider traders do not suffer any harm. 61 However recent empirical work
suggests that more stringent insider trading laws are economically efficient.62 For example, a
study undertaken by Laura Beny found that countries with such laws were associated with
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greater stock price accuracy, suggesting a more efficient market. 63 Beny also found that
such countries also demonstrated greater stock market liquidity.64 Like stock price accuracy,
a more liquid market points to a more efficient market. A more liquid market has relatively
low trading costs and this can reduce the cost of capital, resulting in more efficient capital
allocation in the economy.65 Beny postulated that her study cast doubt on the premise that
insider trading prohibitions harmed market efficiency.66
Regardless of economic efficiency arguments others argue that insider trading should be
banned because it is unfair. This argument is cast on a number of different premises. One is
linked to economic efficiency, being that insider trading harms contemporaneous traders and
thereby undermines investor confidence. This then results in a reduction in trading. Another
comes from the law of fraud and rejects the need to ground the argument in economic
theory.67 This ‗fraud‘ argument states that insider trading is a form of deception undermining
the ability of investors to make an informed choice as to their investments. Linked to this is
that insider trading usually results in a gain for the trader from improperly obtained
information. Studler and Orrs argue that:
economic analysis is not the best approach to understanding insider trading because the core
controversies in this area of law are really about ethics not economics. The hard problems in
insider trading law are paradigmatically moral, such as whether nondisclosure of material nonpublic information deprives a participant in a public securities market of the ability to make an
autonomous choice, or whether an insider securities trader uses information that is stolen,
converted to an improper use, or otherwise morally tainted.
We do not say that economics is unimportant. On the contrary, ethics and economics seem
strongly linked in securities regulation. Before arguing about economic costs and benefits,
however, we maintain that a threshold issue should be addressed: whether the acts proscribed as
insider trading are morally wrong. Even if economic arguments conclusively favored unfettered
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insider trading, moral arguments would potentially give an independent reason for prohibiting
insider trading to "satisfy such noneconomic goals as fairness, just rewards, and integrity."

68

Studler and Orrs believe insider trading should be prohibited because, like fraud or
misleading conduct, it interferes with a person's autonomous decision-making and is unfair
unless the person who has the information is protecting their legitimate property rights.69
More recently Ian Lee took this a step further by arguing that a successful market, to be
Pareto efficient, must be governed by rules that are fair, and that such rules must preserve
the voluntariness of the market respecting individual preferences and individual choice. As
such, he draws from the work of Studler and Orrs that the autonomy of the parties must be
respected and that exploiting ―a party‘s informational disadvantage is inconsistent with
respect for his or her autonomy‖.70
Critics of unfairness as a justification for insider trading laws believe that it is too vague a
concept to ground market rules because of the variety of practices in financial markets:
[J]ustifying the prohibition of insider dealing on grounds of mortality and fairness has given rise to
a perpetual struggle to formulate a comprehensive and workable approach to insider dealing
regulation that will withstand the scrutiny of economic analysis and not ignore the reality of
modern day financial markets.
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In addition, in the most jurisdictions, such as the US and Canada, the laws are structured so
that only certain persons, not everyone, is prohibited from trading whilst in possession of
insider information. For example in Ontario only persons who are in some form of special
relationship with the issuer of the securities, or the source of the information is from
someone who is in a special relationship and the person knew of the special relationship, are
prohibited from trading. 72 In the US only persons who have information sourced from
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someone who breached a fiduciary duty or misappropriated information are prohibited from
trading.73 If insider trading is unfair because it harms market participants, reduces investor
confidence or reduces investor choice, surely all those with insider information should be
prohibited from trading, regardless of whether or not they are under some type of duty or
occupy a special position that allowed them access to the information? Furthermore, critics
of the unfairness justification point to the fact that there will always be informational
imbalances depending upon factors such as the wealth, education or knowledge of the
market participant leading them to divergent investment choices.74 However, in answer to
this latter proposition, advocates of insider trading regulation state that this confuses
inequality with differences in investment preferences based on the extent of examination by
the participant of available public information.75
Notwithstanding the debate in the literature as to whether the prohibition against insider
trading can be justified on efficiency grounds, public opinion appears to be firmly behind the
fairness justification grounding its prohibition. Furthermore, the prohibition against insider
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trading, which started in the US in 1934, has now spread to most countries. 76 Utpal
Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk, who conducted a study of, inter alia, the spread of insider
trading regulation, state that ―it seems that a consensus has been achieved among
governments: insider trading laws are good for society‖77 and note:
Though the debate about the pros and cons of allowing insider trading in stock markets has been
quite contentious in the law, economics and finance literature, it seems that from the point of view
of actual practice, the debate seems to have been settled. In a comprehensive survey of insider
trading regulations in every country that had a stock market at the end of 1998, this paper finds
that all of the 22 developed countries and four out of five of the 81 emerging markets had insider
trading laws in their books.

78

The data Bhattacharya and Daouk used was collected in 1998. Given the work of bodies
such as the IMF and IOSCO in converging world securities regulation, and the adoption in
2003 of the Market Abuse Directives by the European Community, requiring all countries in
the EU to prohibit insider trading, insider trading regulation is even more widespread today.79
Part 3 Market Abuse – Is Enforcement Important?
The debate, it seems, has largely moved from whether market abuse should be prohibited to
the importance of enforcement of securities laws for the development of stock markets and,
if enforcement is important, whether public enforcement is more or less important than
private enforcement. Public enforcement:
is the disciplinary function of the regulatory system. Enforcement is an ex post tool used to punish
breaches of laws and regulations as well as to deter future wrongdoings. This means that there
are tangible consequences to noncompliance with regulation and violations of securities law.
Enforcement requires a regulator to investigate both regulated and unregulated entities, bring an
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enforcement action against a person who has violated the rules, and apply a penalty if the action
succeeds.

80

Public enforcement encompasses enforcement by securities regulators of securities laws
and stock market rules. This differs from private enforcement, which involves individuals or
corporations engaging in private litigation in relation to violations of securities laws.
The issue arose primarily because of the debate, referred to above, as to whether insider
trading laws detracted or contributed to efficient capital markets and the need for empirical
evidence. The debate as to the importance of public enforcement verses private
enforcement was energized because of empirical work undertaken by four finance
academics from Harvard University, namely, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,
Andre Shleifer and Robert Vishny (La Porta et al). This research led them to conclude that
private, not public, enforcement of securities laws is the key to the development of stock
markets. These conclusions caused the World Bank to make policy recommendations as to
which laws a country should emulate if a country wished to develop its stock markets.81
However, as discussed below, the findings of La Porta et al and the policy proposals made
as a result have been challenged by a number of academics. These academics champion
public enforcement as the key to strong financial markets.
Existence of Laws vs. Enforcement of Laws
One of the earliest studies on the impact of enforcement was undertaken in 2002 by Utpal
Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk. 82 Their study looked at the impact of enforcement of
insider trading laws in stock markets on the cost of capital. They considered 103 countries,
87 of which had insider trading laws. They found, however, that prosecutions had only taken
place in 38 of these countries. They concluded that the introduction of insider trading laws
80
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did not change the cost of capital. However after the first prosecution of insider trading laws
the cost of capital decreased significantly:
[T]he easy part – the establishment of insider trading laws – is not associated with a reduction in
the cost of equity. It is the difficult part – the enforcement of insider trading laws – that is
associated with a reduction in the cost of equity in a country.

83

This is consistent with other studies that suggest that it is not the existence of laws that is
important to financial market development, but credible enforcement.84
In relation to the first prosecution they hypothesize:
It is important to note that the first enforcement of a law, however perfunctory it might be, is an
event of paramount importance. The first prosecution signals to the world that we have gone from
a regime where there have been no prosecutions to a regime where there has been at least one
prosecution; this implies that the probability of future prosecutions has had a discrete jump up.

85

Interestingly Bhattacharya‘s study found that enforcement of insider trading laws is a
relatively recent phenomenon:
Insider trading laws existed in 87 countries, but enforcement, as evidenced by prosecutions, had
taken place in only 38 of them. Before 1990, the respective numbers were 34 and 9. This leads us
to conclude that the existence and the enforcement of insider trading laws in stock markets is a
phenomenon of the 1990s.
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One of the problems with Bhattacharya‘s study is that it only measures the first prosecution,
not how often the laws are used, and it also has no adjustment for the stringency of the
insider trading laws or penalties.87 This was answered to some extent by two later studies,
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one by Laura Beny and one by Arturo Bris, which seem to show that harsher laws results in
fewer instances of insider trading and will result in better stock market outcomes, including
more dispersed equity ownership, more informative stock prices and more liquid stock
prices. Beny‘s study in 2005 added to the analysis the stringency of insider trading laws,
and, in particular, whether insider trading was a criminal offence. She found that the first
prosecution (as measured by Bhattacharya) together with the strength of the insider trading
prohibition did matter to stock market development. She found that ―the possibility of
stringent sanctions (especially criminal sanctions), rather than the breath of the prohibition,
seems the pivotal feature of the insider trading prohibition‖ and that stronger sanctions were
associated with more dispersed equity ownership, more informative prices and more liquid
stock markets.88 A study by Bris in the same year also seemed to suggest that harsher laws
work better at reducing the incidence of insider trading. However this study, which measured
the incidence of abnormal price movements surrounding takeover announcements, also
suggested that tough insider trading laws could also result in an increase in the profitability
of insider trading. This is because fewer insider traders can mean more dramatic price
increases when the information is eventually made public.89
One difficulty with studies considering the importance of enforcement to the cost of capital is
that the issue of causality has not yet been conclusively proven, that is, whether
enforcement is the real reason behind the reduction of the costs of capital or it is just a
coincidence. This is because countries with strong enforcement of insider trading laws, such
as the US, may have better stock market outcomes based upon other reasons.
Studies of Capital Market Outcomes by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer
Since the mid-1990s, La Porta et al have been working on what they view as a gap in the
literature, namely, the use of statistical analysis to determine how differences in the laws of
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countries impact on corporate finance. For example, in 1998, La Porta et al, assisted by
Robert Vishny from the University of Chicago, undertook a study looking at the laws covering
the protection of shareholders and creditors in 49 countries.90 They compiled a data set of
laws and coded these with numbers. For example, a country scored a one if the law
prescribed that there was one vote for each share and zero otherwise. They then grouped
countries according to their legal origins.91 From their results they concluded that countries
with common law origins provide superior shareholder protection than countries with civil law
systems. As a result, they argued, companies with common law legal systems can access
external finance more easily and should grow more quickly to the benefit of the economy as
a whole.92
In 2006 La Porta et al conducted another study using a similar method to determine whether
public enforcement, disclosure laws and/or private enforcement benefited stock markets. 93
Again the study surveyed attorneys from 49 countries, including Canada, the UK, Australia,
USA and Germany, to establish a database of rules and regulations in relation to securities
laws.94 The study also encoded the laws with numbers. For example, a country scored a one
if the prospectus issued for a newly listed firm had to disclose the compensation of each of
the directors and key officers, a half if only the aggregate compensation of executives had to
be disclosed and a zero if there was no requirement to disclose such amounts. This method
was repeated with a number of elements in relation to disclosure standards in order to
produce what was called a ‗Disclosure Requirements Index‘. Laws in relation to the civil
liability of those associated with the prospectus were treated in the same way to develop a
‗Liability Standards Index‘. A ‗Public Enforcement Index‘ was also created in the same way,
coding laws in relation to the powers of the regulator in relation to misstatements in a
prospectus. Each of these indexes were compared with a number of elements indicating the
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strength of the particular stock market, including stock market capitalisation, ownership
concentration, the number of initial public offerings and the number of domestic firms.
The study concluded that there was little evidence that public enforcement benefited stock
markets, but there was strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating
private enforcement benefited stock markets.
One of the key problems with the study was that the Public Enforcement Index measured,
not how often the regulator brought enforcement proceedings, but only the existence of
public enforcement powers of the regulator. However the Bhattacharya study had provided
some evidence that it is not the existence of laws that is important, but whether they are
used by the regulator. This is presumably because unenforced laws can simply be ignored
and therefore effectively have no impact.95 This is one of the key reasons why La Porta et
al‘s findings, particularly in relation to the impact of public enforcement, have been
criticised.96
The study also suffers from some other problems namely:
1. The laws measured centred only around civil and criminal liability for a misleading
prospectus. It did not measure other important areas of securities regulation such
laws dealing with takeovers, continuous disclosure and market abuse. The impact of
public enforcement verses private enforcement for these other areas could,
therefore, be quite different.
2. It appears to be biased towards US laws and institutions. For example, a country
received a lower score for public enforcement if the country did not have separate
government agencies in charge of supervising banks and stock exchanges or if the
members of the regulator were unilaterally appointed by the executive. So on this

95

Bhattacharya, supra note 77.
See Howell E Jackson & Mark J Roe, supra note 81 at 210; Mathias M Siems, ―What Does Not Work in
Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et al.'s Methodology‖ (2005) 16(7) I.C.C.L.R. 300; John C
Coffee, ―Law and the Market; The Impact of Enforcement‖ (2007) 156 U Pa L Rev 268.
96

36
measurement the US scored a one, Australia scored .67 and the UK scored zero.97
However it is questionable as to whether just because a stock exchange regulator is
physically separate, rather than combined under a large umbrella organisation, it is
necessarily less responsive and accountable. Furthermore, the appointment of the
members of the Securities Exchange Commission in the US, the Financial Services
Authority in the UK and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission in
Australia have more to do with the constitutional arrangements of the particular
country than an attempt by Government to influence the regulator.
3. To make the study workable, La Porta‘s et al had to limit the number of laws coded
for the study. Therefore judgements were made as to which laws were the most
important and were to be measured. For example there is no measurement of the
liability for a misleading prospectus of the underwriter.
4. There are other problems with coding laws with numbers. Coding laws with numbers
fails to take account differences in how laws operate. It also attributes weightings that
may not be accurate. This was one of the main criticisms of the study by Mathias
Siems, discussed below.98
Attack on the Methodology of La Porta et al
Mathias Siems, a Professor from the University of East Anglia in the United Kingdom, was
one of the first academics to challenge the findings of La Porta et al. His primary criticism
was their methodology.99
Siems questioned the use of mathematical modelling for analysing countries‘ legal systems
which he views as too simplistic, at least the way it is used by La Porta et al. His reasoning is
that it is difficult to classify legal rules across countries as laws can operate quite differently:
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[T]he devil may be in the details. La Porta et al. did not pay enough attention to differences in the
micro-structure of the law, which are often of crucial importance. The question itself of whether in
the cases of a misleading prospectus there was a shift of the burden of proof of causality is
insufficient, because various details can mean that what appears to be the same rule works
completely differently.
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In relation to the measurement of public enforcement, Siems says:
[T]he complexity of public enforcement is also disregarded. In the La Porta et al. index, countries
get, for instance, a ―1‖ if directors can be held criminally liable when negligently unaware that the
prospectus is misleading. It is therefore, for example, not taken into account what kind of sanction
is imposed, although a very minor sanction probably does not justify a ―1‖. Moreover, there are,
once again, various general differences in criminal law and criminal procedure of the 49 countries.
These differences were most often not even mentioned in the reports of the local lawyers, because
the legal system of each country was usually only described within three to five pages.
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Siems believes that a proper analysis of comparative law must be based on, not the
existence of laws, but on their functionality, in that there may be different laws which achieve
a similar effect.102
Siems also argues that the La Porta et al study is flawed because the foundations of the
study, as well as the way the questions were framed, reflect a US approach to securities law.
For example, La Porta et al considers as an important factor in investor protection the
disclosure requirements of prospectuses. This reflects a fundamental principle of US
securities regulation which may not be universally accepted in all countries. Some other
countries may place a greater focus on merit regulations as an important tenet of investor
protection.103 For example China requires companies seeking a public listing meet specific
financial viability tests.104
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Siems argues that La Porta et al should not draw strong conclusions from their study given
the limitations he identifies. At best, Siems argues, the La Porta‘s et al study should only be
the basis for further research.105
Alternative Proxies for Public Enforcement
Howell E. Jackson and Mark J. Roe from Harvard Law School were also critical of the La
Porta et al study. 106 Like Siems, Jackson and Roe see the La Porta et al study as
problematic due to the difficulty in reliably classifying laws across countries and weighing the
importance of each law.107 However, Jackson and Roe find that the basic flaw with the study
is that it measured enforcement based upon the regulators‘ powers, rather than on the actual
use of those powers.108
Jackson and Roe point to the research into insider trading by Bhattacharya and Daouk,
which found that the key issue was whether a regulator used their powers, not the existence
of the powers. 109 At a theoretical level, Jackson and Roe question whether private
enforcement will prove superior to public enforcement, although both have their advantages
and disadvantages:
A public enforcement system is degraded because public actors have mixed and often weak
incentives to do their jobs well and because they often suffer from poor information of both
general market and specific firm conditions. But a private enforcement system is subject to
collective action and free rider effects among dispersed investors, to slow and inept judiciaries, to
lawyers‘ rent–seeking, and to the potential inability of private enforcement to visit severe
monetary penalties on wrongdoers. On the positive side, public enforcement could be run by
public–regarding policymakers and invoke sharp criminal, financial, and reputational penalties
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that deter egregious wrongdoing, while private enforcement actions could be brought by well–
informed actors with well–aligned incentives.

110

Jackson and Roe doubt whether private enforcement, as least as it is practiced in the United
States, will produce better stock market outcomes because of fundamental problems with
how private enforcement operates:
Private securities lawsuits in the United States (1) often provide meagre returns to wronged
plaintiffs, (2) usually do not visit their costs on the wrongdoing actors inside public firms, because
the wrongdoers can usually transfer the costs to others, and (3) often just transfer losses from
one innocent group shareholders to another innocent group, with large fees obtained by the
lawyers for both sides ... Private securities litigation via class actions to remedy the disabling
effects of shareholder dispersion often results in class action attorneys controlling the litigation in
ways that do not fully benefit dispersed shareholders. … And private enforcement cannot provide
a wholly or even largely self–sufficient system of securities regulation, as the transactions costs
of private remedies for even basic issues like insider trading stymie private enforcement from
being fully effective. Litigation–based forms of private enforcement can cover only certain kinds
of corporate wrongdoing. Indeed, the major securities reform statutes of the 1930s were enacted
to address these shortcomings of private enforcement ... and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), a public regulator, has played a major role in American securities markets
ever since.
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In response to the study by La Porta et al, Jackson and Roe conducted their own empirical
study using securities regulators‘ budgets and staffing levels as the proxies for enforcement
intensity. They replicated La Porta et al‘s regressions but substituted these resource based
measures for enforcement intensity instead of the index developed by La Porta et al.
Jackson and Roe found the same results for disclosure, (i.e. increased disclosure is present
in stronger markets) but found that public enforcement is overall as important as disclosure
for explaining financial market outcomes and more important than rules governing private
civil liability. They found that allocating more resources to public enforcement is positively
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associated with robust capital markets as measured by market capitalization, trading
volume, the number of domestic firms and the number of initial public offerings.112
Jackson and Roe recognised that perhaps a better measurement of enforcement intensity
would be enforcement outcomes, but did not pursue this due to the unavailability of the data
and problems of interpretation.113 For example, a low number of actions by a regulator may
be the result of the existence of a powerful regulator that deters persons from breaking the
law. In addition, outcomes may not capture, for example, informal discussions or settlements
that are not made public.114
Although Jackson and Roe find that public enforcement is co-related with stronger markets,
they do not reach any conclusion as to why this is the case. They suggest that it may be
because increased resources may enable a regulator to conduct market surveillance and
look for wrongdoing and other problems which may need rule-making fixes. Higher budgets
may also mean more resources for investigations making it easier for the agency to bring
enforcement actions and enabling it to seek large financial and criminal penalties. Those
penalties may also have a reputational impact resulting in additional financial costs for the
offender. In addition agencies with more resources engage more staff able to devise more
sophisticated and targeted regulatory rules. Higher budgets may also mean that more
informal enforcement through administrative guidance.115
One key problem with the Jackson study is causation. Just because higher resources for
securities regulators co-relate with better market outcomes this does not prove that one
causes the other. It may be that stronger financial markets increase the call for better
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resourced regulators and governments respond.116 However, as Jackson and Roe point out,
causation is also an issue with the study conducted by La Porta et al.117
Jackson and Roe caution against drawing policy recommendations from the results of their
study. Their aim seems to be to stop the La Porta et al‘s study forming the basis of policy:
The best evidence now available is that public enforcement is no less valuable for financial
market outcomes than private enforcement such as disclosure and, given the weak results for
private enforcement‘s liability measure, perhaps liability is less important. Hence, World Bank
units that promote private over public enforcement are making policy without empirical backup,
because the resource–based evidence is inconsistent with private enforcement being superior to
public enforcement for building good securities markets.
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Analysis by Coffee of the Jackson and Roe Study
Although Jackson and Roe caution against using their study as a basis for policy, other
academics have not been as reticent. In particular, Professor John Coffee from Columbia
University has taken these findings to contend that the intensity of public enforcement in the
United States is probably the reason the United States has the lowest cost of capital and the
reason non-U.S. firms exhibit a listing premium when they list on a US exchange.119
Coffee argues that policy makers take note of the importance of public enforcement as a
factor in stock market development:
...enforcement intensity affects the cost of capital. If this hypothesis is accepted, then it has
dramatic implications for securities regulators: their mission should not be simply to protect
investors, but to reduce the cost of capital and thereby enhance gross domestic product. The
literature on securities regulation has long underplayed this public regarding role, but non
investors as well as investors depend on the efficiency of securities regulation, as the costs of
underenforcement fall on the economy as a whole.
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Coffee conducted a review of comparative research on enforcement, considering both the La
Porta et al study and the findings of Jackson and Roe. Coffee is very critical of La Porta et
al. He is critical of their methodology in relation to which he states he ―could fill an entire
article‖.121
Coffee is also critical of La Porta et al using the existence of the powers of securities
regulators as the gauge of public enforcement rather than the use of those powers, and
describes La Porta et al‘s conclusion as to the relative unimportance of public enforcement
as ―breathtaking‖.122
Part of the reason, it seems, that Coffee advocates the results of the Jackson and Roe study
so strongly is because, since 1999, Coffee has postulated a theory he has called the
―bonding hypothesis‖. 123 In brief, this is that the reason non-U.S. firms exhibit a listing
premium when listing on a US exchange is that they reduce their agency costs, that is, the
prospect that management will not act in the best interests of shareholders. By subjecting
themselves to the SEC‘s higher disclosure standards and the greater prospect of
enforcement in the United States these non-US firms are received more positively by
investors. He argues that the Jackson and Roe results support this hypothesis.124
Cumming, Groh and Johan Study
Recently the findings of the Jackson and Roe study have been taken further by Professors
Cumming, Groh and Johan. They conducted an empirical analysis on fraud in the markets in
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Europe. They measured the level of detected fraud against resources of authorities
responsible for the supervision of the markets, the level of cooperation of these authorities
and the seriousness of the penalties prescribed for fraud. Cumming, Groh and Johan found
that the level of resources is associated with an increase in detected cases of fraud. They
also found that formalized cooperation agreements between supervisory authorities within a
country are associated with a decrease in fraud cases. They also found that an increase in
the minimum imprisonment is associated with a decrease in fraud cases.125
Is Public Enforcement Important to Stock Markets?
Despite some evidence that public enforcement is important, a number of questions remain.
It does seem that the impact of private enforcement on stock market development is
uncertain. Both Jackson and Roe and Coffee question whether private enforcement will
send the right signals to the markets, given that private enforcement often involves just a
transfer of wealth from existing shareholders to past shareholders with the persons who
were responsible for the loss, usually the directors, having a limited role in the proceedings.
Furthermore, given the criticisms of the study by La Porta et al, their conclusion as to the
importance of private enforcement on stock market development must be open to doubt.
However, although it seems that public enforcement is important to stock market
development, this issue is not yet settled. At a theoretical level, it can be argued that this
should be the case, as the fact that a securities regulator does not enforce the laws should
impinge upon investor confidence, investors being wary of investing in a market that is not
fair for all participants and where investors may lose their investment to unscrupulous
operators. A reduction in the number of investors in a particular market should then result in
an increase in the cost of capital in that particular market. The empirical evidence done by
Jackson and Roe does support this hypothesis showing that public enforcement co-relates
with stronger stock markets.
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However, the issue of causality remains unresolved and requires further research. It may be
that the only reason why public enforcement is so intense in some countries such as the
United States is because of the high number of retail investors in the United States
compared to other countries. With the rise of retail investors and ownership of companies
becoming more dispersed, this creates a political demand for investor protection through
increased enforcement efforts, and governments may respond accordingly. 126 Another
reason why the cost of capital may be lower in some countries may be to do with the
effectiveness of a country‘s legal institutions and/or the countries‘ securities regulation
mandating and enforcing disclosure obligations. 127 Robert Prentice suggests yet another
reason why the US may have the lowest cost of capital. He suggests the reason is because
the United States has the largest most liquid markets in the world, with the largest number of
investors.128 The US dollar is also the most dominant currency in the world and the one in
which many governments hold their foreign reserves. This may also contribute to the
strength of the US markets. If, as has been suggested129, the US dollar declines as the
world‘s dominant currency, this may result in the decline in the strength of US markets.
What is the Optimum mix of Public Enforcement Options?
Furthermore, if public enforcement intensity is important, the optimum level of public
enforcement has not been established. Nor it been established what the optimum mix is
between public enforcement remedies which may be available to securities regulators, such
126
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as criminal, civil and administrative remedies. Public enforcement of securities laws,
particularly criminal prosecutions, are very expensive for the regulator and, to date, no
empirical research has been conducted on the relative costs and benefits of enforcement
intensity. In particular, the high intensity of criminal prosecutions in the United States may
not be necessary to obtain the lowest cost of capital. Perhaps, the same results could be
achieved by lower enforcement intensity or a different mix of criminal prosecutions and
regulatory procedures at a lower cost.
The optimum level of public enforcement has been one of the main criticisms of Coffee‘s
conclusions. Coffee has come under particular attack from Ellis Ferran, an academic from
the University of Cambridge, who takes issue with Coffee‘s criticism of the Financial
Services Authority‘s (FSA) (the predecessor of the FCA) cooperative approach to its role in
the markets, consistent with the FSA‘s then principles-based approached to financial
regulation.130
Coffee was critical of the approach of the FSA which does not often pursue formal sanctions:
Some regulators may advise, request, and even admonish, but are slow to punish. Others may
believe that punitive fines generate a desirable general deterrent effect, and that the greater
danger lies in using overly mild penalties that can be easily absorbed as a cost of doing business.
In this regard, the FSA and the SEC appear to be located at opposite ends of the continuum.
Indeed, both agencies publicly proclaim as much. In 2006, the FSA's then-chairman said that his
agency was "emphatically not an enforcement-led regulator." In contrast, it is a virtual truism to
portray the SEC as primarily an enforcement agency. Yet ironically, the FSA has considerably
more formal authority over the London Stock Exchange than the SEC has over U.S. exchanges;
indeed, the FSA even possesses authority to determine the listing rules of the London Stock
Exchange, while the SEC faces severe constraints on its ability to amend stock exchange rules.
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Although the FSA has more than ample legal authority, it is reluctant to use it and strives to
employ other means of influence in preference to enforcement actions.

131

Ferran, however, believes that Coffee has not established a sufficient basis for the UK
abandoning its approach to regulation, which focuses more on ex ante compliancepromoting strategies than ex post sanctions. Ferran points out that if the UK‘s strategy of
promoting ex ante compliance is working, there will be a less of a need for it to engage in
formal ex post enforcement. 132 Ferran is also critical of Coffee‘s measurements of
enforcement:
The article tends mainly to use the term ‗enforcement‘ in the rather narrow traditional sense of
formal sanctions imposed via legal processes rather than in the broader sense now often used in
regulatory contexts to embrace a wide range of strategies from persuasion to criminal penalties
and licence revocations that countries use to promote compliance.
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Ferran believes that a more inclusive definition of enforcement would show that the FSA was
more successful:
A point that is not fully developed in the Coffee article is that the interplay between different types
of formal enforcement (criminal prosecutions, administrative sanctions under the market abuse
regime administered by the FSA, and FSA sanctions for breach of rules and/or principles applying
to the regulated community) is important in this context. When the full range of sanctions that can
be applied to market misconduct is examined, the number of successful cases is revealed to be
larger than that mentioned by Coffee in the article.
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Ferran is also critical of Coffee‘s supporting data and points to the fact that there is a listing
premium on the London Alternative Investment Market (AIM), despite the fact that it is
supervised by the FSA:
The Coffee thesis relies heavily on the availability of valuation premiums for foreign firms that list
in the US. However, the supporting data cited by Professor Coffee has been questioned. In
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particular, the US Committee on Capital Markets Regulation has recently identified a number of
significant concerns with a key study by Doidge et al cited in the Coffee article (Committee on
Capital Markets Regulation). The concerns are:
o First, if there really is a listing premium, the decline in the number of foreign companies seeking
a US listing indicates that it is also the case that increasingly few foreign companies are finding
it appealing.
o Second, the presence of a premium could indicate some real benefit from listing in the US, but it
could also reflect market segmentation.
o Third, there may be a significant self-selection problem because better companies cross-list in
New York – properly controlled for such self-selection, the NYSE premium drops to 8% versus
5% in the over-the-counter market.
o Fourth, even higher listing premiums are available on other markets— Doidge et al‘s‘ own data
shows a 27% premium on AIM in 2005.
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However, despite Ferran‘s criticism of Coffee and his data, Ferran‘s main issue seems not to
be whether formal enforcement is necessary, but the level of intensity of formal enforcement.
She admits that formal sanctions and enforcement are an important part of a credible
regulator and that perhaps the UK has not yet reached the correct balance:
Maintaining confidence in the financial system and reducing financial crime are fundamental,
symbiotically related, regulatory objectives. It is thus crucial from a public interest perspective for
the FSA to prioritize market cleanliness and to accommodate within its measured risk-based
approach to the imposition of penalties or other formal sanctions a credible commitment to
cracking down on insider dealing and other forms of deliberate misconduct. Although a risk-based
approach implies that some instances of even deliberate wrongdoing may not be prioritized
because they are too low-level to have strategic repercussions, this has to be balanced against
the danger that tolerance could lead to some forms of malpractice becoming so widespread that
its cumulative effect is strategically dangerous.
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To this extent Ferran acknowledged that the FSA‘s own research seems to show that it
needs to do more to address the issue of insider trading in its market.137 The FSA, and now
its successor the FCA, seem to have also taken this view and has, since 2010, ratcheted up
its criminal enforcement efforts in relation to market abuse.138
Enforcement Techniques may be Complementary
Whether or not regulators adopt a persuasive compliance based approach to enforcement or
a more stringent ex post sanctions approach, investing substantial resources in enforcement
may have a significant and even a compounding effect of deterring breaches of securities
laws particularly if regulators adopt a range of enforcement strategies and each part
complements the others.
Jackson & Howe did not attempt to identify which part of an investment in public
enforcement was important to financial market outcomes but suggested that high
enforcement budgets allowed more sophisticated market surveillance, resulting in better
detection of securities violations and well-resourced investigations give the potential for
severe sanctions. In addition Jackson and Howe suggested more resources would facilitate
more targeted rules. 139 Perhaps each of these components in a regulators enforcement
strategy are complementary to each other and compounds impact of enforcement on
financial market outcomes.
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Although there is limited evidence to support the complementary effect of enforcement, in
theory at least such a result seems likely. This is due to the fact that better detection through
market surveillance could result in better targeted rules addressing particular problem areas
and also targeted monitoring of particular market participants known to be likely to breach
the rules. In addition possible perpetrators of securities offences may become aware of
increased enforcement efforts of securities regulators, thereby increasing the perception by
such potential perpetrators that they will be caught. This could act to deter such perpetrators
as the potential costs of being caught outweigh the potential benefits. Aitken, Cumming and
Zhan have shown that more detailed trading rules and increased surveillance seems to
reduce the incidence of insider trading and market manipulation, even though the
participants are not aware of the extent of that surveillance. However they also found that
profits from such market abuse seem to increase, suggesting that perpetrators only engage
in market abuse if the profits are substantial, outweighing the costs of detection. 140
In addition increasing enforcement through better detection, higher sanctions and targeted
rules may lead to financial institutions, perhaps fearing the high reputational costs
associated with being associated with securities offences, to increase resources in
compliance departments. Studies into reputational penalties associated with corporate crime
show that corporations pay substantial reputational penalties, over and above, penalties
imposed by regulators or courts.141 This flow on effect of increased internal monitoring from
compliance departments may also work to deter potential offenders within such firms from
engaging in breaches of securities rules.
Enforcement as a Part of a Regulatory Strategy
In sum, although the empirical evidence is not conclusive and there is a debate about the
necessary intensity of enforcement and mix of enforcement strategies, there does seem to
140
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be a general consensus that some level of public enforcement is important to reducing fraud
and maintaining robust stock markets and this should include prosecution and the imposition
of sanctions. If such sanction based enforcement is not part of a regulatory system there is
likely to be an erosion of credibility of the regulators and market confidence and the strength
of the market is likely to diminish. 142 Furthermore, and in recognition of this fact,
governments are increasingly committing to increasing enforcement as part of their
regulatory strategies. A 2009 report of a G-20 working group emphasised enforcement as a
key issue:
Achieving the objectives of the regulatory framework requires not only sound regulation but also
effective enforcement. No matter how sound the rules are for regulating the conduct of market
participants, if the system of enforcement is ineffective – or is perceived to be ineffective – the
ability of the system to achieve the desired outcome is undermined.
It is thus essential that participants are appropriately monitored, that offenders are vigorously
prosecuted and that adequate penalties are imposed when rules are broken. A regulatory
framework with strong monitoring, prosecution, and application of penalties provides the
incentives for firms to follow the rules. This, in the end, adds to the framework‘s credibility and
enhances investor confidence in the financial system.
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There are, of course, other parts of a regulatory system that can also have an impact in
reducing market abuse and thereby work towards improving market integrity. Supervision, or
ex ante methods of regulation, by securities regulators and self-regulatory organizations are
an important part of the framework of securities regulation and work towards education of
market participants and deterring securities law violations, including market abuse.144 Selfregulatory organizations also engage in ex post methods, taking action against market
participants who engage or enable others to engage in market abuse for breaches of market
conduct rules or conditions of licences to participate in the market. Usually, however, the
terms under which self-regulatory organisations operate require them to refer the more
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serious instances of market abuse to the regulators.145
Improved corporate governance systems may also contribute to a reduction of market
abuse. It was corporate governance failures during the 1990s in companies such as Enron
that created the opportunity for some to engage in instances of market manipulation and
insider trading. Stock market ‗bubbles‘ can also create an environment which can lead to
increased instances of market abuse, so efforts to ‗deflate‘ such bubbles may also lead to
reduced market abuse.146 Furthermore, improving mandatory disclosure by corporations and
increasing market transparency can lead to reduced opportunities to engage in market
manipulation and insider trading. However, the impact of all of these other strategies,
although they will be referred to in part, is generally outside the scope of this dissertation,
which is focused on formal sanctions based enforcement strategies of regulators against
market abuse and the challenges faced by such regulators.
Deterrence
Underlying the effectiveness of formal sanctions based enforcement strategies to address
market abuse is a presumption that they act as a general deterrent to others minded to
engage in such offences. Furthermore in order to ensure the maximum deterrent impact of
enforcement proceedings it is contended that a regulator needs to have a range of
enforcement remedies. Such remedies need to include harsh punishments to deter the most
heinous offences even if these severe remedies are not used frequently.147
Aiming for general deterrence by the imposition of an appropriate punishment is a long
established utilitarian norm of the criminal law. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada:
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General deterrence as an aim of sentencing in criminal law is well established: see R. v. M.
(C.A.), 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 56; R. v. Morrisey, [2000] 2
S.C.R. 90, 2000 SCC 39 (CanLII), at paras. 44 and 46. One of its earliest proponents was
Jeremy Bentham. In his view, where the same result cannot be achieved through other
modes of punishment and the net benefit to society outweighs the harm imposed on the
offender, a deterrent penalty should be imposed and tailored in order to discourage others
from committing the same offence. He assumes that citizens are rational actors, who will
adjust their conduct according to the disincentives of deterrent penalties …. Similarly, law
and economic theorists such as R. A. Posner view deterrent penalties as a kind of pricing
148

system…

The same rationale can be applied to enforcement action, that is that possible offenders, as
rational utility maximizers will undertake a cost benefit analysis - weighing up the probability
of detection, enforcement action and likely penalties against the possible gains to be
made.149
However the premise that punishment will deter those considering whether to commit an
offence, based upon the assumption that individuals are rational actors, has been the
subject of much criticism and scepticism. The effect of punishment is unpredictable150 and
may not be successful in changing the culture of organizations 151 Using sanctions as
deterrence may also be particular unsuited for some crimes such as those motivated by
social or psychological factors.
Nevertheless white collar crimes, such as market abuse, are typically committed by those
who do not come from deprived backgrounds, are not crimes of passion and are often
motivated by personal or organizational greed. As such it would seem that white collar crime
would more readily fit within the rational actor theory of deterrence and therefore should be
148
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more responsive to the deterrence effect of sanctions and enforcement than other areas of
illegal behaviour such as crimes of violence.
Unfortunately the empirical evidence that exists in relation to the ability of sanctions and
enforcement to deter white collar crime is somewhat equivocal. For example Braithwaite and
Makkai studied nursing home executives and found that little support for the deterrence
effect of increased sanctions and enforcement.152 Yet Klepper and Nagin studied the impact
of deterrence on non-compliance with taxation obligations and found that increased
sanctions did shift potential offenders toward compliance.153 In the antitrust area Simpson
and Koper found some evidence that increased enforcement and increased sanctions
inhibited recidivism. However they also found that the characteristics of the particular
industry were more important on the risk of reoffending than enforcement and sanctions.154
As is referred to above, Cumming, Groh and Johan found an increase in imprisonment was
associated with a reduction in fraud detected by those responsible for supervision of the
markets in Europe.155 A review of the literature indicates that there have been no specific
empirical studies in relation to the ability of sanctions and enforcement to deter market
abuse offences.
Nevertheless despite the absence of strong empirical evidence to prove the deterrent effect
of enforcement that does not necessarily mean that punishment and enforcement does not
have a deterrent effect. In fact the norm of punishment and enforcement to deter others from
committing crime is relied upon by the judiciary and the legislature in most countries to
design appropriate punishments which suggests that despite criticism levelled against the
norm of general deterrence it is still broadly accepted to be effective. In particular in relation
to white collar offences both courts and the legislatures emphasise the need to impose
harsher sanctions to deter others from committing similar offences, again based upon the
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theory that others are rational actors likely to take into account the severity of sanctions
imposed.156
Part 4 Difficulties for Regulators in Enforcing Laws Prohibiting Market Abuse
Public enforcement of securities laws by securities regulators, although usually a key part of
their mission, is often the most challenging part:
[R]egulators throughout the world face significant challenges in implementing credible and
effective enforcement programs. A combination of the need for extensive resources, strong
institutional and political support, and a supportive legal environment make enforcement a
particularly difficult challenge and has proven insurmountable in many jurisdictions.
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Market abuse, in particular, is difficult to detect, investigate and prosecute. Detection is
difficult because legitimate trades have to be sorted from insider trades or manipulative
trading. These offences are difficult to investigate as perpetrators may seek to disguise their
offence and may leave little in the way of a documentary evidence trail. There is usually no
victim to give evidence or report the crime. The regulator has to be able to establish that,
usually based solely upon circumstantial evidence, the trades were not made for legitimate
reasons. In relation to market manipulation, which involves trades made with ‗manipulative‘
intent, the regulator must also prove the state of mind of the accused.158 The trading is often
complex and/or takes place over a period of time adding to the difficulties of detection,
gathering evidence and satisfying the person charged with adjudicating the matter that the
offence occurred. For example, the practice commonly known as ‗painting the tape‘ involves
156
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traders engaging in a series of transactions to create an appearance of activity in a stock
with a view to inducing others to invest. As such, this practice can consist of multiple
transactions taking place over an extended period.159 This can add significant complexity to
any investigation and subsequent prosecution. Defendants are often well resourced and can
afford to invest in defence counsel who may make multiple appeals and/or engage in
collateral challenges to the regulators‘ actions, delaying and possibly thwarting an
investigation or prosecution.
Some of the other factors that can impact on the enforcement of market abuse offences by
securities regulators are:
1. Capacity
A key component of effective enforcement is regulators having the capacity, in particular
sufficient resources, to detect market abuse and then institute and progress enforcement
actions. Furthermore, regulators must be actively willing to take action in matters that
may be complex and costly to pursue.160
2. Technical skills
Tackling market abuse through formal enforcement is a specialised field requiring not
just investigatory and legal skills, but skills enabling investigators and lawyers to
understand the markets and trading. In addition, due to the complexity of market abuse
detection, investigations and prosecutions may require a substantial investment in
technology and specialized staff.161
3. Political or industry resistance/interference
Regulators need a clear and transparent mandate to bring enforcement action when
there are securities violations, and need the ability to conduct enforcement action without
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political interference.162 Persons who violate securities laws or who may be exposed to
prosecution may be persons of substantial wealth or influence. Such persons may seek
to influence the actions of the regulator or may attempt to weaken its resolve.
Accordingly, to withstand such pressures, regulators need to have a level of
independence and be able to pursue their mandate without the possibility of backlash.
4. Legal powers to investigate and bring action
Effective enforcement is contingent upon strong investigative powers. These may include
powers to obtain documents and testimony, powers to enter premises and search and
powers to intercept electronic communications. A lack of investigative powers will
weaken investigations, and may result in action either not being taken or being
unsuccessful. Unsuccessful investigations can weaken the role of the regulators and
embolden potential offenders.
Regulators need tools that will enable them to take quick action to either restrain funds or
detain within their jurisdiction possible offenders. Movement of funds or offenders
beyond a jurisdiction can also significantly lessen the impact of an enforcement action.
Regulators also need a range of enforcement penalties in their arsenal such that they
can seek an appropriate penalty for the offence. This may include lower level fines and
the ability to issue warnings for minor or technical violations, administrative penalties
through to the ability to seek significant jail terms for the worst types of offences.
Inappropriate penalties may not sufficiently deter other possible offenders.
5. Effective court system
Regulators need the support of an effective court system to pursue actions, including
administrative remedies. Such a system needs to support the regulator by being quick
for both interlocutory and final proceedings, as delay can reduce both the value of
evidence as well as the deterrent impact of enforcement action and can undermine the
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credibility of the regulator. The court system also has to be free from corruption and have
effective mechanisms to enforce judgments and penalties.163
Challenges may Increase when Securities Regulators tackle Cross Border Market
Abuse
Cross Border Market Abuse is market abuse that straddles jurisdictional boundaries. That is,
not all of the activity that constitutes the market abuse takes place within the jurisdiction of
one securities regulator. For example, the perpetrator or perpetrators could be situated in
one or more jurisdictions.
Taking enforcement action in relation to an offence where all of the activity did not take place
within one jurisdiction increases the challenges for regulators charged with taking such
action. For example, the laws of the jurisdiction have to be broad enough to cover situations
where offenders may not be within the jurisdiction. Evidence may have to be gathered from
other jurisdictions and so regulators may have to obtain the cooperation of foreign regulators
to obtain this evidence. However, for various reasons, these foreign regulators may lack the
ability to obtain the material or the capacity to share it with their foreign counterparts.
Offenders may have to be extradited to face trial and regulators may not be able to compel
such an extradition. Regulators may have to obtain oral evidence from witnesses who do not
reside within the jurisdiction and they may be unable to compel their attendance at trial. All of
this is likely to add to the time, cost and complexity of investigations abroad and the risk that
any action taken by regulators will ultimately not be successful.
In addition regulators must be willing, and have the political support, to take action in relation
to cross border market abuse that does not impact directly upon their own markets. For
example the perpetrators may be situated within the jurisdiction but may trade on a market
outside of the jurisdiction. There may be domestic pressures on regulators to not pursue
action in such a matter and focus only upon those instances of market abuse which threaten
the integrity of the domestic markets. However a failure to take action in relation to such
163
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matters will present an opportunity for those who intend to engage in cross border market
abuse to structure their trading to avoid enforcement action.
Conclusion
Protecting market integrity is a core objective of securities regulators to protect the fairness
of the markets for investors, maintain confidence in the markets and ensure that the markets
are efficient. In furtherance of this objective, securities regulators direct resources into the
public enforcement of laws that prohibit market abuse and, in particular, laws that prohibit
insider trading and market manipulation. Although there is still, and likely will to continue to
be, some debate over the level of public enforcement required, some level of enforcement of
these laws can be justified. This justification can be grounded upon ensuring the market is
normatively ‗fair‘ for participants and, based on empirical evidence, upon the interests of
making markets more efficient and thereby lowering the cost of capital.
Yet despite the importance of the role of securities regulators to take action against market
abuse in the interests of protecting market integrity, this function is a difficult one. Detecting,
investigating and prosecuting market abuse, even if this market abuse takes place wholly
within the regulator‘s own jurisdiction, can be complex, expensive and challenging. These
challenges are likely to increase if the market abuse straddles jurisdictions. Furthermore,
markets have changed significantly over the last few decades, as opportunities to trade
internationally have increased. This may have changed the nature, type and quantity of
market abuse that takes place across borders and thereby increased the challenges faced
by regulators in effectively dealing with such market abuse. The changes to the markets,
whether they have increased opportunities for cross border market abuse and the regulatory
response is the focus of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CROSS BORDER MARKET ABUSE

These new trading venues and facilities (i.e. Alterative Trading Systems) have provided more
competition to existing regulated markets, gaining an increased share of liquidity and attracting a
broader range of investors. The increase in trading across different venues has made it more
difficult to monitor for market abuse.
European Commission ―Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on insider
dealing and market manipulation (market abuse)‖ 164

Compared to say the 1970‘s today institutions, and even individual investors, have access to
a much vaster array of securitized products and trading venues. Furthermore the last few
decades has seen brokerage costs fall significantly and the time taken to execute a trade
has been reduced to a fraction of a second. Falling costs and rapid execution times have
resulted in new participants entering the markets contributing to significant increases in
trading volumes.
These changes to the markets have largely been driven by competition between markets
which has resulted in reduced brokerage costs for traders and listing costs for issuers.
Competition has also increased liquidity, reducing the spread between buy and sell orders,
which in turn has decreased the profits that can be made on such spreads. As the profits on
such spreads falls this improves liquidity benefiting traders and investors. At the same time,
competition has resulted in the development of new products as investors seek new ways to
improve the returns on their investments. This has occurred in an environment in which over
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the last few decades has seen the number of cross border mergers and acquisitions rapidly
increase.
Securities regulators have largely welcomed these developments as one of their key
objectives includes promoting market efficiency. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the
goals of securities regulators extend beyond promoting the efficiency of markets to also
protecting the integrity or fairness of the markets. This requires, as a minimum, that
securities regulators work towards preventing market abuse. This is because there is a
compelling public interest in regulators taking action to maintain and improve market
integrity. Securities markets are vital mechanisms by which corporations can access funds
from investors in order to grow. Such investment is dependent to a large extent upon
investors having confidence that the market is fair. Market integrity is therefore important to
promoting investment, which is, in turn, important to the economic development of a country.
However protecting the integrity of the markets was not a primary concern in the
development of markets of the last few decades, the changes being driven by the benefits of
efficient markets in terms of reduced costs and investor choice. However a consequence of
these changes may be that there has been an impact upon market integrity and the changes
may have made markets more susceptible to market abuse and cross border market abuse.
Given that this dissertation is concerned with ascertaining whether securities regulators have
kept up with the level of sophistication of the markets, this chapter seeks to outline how and
why the markets have changed and become more complex. In addition this chapter also
seeks to ascertain how those responsible for securities regulation policy have responded to
possible threats to market integrity and possible increases in the susceptibility of markets to
market abuse.
In particular this chapter details how, as a result of recent crises in securities markets,
securities regulations have been strengthen. However much of the focus of these new
regulations has been directed towards a relatively new, and different, regulatory goal – that
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of reducing systemic risk.165 While some of these systemic risk regulatory changes may have
incidentally also worked towards improving the integrity of the markets, this has generally not
been the primary objective.
To explore these issues, Part 1 outlines the main changes that have taken place to stock
markets and securities market trading over the last few decades that may have impacted
market integrity. Part 2 considers the risks to market integrity inherent in these changes. Part
3 details the changes in both the architecture of securities regulation and specific regulatory
measures that may work towards preserving market integrity. Part 4 then seeks to analyse
the policymaker‘s regulatory responses. The chapter concludes by arguing that up until
recently the impact on market integrity has been largely overlooked by regulators in
supporting the changes to the markets. If securities regulators and legislators are to maintain
and improve market integrity and prevent market abuse in this different and ever evolving
trading environment they probably need to do more. In particular more needs to be done to
collect trading and other data in a standardized form, to establish procedures and systems to
exchange and analyse this data to detect market abuse, and to bring enforcement
proceedings in relation to such market abuse.
Part 1 Changes to Securities Markets and Trading
The break-down of the exchange monopolies and fragmentation
Securities markets today bear little resemblance to stock exchanges which operated up until
the 1970s and 1980s. Up until that time exchanges around the world were physical trading
floors operating within their own protected, often monopolistic, environment, typically defined
by national boundaries. While a few exchanges were run by governments, most exchanges
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were private mutual organizations owned and operated by brokers. 166 Those exchanges
were largely self-regulated and subject to only a limited degree of government oversight.
Although this system of a single or very few private exchanges for each jurisdiction was
largely anti-competitive it was allowed to continue as it delivered a number of benefits:
Governments benefited as they were able to regulate the securities market without the cost and
trouble of setting up a very extensive system of supervision and enforcement. Stock exchanges
benefited by being recognized by government as the means through which the securities
market was regulated. Their members benefited as this enhanced position limited or removed
competition, so allowing them to pass on their costs to buyers and sellers of securities.
Investors benefited as they had access to a regulated market in which the risk of default or
fraud were much reduced. Issuers of securities benefited as they continued to have access to a
market where the stocks and bonds they created could be traded.
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Nevertheless this anti-competitive environment was not without critics in that, like other anticompetitive environments, exchanges were able, or at least had the capacity, to exercise the
power of a monopoly. This gave the exchanges and the member brokers the ability to stifle
innovation and make monopolistic profits from high charges levied on brokers, issuers and
investors.
Towards the end of the 20th century exchanges increasingly came under pressure to
change. These changes were influenced first by the fact that from the 1980s institutions took
over from individuals as the main investors in securities.168 The number and size of such
institutions grew dramatically as individuals increasingly invested through mutual funds to
diversity and reduce the volatility of their portfolios and perhaps also because it became
apparent that government benefits for retirement would become less generous in the future,
thus compelling individuals to make their own provision for retirement through the use of
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mutual or pension funds.169 Competition between such funds put pressure on funds to obtain
high rates of return. As part of their push to increase returns, these institutional investors
pressed governments for changes to the anti-competitive fee structures of exchanges. As a
result, governments gradually required the existing exchanges to abandon their anticompetitive

practices

including

fixed

commissions

and

restrictive

membership

requirements.170
Another driver of change was the dramatic improvement in communications and trading
technology, and, in particular, the movement from trading floors to screen trading systems. 171
This move to electronic trading enabled the establishment of new regulated exchanges and
alternative trading systems (ATS),172 as barriers to enter the market for securities trading fell.
The impetus for establishing ATS (also called electronic communication networks (ECN) or
Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTF)) also came from reduced fixed costs, for example
location costs, compared to regulated exchanges and by the fact that they often had a lower
cost regulatory framework.173 Established exchanges also faced increased competition from
expanded over the counter trading (OTCs).174 Although OTC dealings have existed for most
of the twentieth century, increased technology and communications allowed their
expansion. 175 Like ATSs, OTCs have competitive advantages of reduced fixed and
regulation costs compared to established exchanges. Competition to established exchanges
has also come from larger security houses increasingly internalising order matching. This
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involves firms setting off positions within their order books and only settling net positions
through a formal exchange. The advantage to the firms and their clients of this internal
matching is the reduced cost of only having to book net positions on an exchange.176
The revolution in communication technologies also resulted in exchanges having to compete
for listings. Whereas previously corporations would list their securities on exchanges to
which they were geographically connected, corporations were no longer bound to continue
this practice. Issuers can now search for the cheapest source of capital wherever it may be
in the world. 177 At the same time, there has been a dramatic increase in securitization
globally as corporations move away from bank financing to tradable securities based
financing.
To maintain market share in the face of these competitive pressures, established exchanges
looked to lower costs, primarily through investment in technological change. To raise the
capital to invest in such technologies most stock exchanges that were member cooperatives
demutualized. Such demutualization involved converting their ownership structure from
being owned by brokers to public corporations owned by shareholders. Many also listed the
shares of this public corporation on the exchange it operated. 178 In Europe, state owned
stock markets converted to public traded corporations.179 This change in ownership structure
made it easier to raise funds through both equity and debt. It was also thought that this
would facilitate innovation by changing the incentive structure of the organization that
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operated the market to a board of directors focused on maximising profits for
shareholders.180
Consolidation – the rise of global stock exchanges
Following their conversion to public corporations, exchanges started to invest heavily in new
technologies and began consolidating their competitive position by merging with, or
acquiring, other exchanges and/or ATSs. This was made easier by the fact that many
smaller exchanges, deprived of government support and protection, found it hard to
compete.181 For larger exchanges acquiring other exchanges was undertaken to improve
their competitive position by acquiring new trading platforms and technology, increasing
liquidity and allowing them to move beyond their traditional boundaries into new markets.
The growth of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) through acquisitions and mergers with
other exchanges demonstrates this trend. In 2006 the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
merged with ArcaEx. ArcaEx was an ECN launched in 2002 which had, in 2005, acquired
the Pacific Exchange, an exchange which had been created by the merger of the San
Francisco exchange and the Los Angeles stock exchange.182 In 2007 the NYSE merged with
Euronext to form NYSE Euronext. Euronext itself was formed by the consolidation of the
Amsterdam Exchange, the Brussels Exchange, the Paris Bourse, the Lisbon exchange and
London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange.183 In 2008 NYSE Euronext
acquired the American Stock Exchange.184 In 2011 Germany‘s exchange, Deutsche Börse,
attempted to merge with NYSE Euronext, but the EU competition regulator ultimately
blocked this merger.185 Then, in 2013, Intercontinental Exchange Inc. successfully took over
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NYSE Euronext. 186 While the creation of Intercontinental Exchange incorporating NYSE
Euronext is probably the most extreme example of consolidation, other exchanges have also
been involved in seeking to expand by mergers and takeovers of other exchanges.187 For
example, in 2011, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) attempted to take over the TSX Group,
which controls, inter alia, the Toronto Stock Exchange, The TSX Venture Exchange and the
Montreal Exchange for derivatives. This takeover failed but a rival bid was successful. This
rival bid was by the ‗Maple Group‘, a consortium of Canadian banks, pension funds and
insurers, which included the owners of the largest ATS in Canada, the Alpha Group.188
Notwithstanding these attempts by the large exchanges to maintain market share, increased
competition has resulted in a movement away from trading on the large exchanges and
trading has become more dispersed over a number of exchanges, ATS‘s and internal
transactions conducted by broker-dealers. For example, in October 2009, the NYSE
executed only 20.8% of the consolidated share volume in listed stocks compared to 79.1% in
January 2005. 189 This pattern of fragmentation is not confined to NYSE stocks. As
demonstrated by Figure 2.1, trading in U.S. stocks now takes place in numerous venues.
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Figure 2.1 US Markets - 2014 Market Share
Broker-Dealer Internalization
36.9%
Nasdaq 17 %
NYSE 10.3%
NYSE Arca 10.2%
BATS-Z 8.3%
EDGX 7.6%
Nasdaq BX 2.9%
EDGEA 2.7%
BATS-Y 1.9%
NSX 0.5%
Nasdaq PSX 0.5%
Source: M Walder, "Predatory Trading - Just how big an issue is
high-speed trading?" Columbia Management, online: Columbia
Management <http://blog.columbiamanagement.com/predatorytrading-just-how-big-an-issue-is-high-speed-trading>.
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Similarly trading in Europe has also fragmented, with the LSE‘s share trading volume falling
from 35% in 2008 to 13.2% in 2011190. Trading in EU securities also now takes place in
multiple venues [Figure 2.2].
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Figure 2.2 EU Markets - 2011 Market Share
CHI-X Europe 18.8%
NYSE Euronext 15.3%
Deutsche Boerse 14.7%
London Stock Exchange 13.2
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Others 4.8%

Source: E Dunkley, "Pan-Europe vs. the Nationals”, The Wall Street Journal (10 October 2011) online:
The Wall Street Journal
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204138204576602661851424074>.

In Canada, although there has been less drift away from the TSX, other trading venues have
obtained significant market share (Figure 2.3)
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Figure 3: Canadian Markets – 2015 Market Share
Toronto Stock Exchange
56.5%
Chi-X 17.6%
Alpha 9.27%
MATCH Now 4.96%
CX2 4.54%
TMX Select 2.29%
Omega 1.99%
CSE 1.43%
Aequitas NEO <1%
TSX Venture <0.1%
Aequitas Lit <0.1%
Liquidnet <0.1%

Source: IIROC ―Market Share by Marketplace (for the Four Quarters Ending June 30 2015)" online:
<http://www.iiroc.ca/industry/marketmonitoringanalysis/Documents/MarketplaceStatisticsReportCur

Cross Border trading and Interconnected Trading Platforms
The changes outlined above and, in particular, the improvements in trading technologies
have increased the ability of brokers and their clients to trade in multiple markets. In fact,
responding to demands by investors to trade in multiple venues and products has been
another factor driving the consolidation of markets. Consolidated exchanges can enable
broker firms to offer investors more choice in the products and locations of trading, which is
attractive to individual investors and funds chasing superior rates of return. In an attempt to
respond to investor demands for multiple trading opportunities, some exchanges have also
developed joint platforms and linkages to increase the ability of investors to trade in different
markets.191

191

Blair, supra note 172 at 107.
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For example, the Intercontinental Exchange now operates 11 major exchanges in Europe
and the United States trading more than 12000 listed issues including derivatives, equities,
futures, options, fixed-income and exchange-traded products.192 Intercontinental Exchange
U.S. member broker-dealers can apply for access to all of the U.S. markets controlled by the
Intercontinental Exchange, and Intercontinental Exchange European member broker-dealers
can apply to access all of the European markets controlled by Intercontinental Exchange.
Large broker-dealer firms with a presence in both the U.S. and Europe can provide access
for their clients to all of these products and markets.193
Increased Trading in Derivatives
The last few decades have also seen a dramatic growth in the use of derivatives, again
driven principally by investors seeking superior rates of return on their investments and
because the number of markets and derivative products has expanded to meet this need. In
the decade since 2000, derivatives trading has grown from approximately 8 billion contracts
in 2003 to over 25.2 billion contracts in 2011.194 The range of derivatives has also grown,
including derivatives in relation to which the underlying asset of the derivative is traded in
another jurisdiction. In addition to the growth of derivatives on exchanges there has been a
growth in trading derivatives on the OTC markets from US$111 trillion at the end of 2001 to
US$633 trillion by the end of 2012.195
Increased Trading Volumes and ‘High Frequency’ (or algorithmic) Traders
The falling brokerage costs resulting from increased competition between markets has
resulted in significant increases in trading volumes, not just in derivatives, but also in
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equities. Furthermore this growth in trading volumes has been accelerated because
electronic trading, low costs and fast execution times has brought about the emergence of
‗high frequency‘ traders who have now become significant market participants. The business
of high frequency trading would not have been viable without these developments as it
involves using mathematical models to automatically generate thousands of buy and sell
orders each day in search of small profits on each trade.196
There is no single agreed upon definition of high frequency trading and it is often referred to
as algorithmic trading. Yet, in actual fact, high frequency trading is only one type of
algorithmic trading. This is because algorithmic trading appeared before high frequency
trading and was used as a tool to determine some or all aspects of trade execution like
timing, price, quantity and venue. High frequency trading, however, is algorithmic trading
where there is a focus on speed of execution and turnover to generate profits. It can also
have the following common features:


It uses sophisticated technological tools for pursing a number of different trading strategies,
ranging from market making to arbitrage;



Employment of algorithms along the whole investment chain: analysis of market data,
deployment of appropriate trading strategies, minimization of trading costs and execution of
trades;



A high daily portfolio turnover and order to trade ratio (i.e., a large number of orders are
cancelled in comparison to trades executed);



Flat or near flat positions at the end of the trading day, meaning that little or no risk is carried
overnight, with obvious savings on the cost of capital associated with margined positions;



196

Mostly employed by proprietary trading firms or desks; and

The growth in high frequency trading began principally from a change in 2005 in the SEC rules, which
required that brokers fill customer orders at the best available price. This rule led to faster trading speeds as
exchanges competed to fill each order, the competition driving down the cost of each trade. See also DK
Randall, ―How stock trading has changed since 9/11‖, Associated Press (5 September 2011) online: Yahoo
News <http://news.yahoo.com/stock-trading-changed-since-9-11-201335376.html>.
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It is latency sensitive, that is, the success of its strategies crucially depends upon the ability to
be faster than competitors and to take advantage of services such as direct electronic access
and co-location.

197

Figures from the World Federation of Exchanges show that the total number of trades in
equity shares has increased by 700% over a decade from under 2 billion in 2000 to over 13
billion in 2009198, much of which probably be attributed to high frequency trading.199 Another
consequence of high frequency trading is that the average size of trades has dropped 85%
over the last decade from a high of over US$50 000 in 2001 to less than US$9 000 in
2013.200
Direct Electronic Access
Associated with the growth of high frequency trading has been the growth of brokers offering
their clients direct electronic access to markets. This practice allows clients to transmit
orders that automatically route through the brokers‘ infrastructure for execution on the
market. Alternatively, the broker allows clients to use its member ID to transmit orders
directly to the markets. 201 The attraction of this practice for clients is that it allows them
greater control over their trading and reduces execution times for their orders. This is
especially important for high frequency traders who engage in trading strategies designed to
utilize arbitrage opportunities to make a large number of small gains. The attraction for
brokers is that it allows them to ‗rent out‘ their trading facility for profit but, in the absence of
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rules prescribed by regulators, little day-to-day management is needed. In 2010 the SEC
estimated that 38% of all U.S. stock trading was executed thorough direct access trading.202
Hedge Funds
The emergence of hedge funds 203 as significant market participants over the last two
decades has also had a real impact upon the growth in trading volumes and markets
generally. One industry association has estimated that assets in hedge funds in April 2014
were approximately $2.7 trillion. 204 While assets in hedge funds comprise only a small
proportion of global financial assets, they are particularly active players in the markets. 205
This is because hedge funds typically seek alpha returns; in other words, they seek to
consistently outperform the market. 206 In seeking alpha returns hedge funds differ from
mutual funds in that:


they may employ significant leverage, which can enhance investors' returns or
magnify their losses;



they may engage in short-selling, allowing positive returns in negative markets; and



they may deal in derivatives, including options and futures.207

Hedge funds are often structured to provide managers high remuneration for producing such
alpha returns. Typically managers charge an annual fee of 2% of assets under management
plus 20% of returns.208
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Cross border mergers and acquisitions
Over the last few decades there has been an increase in the number and value of cross
border mergers and acquisitions [Figure 2.4]. Whilst the increase has occurred in waves,
with rises during economic booms and dips during recessions, the overall trend is upward.

Figure 2.4 - Cross Border Mergers and Acquisitions 19952008
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
USD (Billions)

600
400
200
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Source: OECD Economic Globalisation Indicators 2010
<http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/industry-andservices/measuring-globalisation-oecd-economic-globalisation-indicators2010/international-mergers-and-acquisitions-world_9789264084360-

This increase has been driven by a number of factors such as the liberalisation of trade and
investment regimes, privatization of public entities, the consolidation of capacity to serve
global markets, international competition, technological change and the benefits that can be
derived from economics of scale.209
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Kang, N. and S. Johansson (2000), ―Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions: Their Role in Industrial
Globalisation‖, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, 2000/01, OECD Publishing online:
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/137157251088>.
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Part 2 The Impact of the Changes on Market Integrity
Risks inherent in the changes
By any measure, the transformation of securities markets over the last few decades has
been remarkable. However, left unchecked, these changes to markets and trading create a
risk that the integrity of markets could be undermined.
An enhanced capacity to trade in other markets and the proliferation of ways to trade the
same underlying economic interest through derivatives increases the possibility that
participants could disguise abusive trading and thereby reduce the probability of detection
and prosecution by regulators. For example, a person with inside information on Research in
Motion Limited (RIM) could split their trading using different brokers, different trading venues
and products. These could include RIM shares on the TSX, RIM options on the Toronto
Stock Exchange (TSX) derivatives exchange, RIM shares on NASDAQ and RIM shares on
an alternative exchange such as Direct Edge. Splitting their trading in this way would reduce
the probability that a trading venue watching only its own market would detect that there was
unusual trading taking place because an otherwise noticeable volume of trading from a
single source could be disaggregated.
In relation to market manipulation, given the multitude of markets, a person could use a less
liquid market to manipulate the price of a security and then trade at this higher level on a
more liquid market. Direct access trading could allow those who wish to commit market
abuse to access the market directly, rather than through the filter of brokers who, because of
their contractual obligations and professional duties, are often able to detect and thereby
stop instances of market abuse. Direct access trading may also make it difficult for securities
regulators to determine just who is responsible for the trading. It may also make taking
enforcement action against a perpetrator of market abuse more difficult as the perpetrator
may be outside of the jurisdiction. In addition, clients of brokers who are granted direct
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access are generally not subject to the same range of sanctions as brokers. 210 For example
in Canada brokers are required to comply with IRROC rules and may be subject to sanctions
for breaches of these rules whereas clients are not subject to IRROC rules.
High frequency traders could use their systems and algorithms to engage in the manipulative
practices known as ‗spoofing‘, ‗layering‘, ‗quote stuffing‘, ‗quote manipulation and ‗abusive
liquidity detection‘. These practices are similar, however, spoofing and quote stuffing refer to
when a trader engages in a series of orders to give the impression of activity or price
movement in a security but the orders are withdrawn before they are executed. For instance,
a high frequency trader might post bids for a stock showing that it wants to buy at a certain
price. However by the time investors show interest in selling at that price the bids are
removed. This can occur in fractions of a second making it difficult to detect. 211 Layering
occurs when, for example, as the price of a security moves up a trader takes out the posted
asking prices for the security further inflating the price. 212 Quote manipulation refers to
entering non-bona fide orders in an attempt to change the best bid or ask. Abusive liquidity
detection refers to the entering orders to detect the existence of a large buyer or seller with
the intention to trade ahead, rather than with, of this large buyer or seller.213
Two reports by IOSCO, in 2010 and 2011, into regulatory issues raised by the changes to
the markets concluded that the technological changes and the fragmentation of markets had
produced risks of market abuse by high frequency traders and direct market access trading.
IOSCO concluded that there is a concern as to whether technological advantages offer high
frequency trading firms the possibility of engaging in abusive practices.214 It also recognized
210
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that the increasing use of direct access trading creates challenges if proper controls are not
implemented, as direct access trading could allow a customer to engage in manipulative
trading strategies. 215 However after conducting hearings with market participants, IOSCO
concluded that there was not, as yet, clear evidence of the systematic and widespread use
of abusive practices by those engaging in high frequency trading.
The existence of hedge funds structured to provide managers high remuneration for alpha
returns may motivate some to look for insider trading or market manipulation opportunities.
As such, their activities may pose a greater risk to market integrity than other investors.
Furthermore, such violations may be more difficult to detect because of the global nature of
trading by hedge funds utilizing different markets, products and derivatives. This is because
hedge funds can invest across various financial markets, utilizing derivatives and
sophisticated techniques including high frequency trading.216
The rise in the number of cross border mergers and acquisitions increases the number of
people from different countries who may become privy to confidential price sensitive
information. This could include persons within the organizations subject to the merger or
acquisition, professionals such as law and accounting firms and even regulators. This
increases the possibility that a person from outside of a jurisdiction may be tempted to
engage in insider trading or tip others to trade.217
Challenges for Regulators
Despite the changes in the markets and trading that have taken place over the last few
decades and the fact that trading has become more global, markets are still regulated and
overseen by national securities regulators, or in the case of Canada, provincial regulators.
The role of these securities regulators to preserve the integrity of their markets principally by
215
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eliminating unfair trading practices such as insider trading and market manipulation has not
changed. However, securities regulators now find that the markets that they have to
supervise are quite different from what they were just 30 years ago.
Recognising the potential risks for markets from the new trading environments, Robert
Marchman the former Executive Vice President, N.Y. Stock Exchange has commented:
The history of the securities markets teaches us that insider trading is a serious regulatory
concern, particularly today, where the volume, complexity of trades, and products, as well as
crossborder transactions are redefining capital markets on almost a daily basis.

218

Other regulators have made similar statements:
Of particular interest to us in Enforcement is the FSA's belief that some hedge funds may be
testing the boundaries of acceptable practice with respect to insider trading and market
manipulation. In addition, given their payment of significant commissions and close relations with
counterparties, they may be creating incentives for others to commit market abuse.
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Whereas regulators used to have to only be concerned with trading and the integrity of one
market, the ground has shifted so that regulators, in their mission to preserve the integrity of
their national markets, now need to take into account issues such as:


The exponential growth in the volume of orders and trades. This raises issues as to
just how regulators can effectively monitor these trades to detect those that may
constitute market abuse.



There are multiple venues to trade the same economic interest, a derivative of that
economic interest or a linked trading instrument. As such, regulators need to ensure
that multiple markets are monitored at the same time to detect unusual trading.
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Investors have access to multiple markets in different jurisdictions which means that
even monitoring all of the markets within a jurisdiction may not be enough to detect
market abuse. An increased ability for persons to trade in other markets increases
the ability for participants to disguise abusive trading, resulting in a need for crossborder monitoring of markets.



Even when suspicious trades are detected, investigating these trades can be
complex because parts of the transaction of placing of the order and the execution
and clearing of a trade may be beyond the jurisdiction of one particular securities
regulator. Investigation of such a transaction will require gathering evidence from
abroad, adding to its cost and complexity.



There has been significant growth in the number of market participants. Some of
these market participants, such as hedge funds and high frequency traders, may be
more likely to, or may have the capacity to, engage in unfair trading practices. The
principal operations of such participants may also be situated beyond the jurisdiction
of one regulator. For example, many hedge funds trade in US and European markets
but are based in locations such as the Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands and
Bermuda.220

Are the changes to markets and trading actually increasing instances of market
abuse?
In the absence of an appropriate response by regulators it seems clear that the significant
changes to markets and trading have increased the opportunities for persons to engage in
market abuse and their ability to hide such abuse from detection. However it is very difficult
to determine whether this has resulted in persons exploiting these opportunities and
220
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whether, in fact, this has resulted in an increase in instances of market abuse which are not
being detected or prosecuted.
Measuring the level of market abuse, such as insider trading and market manipulation, has
always been extremely difficult because offenders generally disguise their actions when
faced with severe penalties.221 Any attempt to estimate the level of unfair trading practices,
or whether they are increasing or decreasing, by questionnaires directed to those in the
market yields results that are at best mostly anecdotal and at worst just pure conjecture. 222
Measuring the number of matters detected and investigated each year is also problematic
because doing so only measures matters detected by regulators, not the actual number of
instances of market abuse. In any event, regulators are often loathe to release figures of
matters detected and investigated which do not lead to some sort of administrative action or
a prosecution because of privacy concerns or fear of criticism and public scrutiny. Measuring
the increase or decrease in matters prosecuted each year as a proxy for the actual level of
market abuse taking place in the markets could also be flawed, as variations could be due to
multiple factors such as resources allocated, the quality of the investigators, the willingness
of witnesses to assist investigations or the complexity of the matters pursued.
Some studies in the finance discipline do provide some empirical evidence of the level
market abuse in a market and suggest trends in the instances of market abuse.223 This work
generally

involves

measuring

unusual

price

movements

ahead

of

significant

announcements, such as takeovers or financial results. Price movements just before
announcements might indicate insider trading. For example, a number of non-academic
studies using this method found that suspicious trading occurred ahead of 49% of all North
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American deals between 2003 and 2007. Another found that pre-bid volume in equity
options increased 221% compared to the average for the 50 days prior to the 17 biggest
U.S. takeovers in 2006. Yet another study, this time by Acharya and Johnson, suggested
that hedge funds are involved in insider trading because of unusual price movements before
private equity buyouts. This seems to be because frequently hedge funds are involved in, or
offered participation in, the equity and debt syndicates needed to be put in place by the
private equity buyer.224
In 2006 the then UK securities regulator, the FSA, commissioned a study that measured
price movements ahead of announcements of financial statements and takeovers made by
companies included within the FTSE index.225 The project found that, at least in relation to
takeover announcements, there was an increase in price movements before announcements
between 2000 and 2004 followed by a decline between 2004 and 2005, but the level
remained high. The FCA continues to measure such price movements each year in what it
refers to as ‗market cleanliness‘ studies.226 In 2013 it reported that since 2010, it has seen a
significant decline in the measure of the market cleanliness statistic for takeover
announcements from close to 30% to 15.1% in 2013.227
Aitken and Harris have taken this research further with a view to developing proxy for the
level of insider trading in a particular market. They measured trading ahead of price sensitive
announcements on a number of exchanges over a number of years and made comparisons
from year to year as well as between exchanges. They found, for example, that the
percentage price change before price sensitive announcements for the TSX has increased
between 2003 and 2009, which seems to indicate that insider trading on this exchange
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became more prevalent over time.228 A similar study by Beny and Seyhun suggests that
insider trading on US exchanges was also becoming more prevalent. They found that the
run up of stock prices before takeover announcements on US exchanges was 50 percent
higher during 2006 to 2011 than in the period 2000 to 2006.229
In relation to cross border insider trading Madura and Marciniak conducted a study to
investigate whether information leakages are more pronounced for U.S. targets whose
bidders come from countries with less effective insider trading regulations. They also
investigated whether information leakages of U.S. targets pursued by foreign bidders are
influenced by the degree of cooperation that U.S. regulators have with specific foreign
regulators. They found that in the period 1996 to 2011 the increase in the price for the 60
days before the takeover announcement was higher in the case of U.S. targets acquired by
foreign bidders with less effective insider trading laws than was the case of U.S. targets
acquired by U.S. bidders. They also found that for the period 1996 to 2011 in relation to the
foreign takeovers the price for the 60 days before the takeover announcement was lower if
the SEC had entered into a bilateral enforcement agreement with the country of origin of the
foreign bidder.230
Aitken and Harris have also developed a proxy for what could be manipulation in the form of
the ramping up of published share prices at the end of the day, called ‗end of day price
dislocation‘. This involves measuring incidences of share price movements at the end of the
trading day which were quickly reversed early on the next day. 231 Using this proxy for
manipulation, Aiken, Cumming and Zhan measuring 22 stock exchanges around the world
from January 2003 to June 2011. They found the increase in high frequency trading made it
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more difficult to manipulate end of day closing prices.232 Frino and Lepone also used this
proxy and came to the same conclusion, namely that that high frequency trading made it
more difficult to manipulate end of day closing prices. In addition, they measured the level of
‗ticking‘ as a proxy for manipulation. Ticking refers to a price movement that is linked to the
activities of one specific trader. They found that high frequency trading had no statistically
significant impact on the level of unusual ticking.233
Such studies are not without their limitations. For example, measuring price increases before
announcements does not distinguish between true insider trading and trades triggered by
rumours, persons establishing a position in a stock before a possible takeover
announcement234 or by persons who merely follow the lead of others. The prevalence of
high frequency trading may also contribute to amplifying price movements. Some of these
studies have also been criticised for perhaps underestimating the problem of market abuse
because of the small windows of trading chosen for analysis.235 Furthermore, such studies
also do not measure how and if the ability to trade across markets and products is changing
the nature and number of instances of market abuse due to perpetrators now having an
enhanced ability to structure their transactions to avoid detection and/or prosecution.
Nevertheless, these studies do provide some evidence of the level of market abuse in
markets. Furthermore the results of the Madura and Marciniak study seem to suggest that
insider trading may be more pronounced when price sensitive information spreads beyond a
jurisdiction, perhaps indicating that those outside of the jurisdiction perceive that they are
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less susceptible to being prosecuted than those within the jurisdiction. The Madura and
Marciniak study also seems to suggest that increasing cooperation between securities
regulators can have a positive impact in lessening the instances of cross border insider
trading and thereby contribute to protecting the integrity of markets within a securities
regulator‘s jurisdiction.
Despite these studies and advances in measuring the level of unusual price movements
ahead of significant announcements there is still no definitive way to measure how the
changes to the markets are impacting upon the level of market abuse. What is clear is that
more research is needed in this area and more work done to strengthen the results that have
already been collected. Given that protecting market integrity is a key goal for securities
regulators and that market integrity is of critical importance to the confidence of investors,
securities regulators should be fostering further research in this area to effectively measure
increases and decreases in market integrity.236
In addition given the trends suggested by these studies and the increased opportunities to
engage in market abuse presented by market developments, there does appear to be a case
for increasing regulation, bolstering the ability of securities regulators to take action against
market abuse and fostering cooperation between regulators to take action against cross
border market abuse. Like all regulation this will come at a cost. The changes to the markets
have been allowed to flourish as these changes have improved the efficiency of the markets,
reducing transaction costs for investors. Even new participants have added to the efficiency
of the markets as, for example, high frequency traders and hedge funds have increased the
volume of trades which increases the liquidity of the markets. The trade-off of increased
regulation and enforcement is likely to be a reduction in innovations in market structure, as
well as possibly restricting the activities of the new participants. This may, in turn, reduce
efficiency gains. However, a balance needs to be struck between market integrity and
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market innovations driven by the need to increase efficiency. It seems that the pendulum
may have swung too far in terms of innovation at the expense of integrity. As such, it seems
that tighter regulation and supervision of markets is required.
Part 3 How has Regulation of Trading and the Supervision of Markets Adapted to the
New Environment?
Although the regulation of securities markets has also changed over the last few decades,
the changes have not been as dramatic as the transformations to the markets. As has been
referred to, market regulation and market supervision is still a national concern. One change
that has occurred, partly in response to market privatization and fragmentation, is that in
some parts of the world there has been a movement away from governments allowing
markets to regulate themselves as Self-Regulatory Organisations (SROs) to governments
taking a more direct role. In North America, where SROs still have responsibility for a large
part of regulating the markets, the character of those SROs has changed significantly.
In terms of specific regulatory changes directed towards protecting market integrity in the
changed trading environment, the response has been limited. After the global financial crisis
of 2008 there was a flurry of activity by securities regulators to introduce stricter regulation
for new market participants who emerged as significant players - such as hedge funds and
high frequency traders. These new regulations were also directed at newer forms of trading
that have flourished such as direct electronic access and OTC derivatives trading. These
new regulations gained support due, perhaps, to an evolving awareness that government
regulation is not the enemy of efficient markets but a valuable instrument in controlling
market excesses. However the main rationale put forward for the regulations was that such
regulation was needed to address systemic risk concerns.237 Such regulations were said to
be needed to address the risk to the markets posed by specific traders and trading and to
protect the markets from future instability. Yet although this has been the principle
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justification, these new regulations may, indirectly, also work toward improving and
preserving market integrity.
Closer supervision of markets by government
One important difference in the regulation of markets that has emerged in the last three
decades has been a trend in some parts of the world to move away from the use of selfregulatory organizations to monitor the markets and enforce rules. Instead government
regulators are now taking a more active role in market supervision.238
Historically the scope of self-regulation of markets varied across jurisdictions. For example,
Europe has never extensively used self-regulation to govern its markets, the predominate
view being that regulation is a public function.239 On the other end of the spectrum is the
U.S. which has historically made extensive use of self-regulation for its markets. 240 This
United States model of self-regulation was influential throughout the second half of the 20th
century in terms of the structure of stock markets and securities legislation in other countries
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such as Canada, Japan, Korea, the UK and Australia.241 One advantage of self-regulation
over government regulation is said to be that SROs may require the observance of ethical
standards which go beyond government regulations. Another is that SROs may offer
considerable depth and expertise regarding market operations and practices and may be
able to respond more quickly and flexibly than the government authority to changing market
conditions.242
However the wave of demutualisation that occurred in stock exchanges around the world in
the late 20th Century brought the self-regulatory model of market supervision into question.
Demutualisation created a new set of problems primarily related to the stock exchange‘s
dual role of being both a market operator and a regulator of the market. Although this has
always given rise to potential conflicts of interests, many believed that this change to a public
company structure exacerbated the possibility of potential conflicts of interest. 243 Perhaps
more significantly, the switch to a public company results in a shift in priorities. In an
exchange owned and operated by brokers regulating the exchange was usually a key focus
because eliminating unfair trading practices directly benefitted the owners who were also the
participants. However a public company‘s primary motive is profit for its shareholders.
Regulation and the elimination of unfair trading practices are only tangentially linked to this
profit motive, as an attribute of the exchange which may attract trading and listings, such
trading and listings being drawn towards fairer and more transparent markets. This
disconnect could lead, over time, to a reduction in resources that exchanges will be willing to
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allocate to this regulatory function. 244 Furthermore, the growth in new markets raises the
issue of whether it is efficient for each exchange or market to regulate itself.
These issues prompted some countries to modify, or even abandon, the self-regulatory
model by shifting more functions back to the government regulator. In Hong Kong for
example responsibility for surveillance of the market for possible insider trading and market
manipulation is now shared between the government regulator, the Hong Kong Securities
and Futures Commission (SFC) and the Hong Kong Exchange.
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The SFC has

responsibility for broker regulation but the exchange retains market regulation to the extent
of its business rules. The United Kingdom, France, Mexico and Australia have also adjusted
their regulatory responsibilities with an expanded role for the government regulator. 246 In
Australia, for example, the government regulator is now responsible for all of the surveillance
of all of the exchanges and ATSs, enforcing broker-dealer rules and laws against market
misconduct. Exchanges in Australia are now only responsible for listings requirements.247
One advantage of governments taking over regulation of the markets is the reduction in
regulatory duplication. With the existence of both an SRO and a government regulator within
a jurisdiction overseeing a market or markets, there is likely to be some overlapping of roles
and conflict in relation to whose role it is to take action in any particular circumstance. For
example, in the U.S. and Canada detection of market misconduct through surveillance of the
markets is undertaken by SROs, as is the enforcement of broker-dealer rules. However, if
securities laws have been violated the matter must be handed over to the government
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regulator (the SEC in the U.S, provincial securities regulators in Canada) to take action. This
can lead to inefficiencies, delay, and as a result, perhaps less than optimal regulatory
outcomes.248
In the U.S. and Canada, although self-regulation remains an important part of the regulatory
framework, regulatory functions have been moved away from the exchanges themselves
and towards SROs that are independent of market operators.249 Initially regulatory functions
were spun off into separate self-regulatory bodies for each exchange, 250 but now, in
response to fragmentation of markets, the trend is to consolidate these SROs into one SRO,
such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in the U.S. and the Investment
Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) in Canada. IIROC performs regulatory
functions for all of the markets in Canada, except mutual fund dealers which are governed
by their own SRO, the Mutual Fund Dealers Association (MFDA). 251 In the US FINRA
performs these functions for almost all of the markets in the US. 252 Although these
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consolidated SROs do not eliminate the problem of duplication and overlap of roles with the
government regulator, they have the advantage of being a more efficient arrangement for
markets, particularly new markets, which can outsource regulatory functions to these
organizations rather than having to set up their own regulatory branch. As such costs are
ultimately passed on to traders, low regulatory costs can also work to keep down trading
costs. Accordingly, this shift to consolidated SROs has not met significant opposition from
the securities industry or regulators.253
a) Consolidation of regulatory functions and its impact on market integrity
One benefit that is emerging from this trend of moving functions to consolidated SROs or
back to the government regulator is that, in an environment of fragmented markets, fewer
bodies within a jurisdiction become responsible for undertaking surveillance and monitoring
the markets within that jurisdiction for possible instances of market abuse. This allows for the
possibility of cross market surveillance within the jurisdiction to detect unfair trading
practices, such as insider trading and market manipulation, by building of a more complete
picture of what is occurring in one security across markets. For example, in Canada, as
IIROC conducts surveillance for all of the exchanges and ATS markets, this allows it to
conduct surveillance across markets in Canada. Consolidation of regulatory functions can
also facilitate the regulator undertaking cross-asset surveillance (or cross-product)
surveillance, that is conducting surveillance over the markets to detect unusual trading
across, not only the security, but derivatives related to the security and also even
instruments that are not a derivative but have an economic relationship to the security.
253
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Cross-market surveillance should contribute towards the preservation of market integrity in
an environment of fragmented markets where such fragmentation may be used by
perpetrators to disguise market abuse. There is currently, however, a lack of empirical
evidence that conducting cross market surveillance results in markets which may be of
higher integrity. A study by Cumming and Johan looked at cross market surveillance in 2005
across 25 jurisdictions. They showed that where cross market surveillance was undertaken it
correlated with higher trading volumes, greater numbers of listed companies and higher
market capitalization. 254 This may suggest that such surveillance was either detecting or
deterring (because of the possibility of detection) market abuse and that this had a positive
impact on the quality of those markets. One problem with drawing this conclusion is that it
did not prove causation. It may be that larger jurisdictions, which may already be
characterised as having higher trading volumes and a higher market capitalization, are more
likely, and have the resources, to invest in cross market surveillance. Nevertheless perhaps
the results of the study make sense, in that cross market surveillance should increase the
likelihood of detection of market abuse which should, in turn, contribute to the overall quality
of the market.
The SEC has also recognised the importance of cross market surveillance to preserving the
integrity of markets. FINRA conducts cross market surveillance on the markets which it
supervises. In addition the SEC has also recognised that fragmentation has meant that the
data that is collected by SROs such as FINRA is not uniform, complicating the process of
detecting market abuse across markets:
The Commission therefore believes that the regulatory data infrastructure on which the SROs and
the Commission currently must rely generally is outdated and inadequate to effectively oversee a
complex, dispersed, and highly automated national market system. In performing their oversight
responsibilities, regulators today must attempt to cobble together disparate data from a variety of
existing information systems lacking in completeness, accuracy, accessibility, and/or timeliness –
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a model that neither supports the efficient aggregation of data from multiple trading venues nor
yields the type of complete and accurate market activity data needed for robust market
oversight.
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In response the SEC has adopted Rule 613 which is designed to require the implementation
of what is called ‗a consolidated audit trail‘.256
The proposal for the rule arose out of what has been called the ‗Flash Crash‘ that occurred
on 6 May 2010 when the prices of many U.S. based equity products experienced an
extraordinarily rapid decline and then recovered.257 The investigation into this event exposed
a serious weakness in the monitoring of trades on U.S. markets. Although the trades
occurred on one day the reconstruction process took months as, in order to determine its
cause, investigators had to reconstruct the trades from a multitude of different data and
systems maintained by different markets.258
Currently, the SEC must rely on data from FINRA, exchanges, and firms, such as mutual funds
and bank trading desks, to track the market. Further, the SEC is unable to track a large amount of
trading every day. Additionally, as was the case with the Flash-Crash report, the lack of a central
repository for data can lead to significant delays in diagnosing what went wrong after an irregular
market event.
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It was not until 2015, some five years after the Flash Crash, that the SEC brought charges
against the person the SEC alleges is responsible for this event.260
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Rule 613 requires SROs to develop a plan for this consolidated audit trail. Once fully
implemented the consolidated audit trail will require exchanges, SROs and their members
trading National Market Securities (NMS) securities to submit detailed trading data to a
central repository in a standardized form. This will include quotes and orders as well as
information in relation to where the order originated any modifications to the order,
cancellations, routing and execution. Certain data will have to be reported by 8 am following
the trading day. SROs and their members are also required to synchronize the business
clocks they use to record transactions. It is also proposed that each customer would be
assigned a unique customer identifier that would be required to be used by that customer in
all of that customer‘s orders, regardless of the market or broker that was used to conduct the
trading. SROs and the SEC would have access to this central authority to search for
indications of market abuse.261 The proposed system is designed to allow the better design
and use of surveillance systems to detect market irregularities, including market
manipulation and insider trading which occur across markets. 262 The release which
accompanied the proposal for the rule stated:
The Commission preliminarily believes that with today‘s fast, electronic and interconnected
markets, there is a heightened need for a single uniform electronic cross-market order and
execution tracking system that includes more information than is captured by the existing SRO
audit trails, and in a uniform format. Such a system would enable SROs to better fulfil their
regulatory responsibilities to monitor for and investigate illegal activity in their markets and by their
members. Further, the Commission preliminary believes that such a system would enable the
Commission staff to better carry out its oversight of the NMS for securities and to perform market
263

analysis in a more timely fashion, whether on one market or across markets.

FINRA has backed SEC in need for this rule. The Chairman of FINRA stated:
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A generation ago, the vast majority of activity occurred on the equity market that listed the security.
Today, orders are routed to some 50 competing platforms. This complex environment creates
opportunities for traders seeking unfair advantage to manipulate markets. How? By exploiting
inconsistencies or gaps created when the responsibility of regulatory oversight is divided.
Regulatory gaps and splintered oversight make it possible for trading abuses—such as market
manipulation, marking the close and front-running customer orders—to be carried out furtively
across multiple markets, with a reduced chance of detection….The most effective way to surveil
for these trading practices across the wide range of market centers is to consolidate audit trail data
in a single place so that violative trading practices can be more readily identified.
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One concern that has been raised is the maintenance of the privacy of such data. 265
However, while privacy concerns are not irrelevant and while steps should no doubt be taken
to protect data, privacy concerns should not be allowed to trump the need to preserve
market integrity. In the interest of protecting market confidence for the good of the economy
as a whole there needs to be an acceptance that, in exchange for access to the markets,
market participants must be prepared to disclose information to regulators.
b) Cross border market surveillance
As connections between markets multiply and investors are presented with a wider choice of
products and markets the need for cross border market surveillance arises. Failure to
undertake such surveillance leaves open the opportunity for perpetrators of market abuse to
avoid detection and therefore punishment simply by structuring their trading across markets
in different jurisdictions.
To enable cross border market surveillance to take place, trading data has to be collected
and exchanged between SROs or government regulators in various jurisdictions in a
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standardized form for comparison. This raises the issue of whether appropriate mechanisms
exist to enable this collection and exchange process to take place and, if so, whether the
information is exchanged in a timely manner so that market abuse can be detected and
investigated. Timely detection and investigation is critical, as the sooner an investigation can
be initiated, the more likely evidence may be captured and preserved. This timely capture of
evidence can have the effect of significantly enhancing the prospects of a successful
enforcement action.
Although there do appear to be some procedures whereby market regulators and SROs
share information for the purposes of cross border market surveillance, the effectiveness
and extent to which these mechanisms are used is far from clear. There is certainly no one
central repository or single body responsible for collating and sharing information between
regulators and SROs responsible for conducting surveillance of markets for possible market
abuse.266 Some SROs do have bilateral agreements to cooperate on regulatory matters and
the supervision cross border trading. 267 However, such cooperation arrangements are by no
means universal. IOSCO does have a Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU)
whereby securities regulators can exchange information for enforcement purposes.268 This
MMoU standardizes the process by which securities regulators who are members of IOSCO
and have signed the MMoU can obtain information from other member securities regulators
for enforcement purposes. It provides a framework of procedures to obtain information from
other securities regulators necessary to facilitate the enforcement of a wide range of
domestic laws prohibiting securities fraud, including insider trading and stock market
manipulation. However, this MMoU was designed principally for the ad hoc provision of
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information for enforcement actions after securities fraud such as market manipulation have
been detected, rather than the day-to-day information exchange demanded for surveillance
of markets for market abuse.269
IIROC, FINRA and many of the large exchanges are members of the Intermarket
Surveillance Group (ISG), an organization that states on its website that its objective is to be
a ―framework for the sharing of information and the coordination of regulatory efforts among
exchanges trading securities and related products to address potential intermarket
manipulations and trading abuses.‖ 270 The ISG was created in 1981 by the major U.S.
exchanges and since 1990 the ISG has allowed non-U.S. exchanges to become
members.271 However this is a private organization whose governance and operations are
essentially opaque, in that it provides no public information as to how it is governed and little
information on how it operates, what information is exchanged between members or how
often. It is also unclear from publically available information whether delay in exchanging
information is a significant issue. The ISG also appears to have no secretariat or permanent
staff and so must be reliant on the activities of its members for its effectiveness. 272
Furthermore, the ISG does not allow government regulators who are responsible for
surveillance to become members. Moreover, its terms of membership provide that SROs are
not allowed to convey information obtained through the ISG to a government regulator
without the consent of the provider.273
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Certainly in recommending the introduction of the consolidated audit trail the SEC appeared
to be somewhat critical of the ISG‘s operations. It stated that because the SEC does not
currently have direct access to all data, to analysis a trade a request has to be made to the
ISG but that:
It can take days or weeks, depending on the scope of the information requested, to receive
responses to requests. Once the responses to its requests for information are received, the
Commission, or any SRO undertaking the same task, must commit a significant amount of time
and resources to process and cross-link the data from the various formats used by different SROs
before it can be analyzed and used for regulatory purposes.
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In addition, even if information can be collected and exchanged in a timely manner, the
software and expertise needed to conduct cross border market surveillance (that is, software
that can analyse the data for trading irregularities indicating possible market abuse) is costly
and complex. Aitken and Harris estimate that it would cost approximately $150 million
initially and $50 million each subsequent year, to maintain and run a real time cross market
surveillance capability for all European exchange-traded markets275. Cumming and Johan
state:
Cross-market surveillance (including cross-product, cross-market within a country and crossborder), involves much greater technical sophistication that is not easily replicated by an
exchange for the following reasons. The level of sophistication of financial trading patterns
across different products (such as derivatives and securities) is much more complicated (and our
data below suggest many surveillance authorities in different countries do not appear to be
aware of the ways in which traders can carry out manipulative cross-market trades). Computer
software to detect cross-market manipulations to pick up patterns of trading across markets
requires significantly greater sophistication than the simple single-market trading alerts. External
surveillance providers such as SMARTS Group do provide cross-market surveillance, but such
productized or customized solutions come at a substantially higher cost both for the development
of the technology and the on-going surveillance effort. Surveillance staff members need to
274
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coordinate surveillance across the different markets monitored, which requires proper
organizational alignment among all those involved. As well, for cross-market and cross-border
surveillance there needs to be formal information sharing arrangements and coordination of
surveillance for cross-market and cross-border surveillance to be legally authorized, permissible
and effective. Such coordination is further complicated by the protectionist policies arising from
the commercial self interest of the respective markets and the related cross jurisdictional legality
issues. In short, cross-market surveillance is much more costly and complicated than singlemarket surveillance.
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They also found that at the time of their study there was a ―dearth of cross-market
surveillance in most jurisdictions in the world‖. This is perhaps a reflection of the stated costs
and complexity of cross-market surveillance as well as the self-interests of the markets
leading to them being adverse to exchanging information.277
Recent regulatory changes which may impact on market integrity
As has been referred to above, hedge funds, high frequency trading, direct electronic access
and trading derivatives on OTC markets may pose specific threats to market integrity. In the
wake of the global financial crisis regulators introduced new regulations regarding these
issues, although the focus for such regulations has generally been systemic risk concerns
rather than protecting market integrity. Indirectly, however, most of these initiatives may well
assist regulators in protecting market integrity because most require additional disclosure of
information to regulators. The more information regulators have access to the more likely it is
that regulators will be in a position to use this information in their endeavours to detect
market abuse.
a) Hedge Funds Regulation
Although hedge funds have traditionally been the subject of less regulation than other
market participants this situation is changing. Many countries have regulations preventing
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hedge funds from being offered to retail investors 278 and now there is a new focus on
regulating hedge funds in order to make these funds and their activities more transparent to
regulators. In June 2009 the IOSCO Technical Committee released a report suggesting that
hedge funds operating in a given jurisdiction should be registered and also that hedge funds
disclose to regulators information such as their risk management controls. Although directed
mainly towards systemic risk issues, this report also stated that regulators should be able to
share information about hedge fund exposures that may impact upon market integrity
issues.279
In tandem with this report, many securities regulators began requiring hedge funds operating
within their jurisdiction to register and disclose information about their operations and trading
positions. For example, the Council of the European Union introduced the ‗Alternative
Investment Fund Managers Directive‘. This requires members of the EU to legislate to
introduce rules for offshore funds and managers located in non-EU countries and requires
hedge funds to, amongst other things, obtain authorization to operate in the EU and provide
authorities with information about their internal risk management arrangements, including
instruments in which they trade and exposures.

280

New registration and reporting

requirements have also been introduced in both the U.S. 281 and Canada. 282 In the U.S.
these requirements include that large funds must report certain information relating to that
fund‘s exposures, leverage, risk profile, and liquidity to the regulators.
This changing focus on the regulation of hedge funds is primarily directed towards the
systemic risk that such funds may pose for the markets and giving regulators the ability to
278
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monitor the exposures by hedge funds so that they do not build up positions which may
cause major market instability. The focus is not on preventing hedge funds from engaging in
market abuse. However it is possible that regulation requiring registration, supervision and
submission of regular data concerning the exposures of hedge funds to securities regulators
may, albeit indirectly, assist regulators to better monitor the operation of such funds for
potential market abuse violations. For example, a hedge fund which is heavily invested in a
particular derivative of an asset may be more likely to attempt to manipulate the price of the
underlying asset. Disclosure of its exposures to the regulator may allow the regulator to link
it to any such manipulation of any securities linked to this asset.
b) High Frequency Trading and Direct Electronic Access
New regulations were also adopted in some countries, such as the US, in relation to high
frequency trading and direct electronic access by brokers. Again these rules are primarily
directed to systemic risk concerns rather than toward preserving market integrity - although
the additional disclosure of information required may assist regulators in this respect as well.
For example, in 2010 the SEC adopted a new rule requiring brokers to have risk controls
and supervisory controls in place before they grant clients direct electronic access to the
markets.283 In 2013 Canada securities regulators also introduced a rule requiring that all
market participants that access markets have risk management and supervisory controls in
place.284 Similarly IOSCO has produced principles for direct electronic access, recognising
the regulatory challenges that such access poses to markets.285 IOSCO remains neutral on
the question of whether jurisdictions should allow direct access trading but advises that if
they chose to such jurisdictions should ensure that market intermediaries have automated
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controls in place limiting risk and must obtain adequate information about the client before
such trading can be undertaken.
In response to systemic risk concerns in relation to high frequency trading the SEC has
issued a ―large trader‖ rule that requires firms whose trades equal or exceed 2 million shares
a day, $20 million a day, 20 million shares a month or $200 million a month, to provide
disclosure of more information to allow the SEC to track their trading through different
markets.286
In Canada the OSC has approved the TMX group introducing a rule allowing a short order
processing delay, or ‗speed bump‘ to discourage high-frequency traders operating on its
ATS Alpha marketplace. This requires orders to be on the market for a minimum time before
they can be withdrawn. The ‗speed bump‘ can be avoided but only if the trader places an
order above a fixed order size. The TMX was prompted to introduce such a change to
trading on this exchange in response to competition from a new ATS, Aequitas NEO
Exchange (‗Aequitas‘). Aequitas is an ATS designed to be a securities market which
discourages the participation of high frequency traders.287 Aequitas was set up by the Royal
Bank of Canada (RBC) following the success of IEX in the US. IEX is an ATS set up by RBC
in 2013 and also designed to discourage trading by high frequency traders by, inter alia, the
use of ‗speed bumps‘. Since its establishment IEX has captured 1% of the market share of
trading in US stocks and is the fourth ranked ATS for stocks trading in the S&P 500.288
In Europe the European Parliament has approved the Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive (‗MiFID II‘) which requires countries in Europe to regulate high frequency trading
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due to systemic risk concerns and the potential for high frequency trading to be used for
market manipulation. 289 MiFID II requires that all firms who use algorithmic trading
techniques are required to be registered.290 In addition such firms are required to maintain
for a period of five years details of their trading algorithm, the name of the person in charge
of the algorithm and the execution factors of the algorithm.291
In response to MiFID II in 2013 Germany enacted The Prevention of Risks and Abuse in
High-Frequency Trading Act. 292 Pursuant to this Act all firms engaged in high frequency
trading who are not already licenced by BaFin are required to obtain a licence from BaFin
and become subject to its supervision. 293 This Act also provided that BaFin can require
disclosure of algorithms used, the system used for trading, trading strategies and trading
limits.294
This Act also expands the definition of market manipulation to include buy or sell orders that
are placed, changed or cancelled on a market by means of a computer algorithm if they:


disrupt or delay the functioning of the trading venue, or are likely to do so; or



make it more difficult for other persons to identify genuine purchase or sell orders on the
trading system, or are likely to do so; or



create or are likely to create a false or misleading signal about the supply of or demand
for a financial instrument.295

This Act also requires that exchanges charge separate fees for the excessive usage of
exchange systems, in particular due to a disproportionately high number of order entries,
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modifications or cancellations. 296 Exchanges are also required by the Act to ensure that
there are circuit breakers to ensure an orderly determination of the exchange price even
when prices fluctuate significantly and to maintain an appropriate ratio between order
entries, modifications and cancellations on the one hand and actually executed orders on the
other.297
c) OTC derivatives
In response to the 2008 global financial crisis and the problems caused by collateralized
debt obligations traded through OTC markets, there was a push by regulators to improve the
transparency of OTC derivatives. This problem was best expressed by the Chairman of the
World Federation of Exchanges:
The pendulum has swung too far and the grand experiment in ―competition‖ led to ―excessive
fragmentation‖ of price discovery.Multiple trading venues, with different regulatory requirements
with respect to disclosure, have led to deterioration in the transaction information available. The
information available to regulators needs to be systematized and OTC transaction information
needs to be captured in some form or other within regulators‘ purview.

298

To that end, the solution is said to be that standardized OTC derivatives trades should be
registered in a regulated repository or cleared through a regulated central repository.299 Such
regulation may assist improving market integrity if such a central repository could gather
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data in a standardized form about the trading of such derivatives. This data could be then
analyzed to look for trading irregularities which could indicate market abuse.
In compliance with this recommendation in relation to OTC derivative trade reporting some
countries, including the US, the EU and Canada have moved to implemented regulations
requiring reporting of OTC trades. For example in Ontario now all OTC derivative
transactions existing involving at least one Canadian counterparty must be reported to a
designated trade repository.300
In addition, in 2011, the Technical Committee of IOSCO recommended that regulators build
a comprehensive framework for conducting market surveillance of these markets, the
objective of this framework being to monitor the market in order to detect and deter
manipulation or abusive trading.301
Part 4 Has the Regulatory Response been Sufficient?
In the interests of protecting and enhancing the economy as a whole, securities regulators
are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that markets are efficient and fair. Given this
goal of market efficiency it is not surprising that the changes to markets and market trading
that have occurred over the last few decades have been supported, rather than hindered, by
securities regulators, because the markets have become more efficient. However perhaps of
some concern is that, notwithstanding that market integrity or fairness is also a key objective
of securities regulators, little attention, at least until relatively recently, seems to have been
given to if and how these changes have impacted that issue and, if so, how trading on these
fragmented markets can be effectively monitored to detect market abuse.
One possible reason for this apparent lack of concern is that, as is referred to above, it has
been difficult to empirically measure changes in market integrity when, by contrast, changes
in market efficiency can be easily measured. It has been difficult to measure the level of
300
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insider trading or market manipulation in a market and whether this is changing over time. As
is indicated in Part 3, some research is now being undertaken to attempt to empirically
measure changes in market integrity. This research is valuable, but even in the absence of
such metrics, just because market integrity does not lend itself to easy measurement does
not mean that it ought to be overlooked. The level of insider trading and market manipulation
has always been difficult to measure but that does not mean that it does not occur or that
regulators should not devote resources to detecting and prosecuting abuses. The
transformation that has taken place in markets and trading over the last few decades has
created more opportunities to undertake and disguise market abuse and, moreover, has
fostered market participants who may be encouraged by such changes to engage in such
abuse.
Maintaining and improving market integrity in this era of fragmented markets and a global
trading environment may prove to be difficult and costly but it is not impossible. It would
necessarily involve three elements – improving data collection by regulators and SROs
across all markets, fluid and information data exchange between regulators and SROs and
improved data analysis by regulators and SROs to detect trading anomalies. Furthermore, it
requires closer links and the exchange of evidence between international regulators and
SROs to bring enforcement action in relation to any market abuse that is detected.
In relation to the necessary first step – the collection of data - a stronger regulatory
framework may be needed. In relation to US markets, once the consolidated audit trail is
fully implemented, this will provide a standardized collection of data. Critically also this will
provide clearer data in relation to the activities of each client. In addition the recent focus on
obtaining information from hedge funds, high frequency traders, OTC derivatives trades and
expanding the records required to be retained for direct electronic trading is a step in the
right direction, although the information and data obtained should not be restricted to
information in relation to systemic risk concerns. All securities regulators should
acknowledge that they require information for the purpose of protecting the fairness of the
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markets, and to that end, should ensure regulations are in place to obtain all of the
information they need from these market participants - ideally in a standardized form to
enhance the ease of analysis. 302 Similarly, a stronger regulatory framework is needed in
terms of collecting trading data in a standardized form worldwide, which can be used for
market surveillance analysis. This would necessarily include data such as the identity of the
client and the broker, and details of the orders and trades, including changes and
cancellations. An appropriate standard set of trading data, including these elements, needs
to be developed. This standard may arise from the consolidated audit trail rule made by the
SEC. However if the standard is to become an international standard, an international body
such as IOSCO may have to take the lead in its development. This would require such an
international body to gather input from other national securities regulators and SROs as to
what should be comprised in this standard.
Secondly, the process and capacity to exchange data may need to be improved. Ideally one
international organization should have the capacity to facilitate this exchange of information.
As it is in the interests of regulators and SROs alike to stamp out market abuse a properly
governed and transparent organization, perhaps under the auspices of IOSCO, would
probably gain support.303 Although the ISG may also be just such an organization, the fact
that it is unable to pass on information easily to government regulators seems to be a
significant limitation. There are also real issues as to its lack of transparency in relation to its
governance and operations if it is to be responsible for organizing the exchange of private
information about market participants between regulators. Furthermore, as an organization
comprised of essentially private organizations, such as exchanges and SROs, it may not be
302
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sufficiently focused on the public interest of eliminating market abuse and may be too easily
swayed by arguments to limit regulation because of competitive and cost pressures on its
members.
Thirdly, regulators and SROs will need to invest heavily in technology and research to
undertake both cross market surveillance and cross border surveillance analysis on the data
that has been collected. Although this will be costly given the complexity of markets, such
technology needs to be developed if regulators are to maintain market integrity in the face of
ever evolving markets. Sufficient funding must be obtained from market participants to
support these costs given the critical importance of market integrity to maintaining market
confidence.
Finally, taking successful enforcement action against market abuse requires the
development of close links between international regulators and SROs to gather evidence in
relation to any market abuse that is detected. If the offending behaviour crosses international
boundaries, the regulator who takes action must obtain evidence and information from other
jurisdictions to prosecute the matter. Here there has been some progress over the last
decade. The IOSCO MMoU appears to be improving the frequency and speed in which
securities regulators exchange information to allow enforcement action to take place. 304
Given that most of the world‘s securities regulators have now signed this MMoU, or have
committed to sign this MMoU, the use of this MMoU to exchange evidence is a trend that is
likely to continue.305
A regulatory shift to focus on market integrity as suggested above will require substantial
commitment from regulators and SROs internationally and will come at a substantial cost. As
there is a lack of hard data that market manipulation and insider trading is flourishing in the
new trading environment there will probably be criticism that the benefits do not outweigh the
costs. However, if such an investment is not made it may become apparent over time that
304
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the preservation of market integrity is not a primary goal of regulators, but one that is
secondary to market efficiency. Given the importance of fairness to promoting confidence in
the markets, this will be a difficult position for regulators to maintain.
Conclusion
The transformation of the markets which has occurred over the last few decades has been
revolutionary. Yet although the securities regulators‘ objective to preserve market fairness or
integrity has remained constant throughout, their ability to meet this objective seems not
have kept pace. They could of course relegate market integrity as a secondary goal and
acknowledge that the markets are unfair but that it is simply too costly and too difficult to
remedy. This, however, is unlikely to be a palatable option.
Regulators are now confronted with markets that present significant challenges to their
capacity to detect and take action against market abuse, which is a key component of their
mission to enhance market confidence. Markets have moved rapidly and irreversibly into the
21st century and securities regulators seem to have no option but to also similarly adapt their
detection, investigation and enforcement practices.
Some steps have been taken by policymakers to address the increasing sophistication of the
markets and to work towards the goal of maintaining the integrity of the markets. The
introduction of the consolidated audit trail, tighter restrictions on direct electronic access to
markets, standardising OTC trading and closer monitoring of hedge funds will go some way
in assisting regulators in detecting and deterring market abuse. However it is relevant to note
that most of these changes were driven by specific instances which exposed weakness in
the integrity of the markets rather than regulators being proactive in protecting the integrity of
the markets. For example the consolidated audit trait was instigated because of the ‗flash
crash‘ incident in 2010 and changes to OTC trading and hedge fund monitoring was
instigated by systemic risk concerns arising out of the global financial crisis.
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Going forward it seems that regulators may need to be more proactive in protecting the
markets from market abuse. This could possibly include improving and standardizing the
collection of trading data, developing organisations and mechanisms to share this data and
developing systems to analyse this data to detect market abuse.
This chapter has examined the changes to the markets, the opportunities for cross border
market abuse and some of the recent changes to the regulation of the markets that may
work towards protecting the integrity of the markets. The response of securities regulators to
the changes to the markets is further developed in the next two chapters. These seek to
ascertain trends in relation to the types of cases of cross border market abuse that have
been identified, how detection, investigation and enforcement mechanisms have developed
in response to these cases and, on the basis of this information, continues to examine ways
in which regulators could develop systems to improve the detection, investigation and
prosecution of market abuse.
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Chapter 3

ISSUES OF DETECTION, INVESTIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CROSS
BORDER MARKET ABUSE – PERSPECTIVES OF SECURITIES REGULATORS

Three trials for markets offences started in March and April this year, and these trials are
expected to be concluded by July. These trials are the most complex and lengthy we have
brought and demonstrate the increase in the size, complexity and international nature of cases we
are prepared to undertake. Each of our insider dealing prosecutions in the last year has
represented an escalation in magnitude from those brought in previous years .
UK Financial Services Authority Enforcement Annual Performance Account 2011/12 306

As outlined in chapter 2, over the past few decades the markets and trading have become
increasingly international in character which may have enhanced opportunities for cross
border market abuse. This in turn may have had an impact upon the kinds of cross border
market abuse matters that securities regulators detect, as well as the types of matters they
choose to investigate and prosecute. As such, the focus of this chapter and the next is to
consider the impact of the changes as viewed through the lens of securities regulators who
are charged with protecting the integrity of the markets by detecting, investigating and
prosecuting cross border market abuse. This analysis is undertaken to reveal whether or not
securities regulators efforts in detecting and deterring cross border market abuse are
keeping pace with the increasing sophistication of the markets
Contained within this analysis is the observation that just as the markets and trading have
changed, securities regulators have been able to change their detection, investigation and
enforcement methods and have had the capacity to adapt. Accordingly, these chapters will
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also examine evolving approaches to the ways in which securities regulators have adapted
to the transformation of the markets and the success or otherwise of these responses.
In this chapter the scope of the detection, investigation and enforcement powers of the
regulators are considered together with the limitations of these powers. This analysis is
reinforced by responses from interviews undertaken by the author of senior employees of
securities regulators involved in investigations in relation to the changes they have observed
over the last ten years.307
As such, Part 1 sets out the enforcement powers of the regulators to take action against
market abuse. Part 2 of this chapter expands upon the material from the preceding chapters
and outlines, from the point of view of securities regulators, how the transformations to the
markets have altered the nature of cross border market abuse. The focus of Part 3 is on how
cross border market abuse is currently detected and what difficulties securities regulators
are encountering in investigating and prosecuting those matters once they are detected. Part
3 also considers issues that have arisen in relation to how securities regulators are working
with their counterparts in other countries. Part 4 reflects upon some of the key factors that
may impact upon the success or failure of a prosecution of cross border market abuse.
Finally, Part 5 then seeks analyse the responses in relation to key issue of this dissertation,
namely has the enforcement efforts of securities regulators against market abuse and cross
border market abuse kept pace with the increasing sophistication of the markets.
Part 1 The securities regulators powers to take action against market abuse
The regulators the focus of the analysis in this chapter are Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) in Germany, the Financial Conduct Authority (the
FCA) in the UK, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) in Australia,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) and the Ontario Securities Commission
307
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(the OSC) in Canada. Because of the importance self-regulatory organizations in Canada
and the USA, staff from Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) and
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) were also interviewed.
The Powers of the Securities Regulators
In Germany BaFin is the principal agency responsible for taking action against market
abuse. It can take administrative action and also refers criminal violations to the public
prosecutor. Germany has six exchanges based in Berlin, Hamburg-Hannover, Munich,
Stuttgart, Dusseldorf and Frankfurt which conduct their own market surveillance. These
exchanges can take action in relation to breaches of the rules of the exchange but must refer
instances of market abuse to BaFin. 308 Supervision of the rules of these exchanges is
undertaken by stock exchange supervision authorities of the State where the exchange is
situated.309
Canada does not have a national securities regulator. Each of the provinces and territories is
responsible for enforcing the provisions in their Securities Act. However all of these Acts
restrict market abuse.310 The provincial and territorial securities regulators, such as the OSC,
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accountability of each of these institutions, particularly because there is confusion amongst stakeholders as
to who is responsible for criminal matters versus and regulatory matters.
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can take administrative action, civil action and can refer criminal instances of market abuse
to the provincial prosecution authorities. 311 IIROC, the self-regulatory body for brokers,
regulates all investment dealer firms in Canada. The Securities Act of each province requires
that all investment dealers to must be members of IRROC if they wish to operate in
Canada. 312 IIROC also regulates trading on debt and equity marketplaces in Canada,
including all exchanges and ATSs. IIROC can also take action against brokers and firms
who are members if these entities breach IIROC‘s market integrity rules.313
In the UK the FCA is the regulator of all markets, brokers and financial advisors. It can take
administrative action and civil action in relation to market abuse and impose penalties or
take disciplinary action against authorised persons.314 It can bring regulatory criminal actions
and refers more serious criminal offences to the Crown Prosecution Service.315 From 1 April
2013 the FCA took over these responsibilities from the Financial Services Authority (the
FSA) which had previously exercised these powers.
In the US the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the primary government
agency in the United States responsible for pursuing enforcement action against market
abuse. It has broad powers which include initiating court proceedings for the imposition of
civil penalties and can also seek cease and desist orders.
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prosecution. 318 FINRA, the self-regulatory body for brokers, regulates most broker dealer
firms in the US. FINRA also regulates trading on almost all of the exchanges and ATSs in
the US. FINRA can take action against brokers and firms who are members and who are
directly involved in or otherwise facilitate market abuse.319
Australia‘s securities regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission
(ASIC), is the sole agency responsible for taking action against market abuse in Australia. It
can seek civil remedies including seeking the imposition of civil penalties by a superior
court. 320 It can bring regulatory criminal prosecutions and investigates criminal cases of
market abuse which then are referred to the Commonwealth (Federal) Director of Public
Prosecutions.321
ASIC primarily prosecutes market abuse offences criminally, not by way of a civil action.
Therefore ASIC is put to a higher burden of proof and must be able to satisfy the court of
each of the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. Although it can bring civil
actions for market abuse, it is still put to a relatively high burden of proof for such matters. As
such ASIC usually opts to bring criminal prosecutions for market abuse because of the
deterrent value of such prosecutions.322
Through its Markets Disciplinary Panel, ASIC can also take disciplinary action against
licenced market participants for breaches of its market integrity rules.323 Until 2010 there was
only one main securities exchange operator in Australia, the Australian Securities Exchange
(the ASX) which dominated the market for listed securities. The ASX also conducted its own
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disciplinary proceedings for breaches of its market integrity rules. 324 In August 2010 the
disciplinary function over all licenced market participants was transferred to ASIC. In the
same year the market for ASX listed securities started to fragment with ASIC allowing a new
provider (Chi-X Australia) to also trade in ASX listed securities.325
Part 2 Impact of the changes to the markets on market abuse
It is clear that the transformation of securities markets over the last few decades has
presented new challenges for securities regulators in terms of their enforcement activities.
While some of their enforcement work has remained relatively constant, factors such as the
globalization of markets, improvements in technology, fragmentation of the markets and the
rise of new types of market participants have all had an impact upon the types of market
abuse matters that are detected and how regulators strategize to effectively deal with these
cases.
Most regulators reported that they are detecting and investigating significantly more
instances of market abuse that have a cross border dimension than they were a decade ago.
This increase has been driven by a complex combination of globalization, interconnected
markets, increases in the speed of trading and the proliferation of ways to trade the same
economic interest.
In relation to market manipulation matters in particular, some regulators report that a
significant proportion of these matters seem to have some element of the activity that took
place outside of the jurisdiction. For example, BaFin currently investigates about 30 cases of
insider trading a year and about 100 market manipulation cases. The majority of these cases
of market manipulation have elements of the activity that were conducted outside of
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Germany. By way of contrast only approximately 5% of these insider trading cases have
elements of the activity that were conducted outside of Germany.326
The aspect of the activity that occurs outside of the jurisdiction can also differ between
insider trading cases and market manipulation cases. In relation to insider trading, frequently
the only foreign aspect of the investigation is that the perpetrator has a bank account in
another country to deposit the proceeds or trades through a family member or broker in that
other jurisdiction. In some cases it appears that this may have been done to disguise the
activity from the scrutiny of the authorities. For example, a person with inside information
resident in Germany may use a bank account in Switzerland to deposit the proceeds of their
insider trading.327
By way of contrast, in market manipulation matters, the schemes appear to be more
organized and there may be different aspects of the behaviour that takes place outside of
the jurisdiction. For example, the perpetrators may use a foreign website to disseminate
information to ‗pump‘ the price of the securities as part of a pump and dump market
manipulation scheme. Alternatively, the perpetrators may not be situated in the jurisdiction
where the trading took place and may be conducting transactions such as wash sales or
matched orders from outside of the jurisdiction.328 Furthermore, given that the perpetrators
of these schemes operate across jurisdictions, they have an enhanced capacity to move the
activity if an investigation commences in a particular jurisdiction. This can then frustrate the
efforts of the enforcement staff who may discover that by the time an investigation is
complete, those involved have ceased the activity in one country and shifted their illicit
activities elsewhere.329
A significant percentage of cross border market manipulation cases detected by securities
regulators appears to be concentrated in the lightly regulated, or penny stock markets, in the
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US and Germany. In Germany, in 2012 Deutsche Börse closed the market which was most
susceptible to such manipulation being the First Board of the Open Market. Although it has
now been closed it will take several years for BaFin to deal with the large number of market
manipulation matters which took place on this market because of the time lag between
detection, investigation and then prosecution. However BaFin anticipates that because this
market is now closed the number of market manipulation cases should fall. 330 In the US the
approach has been to ramp up enforcement efforts by, for example, suspending trading in
dormant companies. FINRA has also been active in taking action against brokers who have
facilitated manipulative trading in these markets with a view to deterring brokers from acting
for such clients.331 In addition the SEC has been actively working with the FBI using cooperators to gather evidence against persons who systematically engage in large scale
pump and dump schemes. This can lead to more compelling evidence being gathered
against the perpetrators of these schemes which, in turn, can lead to quicker and more
successful prosecutions.332
Despite detecting more instances of cross border market abuse, it is not possible for
regulators to conclude whether this is because there is more cross border market abuse
occurring or because they are just getting better at detecting such matters. Certainly over the
last decade there have been significant improvements in systems and methodologies aimed
at detecting market abuse, such as more sophisticated software which analyses news
reports which may cause price movements in securities. Additionally, information that is
obtained can be analysed in more sophisticated ways. For example, FINRA now retains data
in relation previous instances of unusual trading and can mine this data for patterns as new
instances of unusual trading are detected. This may allow FINRA to detect more instances
of, for example, systematic insider trading.333
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New Market Participants
New participants in the market who have emerged over the last decade, in particular, high
frequency (or algorithmic) traders, have changed the nature of some market abuse that is
detected. Most high frequency trading is arguably positive for the market and works to
improve liquidity. However, some trading strategies are manipulative, such as igniting
interest by spoofing, layering or quote stuffing, and there are a number of variations in such
manipulative trading strategies. For example, spoofing of orders used to be confined to
outside of the spread between the highest offer to buy and lowest offer to sell a security, but
can now even occur inside the spread even though this has carries the risk that a trade will
be executed. Often, the victims of such manipulative techniques are other algorithmic traders
who must then engage in defensive strategies to protect themselves from manipulation. This
can lead to what is akin to a ‗cat and mouse‘ game, where defensive strategies are met with
a response from the other trader, causing further modifications to trading strategies. 334
Investigating algorithmic trading for possible market abuse can be highly challenging and
resource intensive. For instance, almost invariably the investigator first has to unravel the
algorithm to determine if the trading strategy is actually manipulative and then, if it is
manipulative, analyse whether or not it can be proven to have violated the law. 335
Furthermore, as high frequency traders often seek to profit by making only pennies per trade
on a large number of trades, a huge volume of data necessarily has to be analysed to
investigate the allegation effectively. Because of this intrinsic complexity in investigating
possible market abuse by high frequency traders which, in turn, requires a high commitment
of technology resources, in 2012 IIROC changed its fee structure. As a self-regulatory body
IIROC is non-profit and works on a cost recovery basis from its members. The new fee
structure is based upon the numbers of orders and trades made by a member and as such

334
335

Interview with FINRA.
Interview with FINRA.

119

high frequency traders are being levied higher fees to reflect the technology resources
IIROC needs to monitor these market participants.336
Another issue is the speed at which the trading takes place. Sometimes the orders are
placed so extraordinarily quickly that the time clocks of the market or markets simply cannot
record sufficient granular detail of the precise time in which the orders were placed to enable
a full reconstruction of the exact sequence of events. Because of this, regulators are working
to improve the detail of the time stamping of orders and trades and to coordinate the time
clocks of different markets.337
In the last few years there have been several cases in the US and the UK in which securities
regulators have been able to prove cross border market manipulation by high frequency
traders. These cases are centred in these jurisdictions probably because the US and the UK
are leaders in innovations in market structure. For example, US markets are characterised
by high levels of liquidity, fragmentation, high speeds of information transfer, high speeds of
trading and efficient linkages between markets. These characteristics of US market structure
result in very efficient markets with low execution costs. However, these same
characteristics may make the markets more prone to market manipulation techniques, such
as layering and spoofing. As other markets alter their market structure, fragment and
execution costs are reduced as a result, regulators of those other markets may start to
observe similar problems develop in their markets.338
Part 3 Detection and Investigation Issues
Detection Issues
In detecting instances of cross border market abuse, detection methods do not differ
markedly from those which are used to detect market abuse which takes place wholly within
the jurisdiction of a regulator. The most frequent methods of detection are market
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surveillance, suspicious transactions reports and information by way of complaints, tip offs or
whistleblowers.
a) Market surveillance
The main way in which market abuse is detected is unusual trading identified by market
surveillance. However surveillance practices around the world vary significantly, particularly
in relation to which kind of organization is responsible for conducting market surveillance as
well as the level of cross market and cross asset surveillance. 339
In relation to the organization responsible for conducting surveillance, in Australia, market
surveillance is undertaken solely by ASIC the securities regulator. In Canada and the US,
market surveillance is undertaken principally by one self-regulatory organisation being IIROC
in Canada and FINRA in the US. In Germany and the UK surveillance is principally
undertaken by the individual trading venues.340
In US and Canada, the self-regulatory bodies, FINRA and IIROC, conduct surveillance over
most of the markets. This allows FINRA and IIROC to conduct cross market surveillance. As
is referred to in Chapter 2, in order to further enhance its detection of market abuse, under
the direction of the SEC, FINRA is developing a consolidated audit trail whereby all data
from all of the markets will be collected in a consistent form and consolidated. 341 The
consolidated audit trail will require brokers to enter into one central data point, accessible by
FINRA, customer information in relation to trades and orders. From a market surveillance
point of view, this system should greatly enhance the transparency of the market, allowing
FINRA to quickly track trading patterns of market participants across different trading
337
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venues. However this increase in surveillance capacity is likely to be expensive to develop
and maintain, particularly given it is estimated that this will eventually evolve into the second
largest database in the world.342
In Canada brokers and clients of brokers who have direct electronic access to markets or
clients who have a routing arrangement are required to use a client identifier at the time of
entry of the order. This information is available to IRROC in real time.343 In 2005 the CSA
proposed a project, called the Trade Reporting and Electronic Audit Trail Standards (or
‗TREATS‘) to develop a consolidated audit trail to collect, in a standard form, information on
orders and trades and to allow IIROC to analyse trades and orders by way of a unique
customer identifier. 344 It appears that this project was cancelled in 2009 because of the
sheer size and complexity of the project and uncertainty about whether market integrity
would actually be enhanced as a result.345 It may also have been cancelled because brokers
lobbied extensively against it. As such, in Canada, like other markets, in most cases
information in relation to which retail customer placed an order has to be obtained by
investigators via an information request directed to the broker who placed the order.
Accordingly this information is not immediately accessible to the organisation conducting
market surveillance.346
In Australia, surveillance is undertaken by ASIC, not an exchange or self-regulatory body.
Until relatively recently, there was only one dominant exchange, the ASX. As such, Australia
had not experienced the fragmentation of the markets that has occurred in other countries
and therefore it was not necessary to conduct cross market surveillance. Since 2011 a
number of new exchanges and ATSs have been licenced to trade ASX listed securities.
Drawing from the experience of other jurisdictions, ASIC is aware that as markets become
342
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fragmented this may give rise to opportunities for persons to conduct manipulation across
markets. ASIC has therefore taken steps to design and implement its surveillance systems
with a view to enhancing its capacity to conduct cross market surveillance. 347
In Europe, no single entity conducts surveillance over all European markets and generally
each individual market still conducts surveillance over its own market. For example in
Germany each of the six regional exchanges still have separate surveillance units which
conduct surveillance for their own market only. Each of these exchanges is required to report
suspicious trading to BaFin. BaFin also receives consolidated trade data from all of these six
exchanges for analysis. In addition, through ESMA, BaFin has access to data from all
executed trades from all markets in Europe.348
b) Suspicious Transactions Reports
Another important method of detection for regulators in the EU is the system which requires
banks and brokers to report transactions suspected to be market abuse directly to the
securities regulator.
In the EU, banks and brokers are required to file suspicious transaction reports in relation to
suspected market abuse directly to securities regulators. The system of requiring brokers in
Europe to report suspected instances of market abuse can be traced to the first Market
Abuse Directive (MAD), which was formulated in 2001 and implemented in 2005 through the
Market Abuse Regulations.349 This states that:
Member States shall require that any person professionally arranging a transaction in financial
instruments who reasonably suspects that a transaction might constitute insider dealing or market
manipulation shall notify the competent authority without delay.
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Each report must set out the facts that justify the suspicion. This includes information such
as the account used, the date and time of the transaction, the price, the volume and whether
it is a proprietary trade or a customer trade. MAD also required European regulators to
forward a copy of any suspicious report to all other supervisory authorities of organised
securities markets within the EU who may be affected by the report.351
MAD was implemented in Germany by section 10 of the Securities Trading Act.352 As a
result, all banks, investment services providers and multilateral trading facilities are obliged
to report to BaFin transactions that they suspect may constitute insider trading or market
manipulation. Although the organization may execute the trade that is the subject of the
report, it is prohibited from informing the person that it has made such a suspicious
transaction report.353
A second Market Abuse Directive (MAD II)354 and regulations (MAR)355 recently adopted by
the European Commission is designed to, inter alia, increase the number and perhaps
quality of these reports. These changes will strengthen the system of reporting suspicious
trades in a number of ways. First, market intermediaries will be required to not only report
suspicious trades but also have compliance systems in place to detect market abuse.
Second, the obligation to report will also include an obligation to report suspicious

351

See Securities Trading Act s10 (2) and Commission Directive 2004/72/EC of 29 April 2004 implementing
Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards accepted market practices, the
definition of inside information in relation to derivatives on commodities, the drawing up of lists of insiders, the
notification of managers' transactions and the notification of suspicious transactions [2004] OJ L162/70.
352
See Securities Trading Act s 10, online:
<http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Aufsichtsrecht/EN/Gesetz/wphg_101119_en.html?nn=2821360#doc2684270
bodyText15> which provides:
Reporting of suspicious transactions
(1) Investment services enterprises, other credit institutions, asset management companies
(Kapitalanlagegesellschaften) and operators of off-exchange markets on which financial instruments
are traded are obliged to notify the Supervisory Authority without undue delay of any facts giving rise
to suspicion that a transaction with financial instruments is in contravention of a prohibition or
requirement pursuant to section 14, section 20a, section 30h or section 30j....
353
See Securities Trading Act s 10.
354
Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions
for market abuse (market abuse directive) [2014] OJ L173/179.
355
Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market
abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, [2014] OJ L173/1.

124
unexecuted orders and over the counter transactions. 356 Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, member states are required to set sanctions so that a failure by a market
intermediary to report a suspicious transaction, or a failure to have in place proper
compliance systems to detect market abuse, will attract a penalty. As a minimum member
states are to prescribe a maximum administrative penalty of not less than €1 million for a
natural person and €2.5 million or 2% of turnover for other legal persons.357 In exercising
their powers to impose administrative sanctions member states are required to cooperate
with each other and coordinate their enforcement activities.358
BaFin receives between 10 and 20 of these suspicious transaction reports each month, and
half of all of the cases that BaFin investigates are sourced from these reports. The reports
include trading on the exchanges and the OTC markets.359
In the US, although it is not an important method of detecting market abuse, the failure to
report a suspicious transaction has become an important enforcement tool for FINRA. This is
particularly the case when a client, rather than a broker itself, has engaged in market abuse.
In such a situation FINRA has no power to take action against the client. However it may be
able to take enforcement action against the broker for failure to make a report of the
suspicious transaction or for failing to have proper compliance systems in place. 360 In
Canada IIROC also receives reports from market intermediaries of suspicious transactions
and can take action against these intermediaries if their actions or negligence enabled a
client outside of the jurisdiction to engage in market abuse.361
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c) Complaints, whistleblowers and tip offs
All securities regulators have systems whereby individuals and organizations can voluntarily
report instances of suspected market abuse directly to the regulator. These systems of
voluntary reporting are variously referred to as complaints, tips offs or whistleblowers
programs. Most regulators regularly receive a large number of such reports. Whilst these
reports are important, making use of them can be resource intensive. This is because given
the high volume of reports, regulators are required to sift through a large amount of material,
or invest in software systems that can do this, to ascertain real and verifiable instances of
what may be market abuse.
However, despite the resources required to be committed to this method of detection, an
advantage of voluntary reporting as a method of detection is that it may result in the
discovery of market abuse schemes which would not have been discovered using any other
detection method. Another advantage is that it may give regulators the opportunity to gather
direct evidence of market abuse, even real time evidence while the abuse is occurring. By
way of contrast, gathering evidence after the event usually results in a less compelling form
of evidence, such as circumstantial evidence, which requires the adjudicator deciding the
case to make inferences to conclude that the offence occurred. 362
Except for the SEC, regulators do not offer a reward in exchange for voluntary information
leading to a successful enforcement action against market abuse. This SEC offer rewards
due to the enacting in 2010 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act.363 This Act inserted a provision into the Securities Exchange Act enabling the SEC to
make monetary awards to individuals who voluntarily provide original information that leads
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to a successful enforcement action which results in the imposition of a sanction of over
US$1million. The amount of the award is to be between 10-30% of the penalty imposed.364
However, on one view offering rewards for voluntary information may be disadvantageous
and may actually cause problems. This is because by not offering payment may result in the
regulator receiving more reliable information. This is arguably because a person has to feel
genuinely aggrieved to make a report without the promise of a reward.365
Investigation Issues
a) Case selection
After possible instances of market abuse have been detected, the number and type of
matters that are selected for investigation depends upon the case selection procedures of
the particular regulator. Some regulators seem to investigate the majority of instances of
market abuse that have been detected whereas others select only certain cases which fit
within a specific area which has been targeted for enforcement action.
In Australia, for example, before resourcing an investigation ASIC may consider the impact
of enforcement action, including whether particular conduct should be the targeted, as well
as how difficult it will be to prove the breach. ASIC primarily pursues market abuse matters
criminally. The reasons for this approach are that first the penalties available for criminal
contraventions are significantly greater than for civil penalty contraventions and hence the
deterrent effect is likely to be greater. Second ASIC finds that the evidence either exists or it
does not - there being no significant difference, as a practical matter, between the standard
of proof for civil penalty and criminal matters.366
In each case of market abuse ASIC will make an assessment as to how likely evidence to
support the charge is or will become available. ASIC, like all regulators, has limited
resources to commit to its enforcement activities. In addition the mandate of ASIC, like most
364
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regulators, is focused on preserving the integrity of markets situated within its jurisdiction
and maintaining confidence in those markets. Accordingly, the integrity of international
markets tends to be important only to the extent that those markets impact on the local
markets.367 As such ASIC is less likely to pursue cross border market misconduct where the
persons of interest are outside of Australia and/or where the conduct does not impact on the
integrity of the Australian markets, although it does, however, take some cases where the
impact is on the integrity of the foreign market.368 Where ASIC does not take action because
it relates to a foreign market ASIC will generally refer the conduct to foreign regulators or will
take action to disrupt the conduct, for example freeze money which is in Australia, as an
alternative to enforcement action. However ASIC will resource all matters (whether cross
border or not and no matter where the evidence may be located) where the conduct has a
significant (or is likely to have a significant) impact on the integrity of Australia's financial
markets.369
Similarly the types of cases selected for investigation by the FCA in the UK largely depends
upon its resources and enforcement priorities. However, if a particular form of market abuse
is within the parameters of these enforcement priorities it will resource the matter even if
there is an international aspect to the investigation.370
In Germany, s.4 of the Securities Trading Act requires that BaFin must refer to prosecutors
all cases where there is a suspicion of a criminal offence. 371 Market manipulation is a
criminal offence if the manipulation influenced the price. However, this does not mean that
BaFin refers every possible instance of market abuse that is detected - it is only required to
refer cases where it has evidence which meets the threshold that there is a ‗suspicion‘ of
market abuse. Forming such a suspicion usually depends upon the initial assessment of the
367
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investigation. BaFin, like other regulators, also considers the prospects of success of a
prosecution before considering whether to commit resources to the investigation. If BaFin
detects possible cross border market abuse and most of the activity, for example both the
trading and suspects are outside of its jurisdiction, instead of investigating the matter itself, it
may decide to refer the matter to the appropriate foreign regulator. 372
Regulators in the US appear to take a relatively aggressive enforcement approach to market
abuse, even when some of the activity or the participants are outside of the jurisdiction.373
Although jurisdictional hurdles may limit the range of enforcement action that can practically
be taken, in most cases some action can be taken. For example, FINRA may be able to take
action against the ‗gatekeeper‘, that is, the broker, if their actions or negligence enabled a
client outside of the jurisdiction to engage in market abuse. The SEC may be able to seek a
court order to freeze the funds suspected to be profits of market abuse or may try to liquidate
the assets of perpetrators in the US to satisfy outstanding judgments. Furthermore, even if
the perpetrators are not in the US the SEC may seek and obtain arrest warrants for those
engaged in market abuse and then place these individuals on a watch list at US borders.
This would result in the arrest of the perpetrators if they seek entry into the US. For example
in 2008 Nicos Stephanou was arrested at Newark Liberty International Airport by the FBI on
insider trading charges. Mr. Stephanou resided in London and was a citizen of Cyprus. He
flew from Mexico to London but when the plane made a stopover at Newark he was
arrested. According to newspaper reports he later became a co-operator with the FBI and
assisted in obtaining convictions of others for market abuse.374
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b) Gathering Information from outside of the jurisdiction
Once an instance of suspected cross border market abuse is detected, generally information
or evidence must be obtained from outside of the jurisdiction to successfully complete the
investigation. Most regulators reported that it is now generally easier to obtain this material
than it was in the past. This is because of two factors. First, the IOSCO MMoU and, in
Europe, the Memorandum of Understanding between members of the European Securities
and Markets Authority (ESMA MoU) have made obtaining information from foreign regulators
quicker and more straightforward. 375 Second it appears that there has been a significant
relaxation in the approach of some offshore financial centres to providing foreign securities
regulators with information, including information as to the beneficial owners of both
securities and bank accounts.
BaFin can now obtain information it requires for its investigations from most European
countries within a few weeks. Most frequently, the perpetrators use a bank account outside
of Germany, usually in Switzerland, and often the bank account is in the name of an offshore
company. However in Switzerland offshore companies are required to name a natural
person beneficiary. As such BaFin can now obtain information about Swiss bank accounts
and the name of the natural person beneficiary of an account in the name of an offshore
company relatively quickly. It also appears that, because it is becoming more widely known
that regulators can now more easily obtain access to information in Swiss bank accounts,

but, even if this effort is modest by U.S. standards, it may still far exceed the limited attention that securities
fraud receives abroad.‖
375 IOSCO MMoU, supra note 268 and The Committee of European Securities Regulators Multilateral
Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of Information and Surveillance of Securities Activities 26
January 1999, online: <http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/05_335.pdf>. This organization is now called
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), see <http://www.esma.europa.eu/page/esma-short>.
See also Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament of 16 April 2014 on market
abuse (Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) is designed to facilitate cooperation between securities regulators in
the EU in their investigations of market abuse. It imposes obligations on securities regulators in the EU to
cooperate including that ―Competent authorities shall render assistance to competent authorities of other
Member States and ESMA. In particular, they shall exchange information without undue delay and cooperate in
investigation, supervision and enforcement activities.‖

130

those committing market manipulation may be starting to use accounts in other countries, for
example Singapore or Dubai.376
BaFin regularly uses the IOSCO MMoU, the ESMA MoU and a few other bilateral
arrangements to obtain information from other countries. This has improved BaFin‘s access
to information over time, although there still seems to be issues in obtaining information from
some jurisdictions and delays in the process of obtaining information from others. For
example in one case BaFin reported that it had not been able to obtain information it
required from the Dubai Free Trade Zone. It seems that part of the problem in relation to
obtaining this information related to determining who was the responsible securities
regulatory authority.377
The FCA most frequently uses the IOSCO MMoU to obtain information. It also uses the
ESMA MoU and several bilateral treaties. Most requests it makes and receives are from the
USA, France and Switzerland. In relation to criminal investigations of market abuse the FCA
has also made use of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties to obtain evidence, although this
process can be slow. This is because to obtain information via a Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty, the FCA request has to go via the Home Office and then the equivalent government
department in the foreign jurisdiction before it is received by the foreign securities regulator
to be processed. The FCA has also received requests for information from countries that are
not members of IOSCO and may answer these requests if the authority making the request
performs a similar function to the FCA.378
The FCA has experienced some difficulties and delays obtaining information from some
foreign regulators, including from offshore financial centres, although access to such
information is improving. The difficulties can be attributed in part to different objectives and
priorities of other regulators, as well as perhaps a lack of understanding of different legal
systems and requirements. However, frequent communication between regulators ensures
376
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that contact is made with the most appropriate person within the foreign regulator, and this
can reduce these difficulties. Sometimes the delay can be because the foreign regulator has
to engage the assistance of other agencies. For example, FCA may make a request to
BaFin, which requires BaFin to engage the assistance of State prosecutors, who, in turn,
may have to engage the assistance of local police.379
ASIC can obtain information informally from New Zealand‘s securities regulator, the
Financial Markets Authority, and makes use of the IOSCO MMoU in obtaining information
from other regulators. Sometimes it has received information requested via the MMoU very
quickly. For example, in one case it used the IOSCO MMoU to obtain information from
Singapore and Malaysia. In this case, the suspect was detained very early in the
investigation after attempting to leave Australia. As the suspect was in custody, ASIC was
required to compile the evidence within months and this included obtaining evidence from
Singapore and Malaysia. The end result was a successful prosecution in which the accused
pleading guilty because Singapore and Malaysia made it a priority to assist in the
investigation.380 However ASIC still experiences delays in obtaining information from some
other regulators, particularly smaller regulators, and sometimes requests can take up to 12
months for a reply. Often the tardiness of the reply is a reflection of the resources of the
other regulator and/or the priority it assigns to complying with the request verses its own
internal demands. ASIC has also experienced delays in obtaining information from offshore
financial centres. However, it seems these delays may be partly due to the fact these
countries are often small and because small regulators tend to have very limited
resources.381
The OSC also frequently uses the IOSCO MMoU, and this has allowed it to obtain
information it requires, such as trading and client information. In its experience, foreign
379
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regulators respond relatively quickly and there are now very few countries where
perpetrators can hide. The OSC now also can obtain information from most offshore
financial centres relatively quickly. For example, in one case the OSC obtained information
from the British Virgin Islands in four days.382
In the US, although those committing market abuse do sometimes use companies located in
offshore financial centres, FINRA is now better able to get that information to continue its
investigation. For example, FINRA can now more easily obtain information from the Cayman
Islands. FINRA is not a party to the IOSCO MMoU so it currently cannot directly use this
MMoU to obtain information. To obtain information using the IOSCO MMoU, FINRA has to
make a request to the SEC which will in turn then make a request to the foreign regulator.
The information has to then be transferred from the foreign regulator back to FINRA via the
SEC. This multi-stage process can add to the delay in conducting an investigation. FINRA
does recognise the value of the IOSCO MMoU, and has requested that IOSCO consider
creating a new category of membership for self-regulatory bodies who do not have a trade
affiliation such as FINRA. It is hoped that this new category will enable FINRA to also
become a party to the IOSCO MMoU and therefore be able to obtain information via the
IOSCO MMoU directly.383
IIROC and FINRA are members of the Intermarket Surveillance Group (ISG). As discussed
in Chapter 2, only self-regulatory organizations and non-governmental associations that
provide regulation services to markets are eligible to become members of this
organization.384 IIROC and FINRA frequently use the ISG to share information such as price,
trading and client data. Another important function of the ISG is the sharing of intelligence
between members. This could cover issues such as what is happening in each of their
markets, new types of market abuse, the activities of market participants and particularly the
activities of market participants who have a presence in more than one market. As such a
382
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few times a year ISG members meet and, inter alia, discuss what is happening in their
markets and consider case studies of possible market abuse that have been detected.385
One issue for some regulators appears to be that requesting information from a foreign
regulator may result in the person under investigation becoming aware that they are under
investigation.386 For example in one case BaFin reported that the Liechtenstein securities
regulator informed the person under investigation that it had received a request for
information. Such disclosure can cause significant problems for an investigation because if a
search warrant is later executed on the suspect it may not uncover anything as the suspect
has had the time to destroy incriminating evidence.387
c) Obtaining Data
Communications data can provide key evidence of the transfer of inside information between
an insider and a trader. Obtaining evidence of this transfer of information is often the most
difficult part of an insider trading investigation. In relation to market manipulation,
communications data can provide evidence of, for example, trading and trading instructions
and dissemination of information designed to pump the market in a pump and dump
scheme.388
Accordingly in cases of cross border market abuse frequently information that has to be
obtained via a request to a foreign regulator consists of data from information service
providers and cell phone providers in other countries. Obtaining such information can be
385
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complicated by the fact that data storage is increasingly moving from being stored on
individuals and businesses‘ hard drives to data being maintained on virtual servers
commonly known as ‗clouds‘. The actual location of the server that maintains these clouds
may be situated anywhere in the world. This complicates data collection in that the regulator
may have to deal with two parties, the business who created and understands the data and
the cloud service provider which is the repository of the data.
Accordingly in cases where data is critical evidence in an investigation regulators first have
to determine where the data is situated, which may itself add delay to the investigation, and
then, if it is located abroad, request that data via a foreign securities regulator. ASIC
reported that there can be challenges locating where the data is stored and inconsistencies
in regulations between countries as to how long this data has to be stored. Sometimes data
is only stored for six months, which may not be enough time for the regulator to detect the
offence, locate the information service provider and request the information via a foreign
regulator. 389 In one investigation, ASIC tried to obtain PIN messaging between two
BlackBerrys and discovered that at the time of the communications the data was not stored
at all by the cell phone provider.390
BaFin also reported difficulties retrieving data from information service providers, even within
Germany. In some matters it must obtain a data provider order via the prosecutors and this
process can take up to six months.391
Part 4 Success and Failure
Each of the regulators was asked about what, in their view, led to enforcement success or
failure in relation to cross border market abuse cases. The responses varied but there were
some common themes.
A frequent response was that enforcement success is often related to taking action against
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the detected abuse quickly and that enforcement failure is often linked to delay. In relation to
cross border market abuse a number of regulators commented that enforcement success
was related to how quickly information was received from a foreign regulator after it was
requested. Instances where a request is given high priority by a foreign regulator and
information is thereby obtained quickly can significantly contribute to the success of the
enforcement action. By way of contrast, delays in obtaining information from abroad can
cause problems for investigations. For example, a delay in an investigation can allow
perpetrators to move assets beyond the jurisdiction, thereby frustrating a regulator‘s capacity
to collect any fines that are eventually imposed. In this respect it seems that any changes
that can be made to accelerate the system of requesting and receiving information could
lead to more successful outcomes for investigations. This could include making the system
in relation to the exchange of information less formal and bureaucratic.
Connected with this theme of the imperative to an investigation to obtain information quickly,
some regulators stressed that fostering cooperation and maintaining good and open lines of
communication with foreign regulators was important to ensure that the information was not
just timely but also accurately responded to what was requested. Such cooperation can also
foster an understanding of different legal systems, regulatory and market frameworks, and
enforcement priorities, as well as the constraints under which foreign regulators operate.
Part 5 The securities regulators’ response
The responses from securities regulators indicate that they are acutely aware that the rapid
increase in the complexity of the markets has made their jobs more challenging. In particular
they do seem to be detecting more instances of cross border market abuse, particularly
cross border market manipulation, which seems to increase the difficulties in their ability to
investigate and take effective enforcement action. It seems that this may sometimes mean
that the ultimate perpetrator of the manipulation ultimately escapes liability with the regulator
only taking action against the gatekeeper, that is the broker, in an effort to deter brokers from
allowing their systems to be used for such activities.
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Detection
In terms of detection, although more cross border market abuse is being detected, it is
unclear whether current detection mechanisms are sufficient in their ability to detect, and
thereby deter, cross market and cross border market abuse. Certainly it is perhaps of some
concern that market surveillance in Europe remains with the surveillance units of individual
trading venues, limiting the ability to conduct cross market surveillance. For example,
although regulators such as BaFin have access to consolidated trading data, and could use
this to conduct cross market surveillance it is not clear that they do in fact conduct this
surveillance. Furthermore order data remains with the individual trading venues which must
limit the ability to detect manipulation of orders across markets. Perhaps the absence of
cross market surveillance is why the European regulators, the FCA and BaFin, are more
frequently detecting market abuse via suspicious transaction reports.
By way of contrast the SEC, Canada and Australia conduct cross market surveillance which
seems to enhance their ability to detect market abuse. Furthermore after the consolidated
audit trail is implemented the SEC will have the most sophisticated detection capabilities
across its markets. In particular the ability to see individual client trading across markets
should result in quicker detection, investigations and prosecutions. Although this
consolidated audit trail will be very expensive and complex to implement, it seems that the
SEC has taken the view that it is necessary to maintain the integrity of its markets. This
raises the issue of whether other countries should follow suit, notwithstanding the costs and
complexity in developing such a system.
In terms of cross border surveillance there seems to be little in the way of cross border
surveillance systems. It seems that if a surveillance matter has a cross border aspect
regulators must rely on the ISG as a mechanism to obtain the information that is needed. As
highlighted in Chapter 2 the ISG may not be the ideal organization to be charged with the
responsibility to exchange such information.
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It seems also that all regulators use systems of voluntary reporting of market abuse which
enhance their ability to detect market abuse. It also appears that some regulators are
augmenting the way in which they to detect market abuse via voluntary reporting by
investing in systems to mine such data. In relation to such voluntary reporting the SEC
stands alone in offering payment for such voluntary reports.
Investigations
It is clear that the increasing complexity of the markets presents new challenges to
enforcement staff. Investigations of market manipulation cases which involve high frequency
trading seem to be particularly complex and resource intensive. Given that the investigative
resources of securities regulators are finite, one issue for regulators may be whether, on a
cost benefit analysis, should it dedicate a large part of its resources to investigating such
matters when the victims of such manipulation seem primarily to be other high frequency
traders, not institutional and individual investors? Alternatively should regulators develop fee
scales based upon the number of orders or trades to take into account the cost of such
investigations as IRROC has done?
Issues in obtaining data, particularly in relation to the fact that a lot of data is being moved to
‗cloud‘ databases also increase the complexity of investigations and seems can add to
delays in completing investigations. Given the enforcement success seems to correspond to
reducing the time that an investigation takes, perhaps more needs to be done to ensure that
such information is stored for a sufficient period and to facilitate the ability of investigators to
obtain information from such cloud databases. It also seems that such action will not be
effective if it is limited to enacting laws facilitating such storage and access within a country.
Given the international nature of data storage it seems that an international approach needs
to be taken to this problem.
An international response may also be necessary to encourage regulators to take action
even when the integrity of their own markets is not threatened or to at least make sure that
all matters that are referred to foreign regulators are pursued. Again, due to finite resources
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or perhaps a lack of political will, regulators seem to focus upon matters which impact upon
the integrity of their own markets. However in the longer term this may cause difficulties for
securities regulators. This is because of such policies may emboldened perpetrators
allowing them to continue to attack markets wherever they are situated.
In terms of the success of investigations, it seems that there is general agreement that
success is often linked to the speed of the investigation and that in relation to cross border
market abuse this is impacted by how quickly information needed for an investigation is
exchanged between regulators. It appears some progress has been made to facilitate this
exchange of information in that the IOSCO MMoU seems to be regularly used. However
given the importance of the exchange of information to the success of investigations,
perhaps more could be done in developing this MMoU, or perhaps similar mechanisms, to
assist investigators to progress investigations quickly.
Conclusion
This Chapter has demonstrated that as markets have become more global and trading
increasingly takes place across borders, securities regulators appear to be increasingly
detecting and taking action against cross border market abuse. However the increasing
complexity of markets and new market participants poses new challenges in relation to
methods of detection and investigation. Securities regulators have had to adapt to these new
challenges by, for example, upgrading their systems of market surveillance.
The following chapter continues to explore these issues including considering the trends and
types of cases that are being detected. In addition it continues to analyse what enforcement
policy frameworks may assist securities regulators in their cooperative endeavours to
prosecute cross border market abuse.
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CHAPTER 4

ISSUES OF DETECTION, INVESTIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CROSS
BORDER MARKET ABUSE – REPORTS FROM SECURITIES REGULATORS

The cases of market manipulation pursued by the German supervisory authority are becoming
more and more international. For example, in the case of a stock promoter from Canada who was
sentenced to six years in jail by a US court for market manipulation, BaFin worked with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the New York District Attorney via a state bureau of
investigation in Germany. In another investigation, BaFin had submitted an enquiry abroad and
obtained information on additional incidents of manipulation by the suspect. It transpired that the
perpetrator had already commissioned other stock recommendations and benefited significantly
from them via foreign securities accounts. Armed with this information, the US authorities were
able to establish the perpetrator‘s true financial position, which he had previously misled them
about.
BaFin Annual Report 2010392

In accordance with their mandate to work towards preserving market integrity, securities
regulators are required to take action against market abuse. As detailed in the preceding
chapter, securities regulators have increasingly prosecuted cross border market abuse when
it has impacted the markets that they supervise, and also occasionally when it did not. It also
seems that the cases of cross border market abuse that have been detected have become
more complex and that securities regulators have been increasingly compelled to work
cooperatively with their foreign counterparts in order to investigate these matters.
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This chapter seeks to expand upon the preliminary conclusions outlined in the preceding
chapter. It examines how the increase in the sophistication of the markets has impacted
upon methods of detection, investigation and prosecution of cross border market abuse as
well as classifying the types of cases which have been detected and prosecuted. From this
and the results of the analysis contained in chapters 2 and 3 some recommendations are
made in relation to possible ways to improve the ability of securities regulators to address
cross border market abuse.
Surveying material publically released by Securities Regulators
The research for this chapter consisted of reviewing publically available information
published by the principal securities regulators from Canada, the USA, Australia, the UK and
Germany for the ten years from 1 January 2004 until 31 December 2013.393 Documents
reviewed were all of the Annual Reports published by securities regulators as well as
enforcement reports where available.394 In particular, information was collected pertaining to
changes in their respective enforcement activities and methods over these ten years, as well
information in relation to specific cross border investigations and enforcement actions.
Furthermore, these reports were analysed in regard to what securities regulators observed in
relation to changes in patterns of detected market abuse and, in particular, cross border
market abuse.
In addition, descriptions of cases of cross border market abuse investigated by these
securities regulators were extracted from these reports and, where available, from other
published data bases such as media releases. These individual instances of cross border
market abuse were collated to ascertain whether they revealed a particular pattern or
problem area. These specific instances of cross border market abuse were further examined
in relation to whether they disclosed the use of particular detection, investigation and
393
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enforcement methods.
Limitations to Methodology
Although this process did reveal some trends and patterns, this analysis and the resulting
conclusions must be considered within the context and intrinsic limitations of the information
collected. For example, cases were only extracted in which cross border insider trading or
cross border market manipulation were specifically alleged. There may be cases in which
market abuse was suspected but could not be proven. In such cases action may have been
taken but, if it was based upon the breach of another rule or law such as failure of a broker‘s
compliance system, this data may not have been captured. In addition, cases of market
abuse which are pursued are generally within the discretion of the regulator and so may not
reflect all cases that are detected. This is because cases which are pursued could depend
upon factors such as identified priorities, the resources allocated to enforcement, the ease of
pursuing particular cases and the skills of those involved in enforcement.
Furthermore, there is usually no legal requirement for regulators to publically report specific
information about their enforcement activities. As such information which is reported is
generally made available at the discretion of the management of the particular securities
regulator. As a result statements made and information released could be influenced by the
then prevailing concerns of each regulator and these concerns could shift over time. Indeed
for the years 2004 to 2013, some regulators did not always disclose the same data each
year and the form and information released sometimes changed based upon what appeared
to be shifting priorities set by the regulator. It could also be reasonably surmised that
information provided in relation to reports of individual cases that were not successfully
investigated or prosecuted may be limited to protect the privacy of the individuals involved.
Perhaps also matters which are not successful are not reported as this may attract public
criticism of the work of the regulator. In addition, even though in some cases information
disclosed was not determined by the regulator but was dictated by various performance
indicators imposed upon the regulator by government, these can also shift over the years.
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Additionally, regulators do not publish information in relation to their enforcement activities in
a consistent form with the consequence that direct comparisons could not be made between
regulators from different countries. As such, the analysis set out below is divided by country
and where observations are made in relation to correlations between different countries
these correlations are, by necessity, limited because of the variations in the data and
information released.
Chapter Structure
Give the limitations of the data, the information for each country is analysed separately in
Parts 1 through to Part 5. Part 6 then seeks to build on the material from the previous
chapter, identify common themes as well as possible patterns arising out of the analysis of
each country. It also considers the evolving challenges faced by securities regulators in their
efforts to address cross border market abuse. Part 7 then proposes a number of potential
strategies that may enhance the effectiveness of securities regulators in their efforts to take
action against cross border market abuse.
Part 1 Germany
BaFin does not report specifically identify the number of market abuse matters that it
investigates that have a cross border aspect. It does, however, report the overall numbers of
investigations it commences in relation to insider trading and market manipulation. Figure
3.1 shows that investigations of suspected insider trading fell over the ten year period such
that by 2012 BaFin investigated approximately half the number of insider trading cases it
investigated in 2004. However the number rose again in 2013. BaFin states that this is due
to a new approach it adopted in 2013 whereby ―selected ad hoc disclosures are preanalysed systematically and in a highly standardised manner in order to pinpoint relevant
disclosures with greater accuracy than before.‖395
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In relation to market manipulation, Figure 3.2 shows that those investigations increased over
the decade and by 2012 BaFin was investigating approximately five times as many cases as
in 2004. However the number fell slightly from 2012 to 2013.

Figure 3.1: Insider Trading Investigations commenced
by BaFin 2004-2013
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Figure 3.2: Market Manipulation Investigations
commenced by BaFin 2004-2013
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Cross Border Market Manipulation
This disparity between the number of market manipulation matters investigated and the
number of insider trading matters investigated could mean that BaFin was detecting more
cases of market manipulation, or was simply resourcing more market manipulation
investigations.
a) Manipulation in the lightly regulated ‘penny stock’ markets
From statements made in its Annual Reports, it seems that the reason for the increase in
market manipulation investigations over the ten year period is that a high level of
manipulation was detected in the ‗Open Market‘. The Open Market can be characterised as
a ‗lightly regulated market‘ as the listing rules which must be compiled with in order to list
securities on this market are not onerous compared to the listing rules of larger exchanges.
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The characteristics of the Open Market were described in BaFin‘s 2011 Annual Report as
follows:
In addition to the regulated market, Deutsche Börse AG operates a regulated unofficial market
called the Open Market. Although the trading rules are largely the same as those on the
regulated market, this segment is not an exchange, but a special form of multilateral trading
facility. The Open Market is organised into the Entry Standard and the First and Second
Quotation Boards. Compared with the regulated market, the Open Market has significantly
fewer (transparency) requirements and post admission requirements. These requirements are
the least stringent for the First Quotation Board. The segment includes shares that have not yet
been admitted at any other trading venue recognised by Deutsche Börse AG. Admission to the
First Quotation Board is granted on application by an entity authorised for trading on the Open
Market, normally a securities trading bank. The issuer is not required to be involved in this
process. For admission, it is sufficient if an auditor has confirmed that the entity has equity of at
least €500,000 and each share has a par value of at least €0.10.

396

In response to this increase in manipulation detected in the Open Market, over the ten year
period BaFin increasingly focused more resources on this manipulation in an effort to tackle
this particular problem and shifted resources away from focusing on insider trading.397 Over
the same period BaFin also reported that manipulation in this market became increasingly
international in scope with perpetrators, companies and victims often situated outside of
Germany, but that Germany‘s lightly regulated Open Market was the market where the
trading took place.
This change in approach and the recognition of the international nature of market
manipulation detected is apparent by statements made in BaFin‘s Annual Reports. In 2005
396

BaFin Annual Report 2011, online:
<http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Jahresbericht/dl_annualreport_2011.html?nn=2821414>
at 194.
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For example in 2009 BaFin reported that ―There has been a marked shift in the focus of BaFin‘s report
analysis activities towards market manipulation. Sham actions, such as matched trades, were the focal point of
these activities in 2009 (28; 2008: 16). The shift from insider trading to more market manipulation analyses is
likely to be due to the fact that the current market environment makes it more difficult for potential insiders to
exploit their insider information to their advantage.‖, see BaFin Annual Report 2009, online:
http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Jahresbericht/dl_annualreport_2009.pdf?__blob=publicationFi
le> at 171.
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BaFin reported that 50% of manipulation investigations related to sham trading. These were
transactions which are referred to as ‗matched orders‘, being prearranged transactions
between two entities, or were ‗wash sales‘, being trades but there is no change in the
beneficial ownership of the securities. Another quarter of manipulation investigations related
to informational offences, that is, misleading or incorrect information or the concealing of
information. It also reported that the transactions mainly impacted on ―illiquid equities or
‗penny stocks‘ traded on the OTC market‖.398
By 2007 BaFin reported that this trend of manipulation in the lightly regulated OTC markets
had continued:
Just under two thirds of the positive manipulation analyses concerned shares that are traded
exclusively over the counter... This represents the continuation of a long-running trend:
manipulation takes place mainly in shares with limited liquidity traded on the OTC market.

399

This report also noted that frequently the problem was ―so-called pump-and-dump method
using spam e-mails and market letters.‖ It also reported on the involvement of foreign
companies in such schemes, noting that this ―occurs when shares, mostly of foreign
companies in the commodity sector, are included in the OTC trade at German stock
exchanges.‖ 400 Pump and dump schemes typically involve individuals acquiring a large
quantity of illiquid securities and then working to ‗pump‘ the price by spreading false and
misleading information, or conducting transactions such wash sales or matched orders. The
perpetrator then sells or ‗dumps‘ the securities when the price has increased by virtue of
these artificial mechanisms.
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By 2008 BaFin reported that ―the significance of OTC trading for market manipulation
remained consistently high‖ 401 and that it was identifying ―increasing levels of cross border
manipulation in the German market.‖402 In 2009 it reported:
BaFin also picked up on cases of attempted market manipulation involving regulated unofficial
market instruments as a result of securities orders placed without authorisation in the year under
review. These mainly related to illiquid foreign equities, primarily from the US and Switzerland,
which are traded on the regulated unofficial market. Presumably with the aim of influencing prices,
individuals pretended to be clients on the phone and instructed the bank to buy selected financial
instruments via the corresponding client securities account.

403

In 2010 BaFin again reported that its focus was ‗scalping‘, also known as ‗pump and dump‘
offences, in the regulated unofficial market. It found that 90% of identified market
manipulation related to this market. 404 In the same year BaFin commented that these
offences were highly complex and difficult to investigate and had the greatest potential to
inflict damage.405 They often also involved extensive cross border activity:
The companies whose shares are marketed in this way often come from abroad; recently, there
have been a growing number from Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In all cases, they are
listed on the regulated unofficial markets of German stock exchanges.

406

In its 2012 Annual Report BaFin reported that this focus on market manipulation in the Open
Market was continuing.407 The 2012 Annual Report also contains the following description of
a ‗pump and dump‘ manipulation matter where two of the perpetrators were not residing in
401
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Germany and some of the information driving the increase in the share price was not
published in Germany.408 The matter involved a corporation named De Beria Goldfields Inc.
whose shares were listed on the lightly regulated Open Market of Deutsche Börse AG. De
Beria Goldfields was incorporated in the US and based in Vancouver. Its shares were also
listed on the OTC Bulletin Board in the US. The media also reported that those involved in
this scheme had previously been involved in investment fraud in Canada and Australia. 409
BaFin described the case as follows:
In February 2006, the shares of De Beira Goldfields Inc. were admitted to the Open Market of
Deutsche Börse AG. There was hardly any turnover at first. In May and June 2006, the price was
manipulated significantly upwards in a very short period of time. In a total of 62 publications –
including market letters, a weekly news magazine as well as advertisements in major national
dailies in Germany and abroad – the shares were recommended for purchase on a massive
scale. The perpetrators of this concerted push campaign did not disclose that they themselves
held considerable amounts of the shares. These publications demonstrably influenced the share
price, which climbed from an initial price of €1.90 in the middle of May 2006 to a high of €18.50 in
the middle of June 2006. At the same time, the trading volume increased significantly. From the
middle of 2006 onwards, both turnover and share price declined again, until the shares were left
without any significant trading volume and the share price trended towards zero. The
manipulation generated gross proceeds totaling approximately €38.4 million.
BaFin examined the case, made comprehensive requests for assistance to foreign supervisory
authorities and uncovered the perpetrators‘ positions and sales, which had been concealed
across various companies....
On 12 October 2012, the Regional Court in Stuttgart sentenced a Canadian national to a jail term
of three years and two months, a market letter publisher with a similar previous conviction to a
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News reports have stated that the other two perpetrators were German and that the Canadian was in custody
in Germany. See K Matussek, ―Four Charged in De Beria Goldfields Stock-Manipulation Case‖, Bloomberg (21
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suspended jail term of one year and ten months and the former editor of a news magazine to a
suspended jail term of one year and nine months for collusive market manipulation. In addition,
the market letter publisher and the former editor have to pay €350,000 and €200,000 respectively
to charitable organisations as conditions of their probation. Another suspected principal
perpetrator, who is an Austrian resident, had also been charged. However, since market
manipulation is not considered a criminal office in Austria, the accused was not extradited to
Germany and could not be tried. The judgement is not yet final.
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b) A solution to the problem – the First Quotation Board of the Open market is closed
The full extent of the problem of manipulation in the lightly regulated markets became
apparent by 2008.411 In the same year, in addition to taking action against such manipulation,
BaFin issued warnings in relation to the risks of trading OTC securities, particularly those
from the USA, Canada and Switzerland.412
One issue for BaFin is that it has no power to approve the listing rules set by a securities
market. However from about 2009 Deutsche Börse, which is responsible for setting the
listing rules for the Open Market, clearly became aware of the problem of manipulation on
this market and gradually tightened the listing requirements. In 2009 Deutsche Börse
increased the requirements that had to be satisfied before it would list a corporation‘s
securities, including a precondition that the securities were either already traded on another
410
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exchange, the corporation had share capital of at least €250,000, or a prescribed form
containing detailed information on the securities and the issuer was submitted.413
Despite these changes, the 2010 Annual Report of BaFin was critical of the listing
requirements of the Open Market:
The regulated unofficial market is run by the stock exchanges, but does not count as exchange
trading. It is used primarily to trade small and in some cases highly illiquid stocks that are
frequently of foreign origin. The conditions to be met for companies to be included are extremely
lax compared with the regulated market. There is no serious examination of the issuers, nor must
the companies comply with any reporting obligations. Even companies in respect of which it is
completely unclear whether they have, or are planning, operational business activities can be
included in trading extremely easily and used for manipulative purposes. Although Deutsche
Börse AG introduced stricter inclusion requirements in 2009, this has yet to have any noticeable
414

effect.

In 2011 Deutsche Börse threatened to delist entities that did not meet its new tighter listing
requirements, and initially suspended trading in the shares of 174 entities on the First
Quotation Board. Prompted by new incidents of suspected market manipulation, it then
decided in December 2011 not to admit any new entities to the First Quotation Board.
Finally, in February 2012, Deutsche Börse announced that the First Quotation Board would
be closed and it was closed on 15 December 2012.415
In 2013 BaFin reported that, although the First Quotation Board was closed down in
December 2012, the number of manipulation investigations has not yet decreased
significantly. This was because of matters were still pending from previous years. BaFin did
however report that instances of scalping had decreased since the First Quotation Board
was closed.416
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c) Other instances of Cross Border Market Manipulation
In addition to multiple instances of cross border market manipulation through pump and
dump schemes, over the ten year period from 2004 until 2013 BaFin in its annual reports set
out details of a number of other, perhaps significant, instances of cross border market
manipulation. These were:


In 2004 an instance of cross border manipulation by traders based in London of Bund
and Bobl futures with a view to influencing the price of government bonds.417



In 2007 BaFin prosecuted two private investors, one of whom was German and the
other Polish, in relation to trading a very illiquid option on the Stuttgart EUWAX
exchange by co-ordinating buy and sell orders to create an artificially high price.418



In 2008 BaFin took action in a matter in which two members of the board of directors
of a Swiss company placed orders for call warrants on Pfitzer Inc. shares on the
Stuttgart stock exchange.419

BaFin also reported one instance of assisting a regulator outside of the European Union in
relation to a market manipulation matter. In 2005 BaFin reported on a matter in which false
information in relation to a company was published over the internet in relation to a
corporation whose shares were listed on both German and Australian exchanges. BaFin
assisted ASIC taking action against the accused and a BaFin employee gave expert
evidence in Australia. 420
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In the period 2004 to 2013 in its annual reports BaFin reported on two unsuccessful
investigations of suspected cross border market manipulation. First, in 2007 BaFin reported
that a market manipulation investigation was not successful because the author of an
internet publication which published false information could not be identified. This was
because the internet provider did not, and was not required to, maintain records to identify
the owner of the IP address. 421 Second, in 2010 BaFin reported on an investigation
concerning possible market manipulation which did not result in a prosecution because
BaFin was not able to get the information it required. The trader was a resident in Dubai and
the company that undertook the trading was resident in a free trade zone in Dubai. BaFin
was not able to get the information it required because the free trade zone was not covered
by agreements BaFin had with the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (ESCA)
and the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA).422
Cross Border Insider Trading
BaFin does not report the details of all instances of cross border insider trading. However in
its annual reports from 2004 to 2013 BaFin reported three cases of cross border insider
trading as follows:


In 2007 BaFin took action in relation to the purchase of call options in Switzerland of
Henkel KGaA by a person resident in Germany who purchased these options with
inside information prior to the public announcement of the information.423



In the same year BaFin took action in relation to share purchases made by a director
of a German consulting company with inside information, the company being the
subject of a takeover offer by a Dutch company. The shares were acquired by a
foundation registered in Liechtenstein and a bank in Luxembourg. BaFin reported
that while the investigation was ongoing the defendant turned himself in to the
prosecutor‘s office and confessed to part of the share dealings transacted via
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Liechtenstein. He had been informed of the BaFin enquiry by the Liechtenstein
supervisory authority (the FMA). This was because the FMA gives customers of
locally registered banks the opportunity to respond before it reveals their identity to
BaFin.424


In 2009 BaFin prosecuted an investor relations manager at Deutsche Telekom AG
who passed inside information on to a friend. Before this information was made
public the friend purchased call and put options using both his own accounts, and
accounts of close relatives held in Germany, Luxembourg and Switzerland. Profits
made were more than €2.4 million and the Telekom employee received a cut of
around €70,000 in cash via a bank safe in Luxembourg. In March 2009, in what was
described in as the most severe case of insider trading to be brought to court to date,
the Telekom employee was sentenced to a suspended prison sentence of 15 months
and 50 hours of community service and the friend was sentenced to three years in
prison for insider trading on 34 counts.425

Detection methods
Over the decade 2004 to 2013 BaFin‘s Annual reports provide some information on the
various detection methods it used in relation to market abuse, although it did not report on
how individual cases were detected.
Not unsurprisingly, market surveillance was an important detection mechanism for market
abuse and remains so. In 2012 BaFin reported that in relation to market manipulation more
―than half of the formal investigations launched – 148 – were based on referrals by the
trading surveillance units at the German exchanges.‖426 BaFin also receives transaction data
which is very important for pursuing market abuse. In 2013, BaFin reported that it received:

424

Ibid at 178.
BaFin Annual Report 2009, supra note 397 at 175.
426
BaFin Annual Report 2012, supra note 407 at 174.
425

154

approximately 772 million transaction data records via the German reporting system (previous
year: 698 million) and a further 714 million reports via the pan-European platform (previous year:
606 million).

427

Despite the importance of market surveillance, over the decade suspicious transaction
reports of market abuse became an increasingly important source of detection of market
abuse particularly in relation to market manipulation. BaFin first reported the receipt of
suspicious transaction reports from securities service companies, credit companies, brokers,
operators of OTC markets and foreign authorities in 2006.428 Figure 3.3 shows a dramatic
increase in the number of these reports over the next few years.

Figure 3.3 Suspicious Activity Reports made to BaFin
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html>

From 2006 to 2010 BaFin also reported the number of suspicious transaction reports which
were passed on to it from foreign supervisory authorities. The number of such reports
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gradually climbed from one in 2006 to 25 in 2010. In 2013 BaFin also reported that broken
down by offence, the majority of the reports related to suspected market manipulation.429
Another source BaFin used to detect market abuse were tips and voluntary reports from
investors. For example in 2009 BaFin received 750 tips. 430 Over the ten year period it
appears that most of these were in relation to market manipulation and originated from
investors who purchased shares as a result of false or misleading information.431
International Cooperation with Foreign Regulators
During the ten year period, requests made by BaFin to foreign authorities in relation to
insider trading matters remained relatively steady (Figure 3.4) until 2013. In 2013 these
increased with BaFin reporting that ―the number of cross-border insider trading investigations
increased sharply.‖432 Over the same period the number of requests received by BaFin in
relation to insider trading gradually fell.
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The reported increase in cases of cross border market manipulation (Figure 3.5) over the ten
year period is consistent with a corresponding increase in BaFin‘s requests for information
from foreign regulators in relation to market manipulation and this also seems consistent with
statements made by BaFin in its Annual Reports that it was increasingly focusing more of its
resources on this issue. In contrast, requests received by BaFin from foreign authorities in
relation to market manipulation remained relatively steady.

Figure 3.5 Information requests in relation to Market
Manipulation made to Foreign Regulations by BaFin
and received from Foreign Regulators 2004-2013
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008
Made

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Received

Source: BaFin Annual Reports 2004-2013, online:
<http://www.bafin.de/EN/DataDocuments/Dokumentlisten/ListeJahresberichte/liste_jahresberichte_node.
html>

In 2013 BaFin reported that most of its requests for information to foreign regulators related
to data concerning customers who had engaged in suspicious trading activities on a German
exchange via a foreign institution.433
Part 2 Canada
Although Canada does not have a national securities regulator, since 2006 the Canadian
Securities Administrators (CSA), the umbrella organisation of Canada‘s provincial and

433
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territorial securities regulators, has reported the number of investigations into insider trading
and market manipulation successfully concluded each year across Canada (Figure 3.6). The
number of investigations in relation to market manipulation has remained fairly consistent.
The number of investigations into insider trading has gradually trended upwards. These
figures do not distinguish between instances where the activity took place wholly within the
jurisdiction or was cross border market abuse.
In addition, since 2009, IIROC has published figures annually on the number of matters in
which it took action against its members for market manipulation. It has also published the
number of ‗gatekeeper‘ cases it has prosecuted. These are prosecutions of members who
have allowed their clients to engage in unlawful behaviour, which could include insider
trading (Figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6 Canada – Insider Trading and Market
Manipulation Investigations concluded 2006-2012
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Cross Border Market Manipulation
Figure 3.6 shows that relatively few investigations were conducted across Canada each year
into market manipulation. Although there are no figures as to the number of these matters
that had a cross border dimension, a review of published material produced by the main
provincial securities regulators in Canada revealed that they did sometimes take action in
relation to instances of cross border market manipulation.
From 2004 until 2013 the largest provincial securities regulators reported eleven cases of
cross border market manipulation. Most of these cases were instances of ‗pump and dump‘
schemes where the trading took place on the US OTC markets. In all of these cases the
architects of the schemes, or the brokers that were used, were located in Canada. For
example, one such case is described in CSA enforcement report in 2011 as follows:
Sulja Bros. Building Supplies, Ltd., another corporation and six individuals were involved in a
fraudulent scheme wherein Sulja shares were issued and subsequently traded in a market that
was inflated by overwhelmingly positive but false press releases about Sulja‘s prospects. The
respondents sought to conceal the extent of their involvement by trading through nominee
accounts, creating a misleading appearance of trading activity in Sulja securities and obtaining
trading profits of US$5.6 million. The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) levelled sanctions
against the respondents totalling more than $7 million.
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In addition to those eleven matters in 2011 the OSC reported an investigation into a similar
matter that could not be proven.435
In three of these cases accounts or corporations situated in countries commonly known as
offshore financial centres were used. Offshore financial centres are nation states that have
laws, or are commonly thought to have laws, which protect financial secrecy thereby
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preventing the disclosure of the beneficial ownership of corporate entities and bank
accounts. Presumably accounts or corporations situated in these offshore financial centres
were used in an attempt to conceal the trading from securities and/or taxation regulators.436
In fact in one of these cases the perpetrator admitted that this was indeed the case. The
decision of the BCSC notes that the main perpetrator stated in his sentencing hearing in the
US in relation to related criminal charges that:
In each of these schemes, I conspired with officers of these companies as well as other people
including people from [Commonwealth], the firm in which I worked, which is located in Manhattan.
We made false filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, issued misleading press
releases, placed stock in brokerage accounts opened under other people‘s names and conducted
stock trades to manipulate the price involving those stocks. When the price and volume rose
sufficiently, we bought and sold stock to manipulate the market to our benefit.
To disguise the nature of these profits and to hide our activities from US law enforcement, we
funneled these monies through accounts in other countries. . . . To carry out our schemes, we
made use of national exchanges and stock trading systems, the US mails and telephone calls and
wires across state lines and between the US and foreign countries.
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In another of these matters involving the use of accounts in an offshore financial centre the
BCSC failed to determine the identity of the perpetrators of the scheme because of the
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See Re Firestar Capital Management Corp et al (2011), 34 OSCB 6123; Re Sulja Bros Building Supplies
Ltd, 2011 CarswellOnt 3915; Re Kunekt Corporation and Mark Bruk, 2011 BCSECCOM 225; Downshire
Capital Inc as reported in CSA Activity Report 2010, online: CSA<http://www.securitiesadministrators.ca/uploadedFiles/General/pdfs/CSA2010EnforcementReportEng.pdf> at 19; AMF c McKeown,
online: Lautorite <http://www.lautorite.qc.ca/files/pdf/bulletin/2011/vol8no39/vol8no39_2-2.pdf>; Re Hypo
Alpe-Adria-Bank (Liechtenstein) AG, 2008 BCSECCOM 257. This case involved the use of accounts at a bank
in Liechtenstein. IIROC took proceedings against the Canadian brokers, see IIROC, News Release, ―IIROC
announces settlement with John Anastasious Collias and Karen Marie Young‖ (17 June 2010), online: IIROC
<http://docs.iiroc.ca/DisplayDocument.aspx?DocumentID=9106B99AB86F485CB50B18ED6982F1B0&Langu
age=en>; Re Watson, 2008 CarswellOnt 124; Ontario (Securities Commission) v 1367682 Ontario Ltd, 2008
CarswellOnt 2920. This matter involved the use of accounts in Belize; Investment Dealers Assn. of Canada v.
Boulieris, 2004 CarswellOnt 385. In this matter a US resident conducted a scheme using a Canadian broker; Re
Nano World Projects Corporation and Robert Papalia, 2005 BCSECCOM 648; Re Edward Andrew Durante,
2004 BCSECCOM 634. This matter involved the use of offshore corporations in Nauru, St. Kitts & Nevis. The
perpetrator was from the US but used a Canadian broker; Investment Dealers Assn of Canada v Kasman, 2009
CarswellOnt 4083. This matter involved the use of offshore corporations in Belize and Bermuda. The
perpetrators were from the US but used Canadian brokers; Re Exotics.com Inc, Firoz Jinnah and Ingo W
Mueller, 2006 BCSECCOM 709.
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Durante, supra note 436 at 12.
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banking secrecy laws in Liechtenstein. It did however note that the laws in Liechtenstein
were due to be amended which would permit such disclosure in the future. 438
During the ten year period between 2004 and 2013 there was only one reported case of
cross border manipulation where the trading took place on a Canadian exchange. In 2004
the BCSC reported the settlement of a matter which involved manipulation on the Vancouver
exchange (now the TSX venture exchange). This manipulation consisted of a series of wash
sales by a director in which he utilized an account in Channel Island of Jersey in the name of
a trust that he controlled, presumably in an attempt to disguise his involvement with the
trading.439
Cross Border Insider Trading
A review of case reports of insider trading cases investigated by the principal securities
regulators in Canada revealed only four identified instances of cross border insider trading
over the ten year period.
Three involved the use of accounts in offshore financial centres apparently in an attempt to
conceal the offences. There were:


In 2005 the OSC brought proceedings against a director of a company who
purchased shares in the company using a nominee account in Bermuda before

438

See Re Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank (Liechtenstein) AG, supra note 436 at 9-11:
―In the course of investigating this trading activity, Commission staff has sought from Hypo and the
Liechtenstein financial regulator the information necessary to identify the beneficial owners of the shares
being traded in Hypo‘s accounts. Their inquiries started in July 2007 but they have been unsuccessful. Hypo
says it has been constrained in providing information as a result of Liechtenstein‘s banking secrecy laws.
Although there is a procedure under that regime for disclosure to foreign regulators, it is lengthy and
cumbersome and, in any event, does not appear to allow disclosure in these circumstances. In November 2007
the Liechtenstein regulator ordered Hypo to give commission staff the information it seeks but Hypo appealed
that order because, it says, commission staff‘s request was too broad, and complying with the order would
have had adverse implications for its other clients. The court granted the appeal and suspended the regulator‘s
order, finding that the empowering legislation limits the regulator‘s authority to order disclosure to cases
where the securities have been traded on a regulated market in Europe (which would not include the OTC BB
or the Pink Sheets). The court remanded the matter to the regulator for ―a possible extension of the
proceedings and a new ruling.
Apparently the legislation in question is to be amended to address this issue.‖
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information in relation to the company‘s participation in a private placement was
made public.440


In 2009 criminal insider trading proceedings were brought by the OSC against two
individuals, Gil Cornblum and Stanko Grmovsek, for an insider trading scheme. The
SEC also brought proceedings in the same case and IIROC brought proceedings
against their financial adviser. This scheme operated over a 14 year period from
1994 to 2008 and the individuals netted over $10 million trading Canadian and US
securities. The scheme was uncovered by FINRA and referred to the OSC. The
purchases were made using accounts set up in the Bahamas and the Cayman
Islands.441



In 2013 the OSC prosecuted Richard Bruce Moore, a managing director of
investment banking at CIBC World Markets and later at UBS Securities Canada Ltd.
He used inside information to purchase securities on the LSE and on the TSX via an
account in Jersey, Channel Islands. The OSC notes that the SEC also was taking
action in relation to purchases made in the US.442

In 2007 the SEC commenced proceedings against two Canadians for insider trading on
securities listed on NASDAQ. 443 Following the finalization of these proceedings, the OSC
also brought proceedings against these two individuals.444
International Cooperation with Foreign Regulators
Given the fractured system of regulation across Canada, there are no consolidated reported
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Greenwood, ―Gromovsek gets 39 months for Insider Trading‖, Financial Post (7 January 2010), online:
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In the matter of Richard Bruce Moore, OSC Settlement Agreement, online:
<https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Proceedings-SET/set_20130408_moorerb.pdf>.
443
SEC v Suman & Rahman, SEC Complaint, online: SEC
<https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20203.pdf>.
444
Re Suman, 2012 CarswellOnt 15350.
441

162

figures of requests received by Canadian securities regulators to foreign authorities or made
by them to foreign authorities.
However, since it‘s 2008/09 Annual Report the BCSC has reported on an annual basis some
data in relation to requests it made and received (Figure 3.7).

Figure 3.7 Information requests made by BCSC to
Foreign Regulators and received from Foreign
Regulators
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Source: BCSC Annual Reports 2008/09 to 2013/14, online:
http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/About_Us/Publications/

Figure 3.7 shows that up until about 2010 most of the requests made by the BCSC were to
US authorities. However, since that time the number of requests it is making to other foreign
authorities has increased and in its 2013/14 Annual Report it reported that these included
requests to the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, the FCA and the Panama
Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores.445
The Ontario Securities Commission reported in its 2010 Annual Report that it acted on 36
requests for assistance from foreign securities regulators under the IOSCO MMoU. By 2013

445

BCSC, Annual Report 2013/2014, online: BCSC
<http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/About_Us/Annual%20Report%20201314%20bw.pdf?t=1432659929716> at 66.

163

this had risen to 54 requests (37 coming from US authorities). In 2012 it made 39 requests,
with 20 of those made to US authorities.446 In 2012 it stated:
The largest number of requests for assistance from the OSC come from U.S. regulators,
specifically the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), but an increasing number of requests are made between the OSC and
regulators in Asia and Europe, such as Hong Kong and Germany…..
Requests to the OSC often involve assistance with access to broker and banking records for
investigations, locating people of interest to investigators and compelling testimony from
individuals in interviews. Assistance requests can alert OSC Enforcement staff to possible
misconduct in Ontario which requires prompt action to protect investors and markets here. The
rising level of assistance is being driven by the effectiveness and timeliness of the OSC‘s cooperation and the significant increase in the number of non-U.S. regulators who are compliant
with the International Organization of Securities Commissions‘ (IOSCO) Multilateral Memorandum
of Understanding for information sharing.

447

These disclosures from the BCSC and the OTC suggest that there is a relatively frequent
exchange of information to and from Canadian and US regulators. It also seems that the
level of exchange of information with other foreign regulators is increasing, largely because
of increased use of the IOSCO MMoU.
Part 3 United Kingdom
Although the mandate of the FCA is to protect the UK markets, particularly given its position
within the EU, it has stated that it will take action even if the perpetrator is outside of the UK:
Our market abuse regime applies to anyone whose activity relates to the UK exchange-based
markets, including those overseas. It is based on the Market Abuse Directive that aims to fight
cross-border market abuse by establishing a common approach among EU member states .
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The FCA does not separately report instances of cross border market abuse but does give
overall numbers of investigations of market abuse each year. As shown in Figure 3.8, over
the ten year period the number of market abuse investigations conducted by the FSA
remained relatively consistent.449 This seems to be a reflection of the fact that the FSA was
selective in the types of cases that were chosen for investigation. For example in 2005 the
FSA stated that it did not investigate every apparent breach of the market abuse regime and
rather it adopted a risk-based approach.450 In 2007 the FSA stated that it was its priority to
focus on high-impact cases of market abuse.451 This approach to case selection was further
explained in its 2011/12 Enforcement Report:
The Executive believes we are using the enforcement tool strategically to deliver our credible
deterrence philosophy. We are selective in the cases we investigate. Our considerations include
whether:


the misconduct poses a significant risk to our objectives;



the misconduct is serious in nature;



there is actual or potential consumer loss or detriment;



there is evidence or risk of financial crime or market abuse; and



it is an FSA priority to raise standards in that sector in respect of that issue. ‖

452

Despite the fact that the number of market abuse investigations remained relatively stable,
the FSA did note that cases were becoming more complex.453
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Figure 3.8 FCA Market Abuse cases outstanding at
year end 2003-2012
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One change that occurred over the ten years is a shift in emphasis by the FSA, and then the
FCA, towards seeking criminal sanctions for perpetrators of market abuse and away from
administrative or disciplinary actions.454 In 2009 the FSA brought its first criminal insider
trading case and in 2010 the FSA noted that:
In the last 12 months, we have seen the visible returns on a long-term programme to put criminal
prosecutions at the heart of our credible deterrence strategy in relation to market misconduct.

454
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As referred to in Chapter 2, there has been criticism in the literature of the FSA in failing to bring sufficient
prosecutions to deter insider trading in markets it supervised. See also Barnes, supra note 9 at 155, in which
Barnes analysed criminal cases brought by the FSA and commented ―It has always been believed that ‗City
professionals‘ such as merchant bankers, accountants and lawyers, who are privy to price-sensitive information,
have continued to use offshore companies and nominees in this manner since the 1950s. By means of nominee
holdings and intricate networks, the tracing of organized dealing rings, the swapping of information, is simply
not possible. The only successful prosecutions of insider dealing of City professional ‗rings‘ are the Asif Butt
and others and the Gray, Rowlands, Liggins and Riding cases. Perhaps the largest case is that of Spearman,
Smith and Payne although they are business people from outside London and not City folk. Most of the
remaining cases are, in the words of the FSA, ‗small fry‘.‖
455
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Cross Border Insider Trading
An analysis of Notices and Releases from 2004 to 2013 revealed that the FSA, then the
FCA, took action in nine cases of cross border insider trading. Of these three involved
finance professionals who used the information they had received to trade for the benefit of
their firms or their clients. For example in 2006 the FSA fined a London based broker
employed by Credit Suisse First Boston who received an email from an analyst about a US
company and passed the information on to clients, including hedge funds, which sold or
shorted the stock. 456 Two cases related to persons who gained insider information whilst
within the UK who tipped relatives or friends abroad or traded in those friends or family
members‘ names. For example, in 2009, the FSA prosecuted a senior investment banker,
his wife and a friend in Singapore for insider trading. The three made profits in excess of
£590,000 on trading of over £2m. As part of this enforcement action the friend was arrested
in Mayotte, a French overseas territory in the Comoros Islands, and extradited to the UK.457A
further four cases related to persons outside of the UK who became aware of insider
information about entities whose securities were traded on UK exchanges and who traded
on this information or tipped off others who traded on this information. For example, in 2010,
the FSA fined three Turkish oil company executives for purchasing shares of UK listed
Heritage Oil Plc., prior to the announcement of a major oil discovery in Turkey.458
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See also FSA, Final Notice, Re Seau Pignatelli (20 November 2006), online: FSA
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/final/Pignatelli.pdf> . In 2006 the FSA fined the head of European Cash Trading
at Deutsche Bank in London £350,000 and Deutsche Bank £6.363M for instructing Deutsche Bank to purchase
shares in a Swedish company, Scania AB, while Deutsche Bank was selling shares in Scania to its clients as a
result of a parcel it had acquired from AB Volvo. See FSA, Final Notice, Re Deutsche Bank (10 April 2006),
online: FSA <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/final/deutsche.pdf>. See also FSA, Final Notice, Re Nicholas James
Kyprios (13 March 2012), online: FSA <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/nicholas-kyprios.pdf>.
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banker sentenced for insider dealing‖ (13 December 2012), online: FSA
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In one case in 2012 the FSA prosecuted two UK based brokers who traded contracts for
difference in US securities and tipped other clients of their firm. The brokers received inside
information from a relative who was married to a senior partner in a large US accounting
firm. The total profits generated by the brokers were approximately £1.9 million, while the
total profits generated by their clients were approximately £10.2 million. The FSA noted that
the case was significant as it involved a successful parallel investigation with the SEC, the
US Department of Justice and the FBI.459
Cross Border Market Manipulation
An analysis of Releases and Notices for the period 2004 to 2013 revealed that the FSA
prosecuted five cases of cross border market manipulation over this period.
a) Layering and High Frequency Trading
During the period the FSA and then FCA brought two cases in relation to the manipulative
technique known as layering. Both involved the use by unauthorised persons of direct
market access.
In 2011 the FSA fined the Canadian corporation, Swift Trade Inc., £8m for manipulation.
Swift Trade was controlled by Peter Beck, a Canadian, and operated a network of over 50
customers based in over 150 trading locations worldwide who, in turn, engaged over 3000
traders. None were based in the UK. Swift Trade was granted direct market access by
licensed London Stock Exchange (LSE) brokers. Between 1 January 2007 and 4 January
2008 Swift Trades‘ traders engaged in layering by causing a succession of small price
movements in a wide range of individual securities on the LSE. The trading was widespread
and repeated on many occasions involving tens of thousands of orders by many individual
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FSA, News Release, ―Three guilty of insider dealing‖ (28 May 2012), online: FSA
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/060.shtml>. In its enforcement report of that year, the
FSA commented on this case and stated: ―[O]ne case was the result of parallel investigations in the UK and
USA by the FSA, the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the US Department of Justice resulting in
convictions and fines in both the UK and the USA. Each such investigation or prosecution we bring increases
our ability to bring further cases and strengthens the ties we have with our international regulatory colleagues
tackling similar matters around the world‖. See FSA Enforcement Annual Performance Account 2011/12,
online: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/annual/ar11-12/enforcement-report.pdf> at 9.
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traders who sometimes acted in concert with each other across many locations worldwide. It
was not possible to quantify Swift Trade‘s profits precisely but they and were in excess of
£1.75 million. In March 2007, when Swift Trade became aware that the LSE had raised
concerns about its trading activity, Swift Trade told its direct market access provider that it
would impose effective controls. However, in fact, the manipulation continued when Swift
Trade changed its direct market access provider.460
In 2013 took enforcement action against a high frequency trader, Michael Coscia, for
layering. Between 6 September 2011 and 18 October 2011 Coscia used an algorithmic
program he designed to place thousands of false orders for Brent Crude, Gas Oil and
Western Texas Intermediate futures on the ICE Futures Europe exchange in the UK. He
traded from the US through a direct market access provider. As a result of the price
movements generated by his layering strategy, Coscia made a profit of US $279,920 over
the 6 week period of trading at the expense of other market participant, primarily other high
frequency traders. Coscia received a 30% discount on the fine by agreeing settlement under
the FCA‘s executive settlement procedures and was fined USD 903,176 (approximately
£597,993). The FCA noted that Coscia was also fined by the US Commodities and Futures
Trading Commission and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) also imposed fines for
similar market manipulation by Coscia on US markets.461
b)

Other cases of cross border manipulation

Other cases of cross border manipulation brought by the FSA over the period were:


In 2004 the FSA fined a US hedge fund and the hedge fund manager who made
misleading statements in relation to a corporation listed on the LSE while trading
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FSA, Decision Notice, Re Swift Trade Inc (6 May 2011), online: FSA
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/decisions/swift_trade.pdf>.
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FCA News Release, ―FCA ines US based oil trader US $903K for market manipulation‖, 22 July 2013,
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contracts for difference.462


In 2005 the FSA fined Citigroup Global Markets Limited for manipulation of European
government bonds463; and



In 2011 the FSA fined an Indian businessman living in Dubai for manipulating the
closing price of an instrument traded on the LSE to influence the payout he was due
to receive on a structured product. The brokers who facilitated this manipulation were
also fined.464

Detection Methods
It appears that the main method of detection of market abuse used by the FSA between
2004 and 2013 was market surveillance. In 2007 and 2008 FSA reported that market
surveillance activities were central to its efforts to combat market abuse and that it was
enhancing its surveillance systems. In 2012, it also reported that it acquired software to
enhance its technological intelligence based detection of market risks and abuse.465
Over the ten year period, like BaFin, it appears that suspicious transaction reports
increasingly became an important detection method of market abuse for the FSA. In 2007
and 2008, the FSA reported that it was improving its system of collecting suspicious
transaction reports by standardizing the form of reports as well as its capacity to exchange
these reports with other European securities regulators.466 Subsequently there was a steady
increase in suspicious transaction reports in relation to both insider trading and market
manipulation (Figure 3.9).
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Figure 3.9 Suspicious Activity Reports made to the FCA
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In addition the FCA also has a whistleblower program. In 2013 it reported that it received
6674 reports from whistleblowers. Out of these it opened cases in relation 1,040 reports.467
International Cooperation with Foreign Regulators
Over the ten year period there was also an increase in requests by foreign regulators for
assistance from the FSA although it is not clear how much of this was related to
investigations in relation to cross border market abuse (Figure 3.10).

467

FCA Annual Report 2013/14 supra, 227 at 38-41.
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Figure 3.10 - Requests to FCA from foreign
authorities for assistance
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
Source: FSA Annual Reports 2004/05 to 2012/13, FCA Annual Report 2013/14 online:
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/corporate/annual>

Answering these requests from foreign authorities seemed to absorb a significant amount of
resources as in 2013/14 the FCA stated:
Over the last few years we have seen a steady increase in the number and complexity of
international requests for assistance in enforcement-related matters, and we are expecting this
trend to continue. In 2013/14, we received 1022 formal requests for assistance from our overseas
counterparts in relation to their investigations. Increasingly these require more intensive
assistance, e.g. through interviews as well as the more routine gathering of information and
documents. We also dealt with many more requests though the criminal mutual legal assistance
route.
We have also asked our counterparts overseas for assistance. This commonly involves locating
and interviewing subjects of investigations, or possible witnesses, who may be residing outside
the UK, and using the powers of overseas regulators to obtain documentation or information
located abroad. Effective relationships with our overseas counterparts are vital in enabling us to
deliver case outcomes and to meet our international obligations. Those day-to-day working
relationships are enhanced through our participation in global committees such as the
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International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and in the European Supervisory
Authorities, notably the European Securities and Markets Agency (ESMA).

468

There also seems to be a large imbalance in the number of requests the FSA received and
the FCA receives far more requests than it makes.469
It also seems that the FCA is now more frequently engaged in parallel investigations. In its
2013/14 Enforcement Report it stated:
We have seen a steady increase in the number of cases we conduct in parallel with overseas
regulatory authorities over the last few years as misconduct across borders becomes increasingly
common. We have worked with the international regulatory community to build on existing
relationships and expertise to work together to tackle misconduct that often crosses borders.

470

Part 4 USA
The SEC takes a relatively large number of market abuse every year compared to other
securities regulators. In 2004 the SEC initiated 42 insider trading matters involving a total of
95 individuals and respondents. 471 In 2013 this had increased to 58 insider trading
matters.472
The SEC also does not separately report the number of cases that it investigates that
involve cross border market abuse. 473 However, it has reported that there were more
instances of investigations that required evidence to be obtained from outside of the US and
that these investigations have increasingly became more complex over time. For example, in
the 2004 Annual Report the SEC stated:
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The increasingly global nature of the capital markets has resulted in an increase in SEC cases
with international elements, and has heightened the complexity of many SEC cases. Many SEC
cases on which the Office of International Affairs assisted the Division of Enforcement involved
complex factual scenarios, such as those presented by fraudulent boiler rooms operating across a
range of international jurisdictions. Other cases posed challenging issues related to conflicts of
law such as cross-border asset freezes or the production of foreign audit workpapers.
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Perhaps in partial response to this increasing complexity, the SEC in 2004 reported a large
increase in funding for its activities and an increase in the number of employees. The SEC
also made additional changes to the structure of its Division of Enforcement in 2007 and
2010 to target specific enforcement areas. In 2007 it set up a hedge fund unit to target
insider trading by hedge funds. The work of this unit led to a number of insider trading
charges involving hedge funds. 475 In addition, since 2010, the SEC has five specialized
investigative units dedicated to high-priority areas of enforcement. One of these is a market
abuse unit targeting high-volume and computer-driven trading strategies, large-scale insider
trading by market professionals and others and market manipulation schemes.476
Cross Border Insider Trading
A review of SEC Complaints and Litigation Releases from 2004 to 2013 reveals no particular
pattern in relation to the number of cross border insider trading enforcement actions that the
SEC brings each year (Figure 3.11). It averaged 8 per year and varied from a low of two in
2004 to a high of 12 in 2007.
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SEC Annual Report 2004, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar.shtml> at 58.
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Figure 3.11 - Cross border insider trading actions by
SEC
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a) Trading abroad or tipping of friends or relatives abroad
A large percentage of the cases of cross border insider trading over the period between
2004 and 2013 involved persons who obtained inside information whilst living within the US
and either tipped relatives and/or friends abroad or traded in the names of these family or
friends names in another country.477 One of these is a case described in the 2011 Annual
Report as follows:
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In 2005, see SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v Zomax Inc et al, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19262.htm>; SEC, Complaint, SEC v Loomans & Loomans, online:
SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19075.pdf>; SEC, Complaint, SEC v Sudol et al, online:
SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19162.pdf>. In 2006, see SEC, Complaint, SEC v
Anticevic et al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19775.pdf>, a case in which
the trades came from persons located in Australia, China and Belgium; SEC, Complaint, SEC v Obus et al,
online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19667.pdf>, a case in which some of the
securities were distributed to a hedge fund in the Cayman Islands. In 2007, see SEC, Complaint, SEC v Jennifer
Wang et al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20112.pdf>. In 2008, see SEC,
Complaint, SEC v Kan King Wong et al, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20447.pdf>. In 2009, see SEC, Litigation Complaint, SEC
v Tang, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp21271.pdf>; SEC, Complaint, SEC v
Naseem, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/34-59367.pdf>. In 2010, see SEC, Litigation
Release, SEC v Arnold McClellan and Annabel McClellan, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21758.htm>; SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v Poteroba et al,
online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21460.htm>; SEC, Complaint, SEC v Wyly et al,
online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21607.pdf>. In 2011, see SEC Complaint,
SEC v Andrew Liang et al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21987.pdf>; SEC,
Complaint, SEC v George Holley et al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comppr2011-9.pdf>; SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v Cheng Yi Liang, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21987.pdf>; SEC Complaint, SEC v Zizhong Fan et al,
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The Commission brought an action against Annabel McClellan, the wife of a former Deloitte Tax
LLP partner, for repeatedly leaking confidential merger and acquisition information to family
members in the UK. These family members traded in advance of seven deals worked on by Ms.
McClellan‘s husband, netting nearly $3 million for themselves (and approximately $20 million for
friends and clients). Ms. McClellan subsequently settled the Commission‘s action by agreeing to
pay a $1 million penalty, and, in a related criminal case, she pleaded guilty to obstruction of
justice during the Commission‘s investigation. In a case of international cooperation, the UK
Financial Services Authority filed charges against Ms. McClellan‘s family members for their role in
the scheme. That case is pending.
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It seems that this was the same matter which was described in the 2012 FSA Annual Report
as a successful case of a parallel investigation by the FSA, the SEC and the DOJ.479
b) Individual outside US trading or tipping others to trade on US exchanges
Another substantial category of matters were those in which an individual residing outside of
the US became aware of inside information about corporations whose securities are traded
on US exchanges and traded on this information or tipped others to trade on this
information.480 Typically these persons obtained inside information when a corporation with

online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21820.pdf>. In 2012, see SEC, Litigation
Complaint, SEC v Timothy McGee et al, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp22288.pdf>. In 2013 See SEC Litigation Release, 25 July
2013, ―SEC Charges Former Portfolio Manager At S.A.C. Capital with Insider Trading‖, online:
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2013/lr22761.htm>.
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In 2004, see SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v Levy et al, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19217.htm>; SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v Kryzda (on file), in
which purchases were made from Panama and Mexico. In 2005, see SEC, Complaint, SEC v Liang, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19049.pdf>. In 2006, see SEC, Complaint, SEC v Cavallero et
al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19731.pdf>; SEC, Litigation Release,
SEC v Jeong, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19531.htm>. In 2007, see SEC,
Complaint, SEC v Euro Security Fund et al, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20211.pdf>; SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v Suman et al,
online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21419.htm>; SEC, Complaint, SEC v Shane
Bashie Suman and Monie Rahman, online: SEC
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online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20157.pdf>; SEC, Complaint, SEC v
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SEC, Complaint, SEC v Luiz Junior, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20013lgmj.pdf>; SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v Jones
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which they were involved made a takeover offer for a US corporation. For example, in its
2010 Annual Report, the SEC reported on the following matter:
In an expedited investigation spearheaded by the Division of Enforcement‘s Market Abuse Unit,
the Commission swiftly charged two residents of Madrid, Spain with insider trading and obtained
an emergency asset freeze. The residents made nearly $1.1 million by trading while in the
possession of material non-public information in advance of a public announcement of a multibillion dollar tender offer by BHP Billiton Plc. to acquire Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan Inc. One
of the defendants is the head of a research arm at Banco Santander, S.A., a Spanish banking

and Godden, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20129.htm>; SEC, Complaint, SEC
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In 2010, see SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v Di Nardo et al, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21935.htm>; SEC, Complaint, SEC v Gianluca Di Nardo,
online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21687.pdf>; SEC, Complaint, SEC v Garcia
and Sanchez, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-153.pdf>; SEC,
Complaint, SEC v Levinburg, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21405.pdf>;
SEC, Complaint, SEC v Richard Verdiramo et al, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21447.pdf>. In 2011, see SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v
Re All Know Holdings Ltd et al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22508.htm>;
SEC, Complaint, SEC v All Know Holdings Ltd et al, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp22194.pdf>; SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v Abatemarco,
online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21980.htm>; SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v
Phillip MacDonald et al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21807.htm>; SEC,
Litigation Release, SEC v Kohler et al, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21860.htm>. In 2012, see SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v Well
Advantage Ltd et al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22428.htm>; SEC, Litigation
Release, SEC v Guth, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22374.htm>; SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v Siming Yang et
al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22320.htm>; SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v
Quorne Limited and Sarkesian, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22312.htm>, SEC
Complaint, SEC v Peter Siris et al, online: <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-1462.pdf>. In 2013 see SEC Press Release, SEC v. Badin Rungruangnavarat, September 5, 2013, online:
<www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539798614#.Uj-NxoYjLmg>, SEC Complaint,
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group advising BHP on its bid. In addition to the emergency relief, the Commission is seeking
permanent injunctions, disgorgement and penalties. The SEC‘s investigation is continuing .
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In 2013 the SEC reported that it had criminally charged Cedric Cañas Maillard, who served
as an executive advisor to Banco Santander's CEO, and a former judge in Spain with insider
trading. It alleges that Maillard purchased Potash Corp. contracts-for-difference (CFDs),
which were not traded in the U.S. but based on the price of U.S. exchange-listed Potash
stock.482 Interestingly the SEC is continuing to pursue these charges even though both were
charged and cleared of insider trading arising out of the same events in Spain and neither is
resident in the US.483
c) Insider Trading Schemes
The majority of cross border insider trading cases did not involve a systematic scheme of
insider trading with a large network of people but rather were more akin to opportunistic
insider trading, whereby a person obtained inside information as a result of their position
within a corporation or professional firm and, as a consequence, traded or tipped others.
One exception was a matter in 2006 where the SEC took action against what it described as
was a:
widespread and brazen international scheme of serial insider trading orchestrated by Plotkin, a
former Associate in the Fixed Income Research division at Goldman Sachs Group (―Goldman
Sachs‖), and Pajcin, a former analyst at Goldman Sachs, resulting in at least $6.8 million of illicit
gains.

484

Plotkin and Pajcin actively recruited individuals into the scheme who had access to price
sensitive information that had not been made public. For example, one was an employee of
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a printing plant that printed a business newsletter. The scheme members tipped a number of
individuals in a number of European countries, who received the tips in exchange for a
percentage of the profits they made from trading based on this information.485
d) Purchase of Call Options
Another common category of cases were instances where there was a suspicious purchase
of securities, often call options, made by an unidentified foreign entity immediately before a
takeover offer. These purchases were made through brokers located in Europe, most
commonly Switzerland. 486 For example, in 2008, the SEC sought the profits and a civil
penalty against an unknown defendant who purchased call option contracts in DRS
Technologies Inc. immediately prior to the announcement of a takeover offer for this
corporation. In 2006 this same entity had also purchased call option contracts in another
corporation traded on US exchanges, American Power Conversion Corp, again immediately
prior to the announcement of a takeover offer for this corporation. Both purchases were
made through an account at UBS in Zurich, Switzerland and resulted in a combined profit of
$3.3M.487 In the case of some of these suspicious purchases of call options by unidentified
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foreign entities, it appears that the SEC did pursue the name of the beneficial owners from
the authorities in the jurisdictions where the call options were purchased and then took
enforcement action against these persons.488 For example, in the DRS and American Power
Conversion case, the SEC later discovered from the Swiss authorities that the purchasers
were three Italian citizens. These individuals subsequently agreed to disgorge the profits
from their trading and pay a civil penalty to the SEC.489
e) Computer Hacking
During the ten year period, the SEC also took enforcement action in several cases that
involved trading on information that was stolen through computer hacking.490 For example, in
one case an Estonian national hacked into a news wire service that distributed press
releases in relation to listed corporations and on multiple occasions traded in the securities
of the corporations before these press releases were made public.491
f) Use of Offshore Financial Centres
The use of accounts in offshore financial centres was common in many of the detected
cases of cross border insider trading actioned by the SEC over the ten year period. Again
these jurisdictions were probably used in an attempt to conceal the activity from the
authorities. In addition to the purchase of call option contracts through Switzerland,
frequently perpetrators used corporations incorporated in the British Virgin Islands.492
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A striking example of the use of offshore financial centres in an attempt to disguise insider
trading is the case of SEC v Samuel Wyly et al. In that case two directors of a number of
public companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange traded whilst in possession of
inside information and used what the SEC described in its complaint as follows:
The apparatus of the fraud was an elaborate sham system of trusts and subsidiary companies
located in the Isle of Man and the Cayman Islands (collectively hereinafter the ―Offshore System‖)
created by and at the direction of the Wylys. The Offshore System enabled the Wylys to hide their
ownership and control of the Issuers‘ securities (hereinafter ―Issuers Securities‖) through trust
agreements that purported to vest complete discretion and control in the offshore trustees. In
actual fact and practice, the Wylys never relinquished their control over the Issuer Securities and
continued throughout the relevant time period to vote and trade these securities at their sole
discretion.
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g) Protecting the Integrity of non-US markets
Almost universally the cases of cross border insider trading in which the SEC took action
were ones in which the activity somehow threatened the integrity of the US markets, either
directly because it involved trading on US markets, or because it indirectly impacted the
integrity of US markets, if, for example, the underlying economic interest was US securities.
One exception was a case in 2012 in which the SEC took action against a US based hedge
fund manager who manipulated the price of two Chinese bank stocks listed on the Hong
Kong stock exchange. In this case the activities of the hedge fund manager seemed to have
no impact on US markets but threatened the integrity of the Hong Kong stock market.494
Cross Border Market Manipulation
A review of SEC Litigation Releases and complaints revealed that there were no cases of
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SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v Tiger Asia Management Llc et al, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22569.htm>.
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cross border manipulation taken by the SEC in 2004. From that time the number of cases
averaged 5 with a high of 8 cases in 2012 and a low of one case in 2010 (Figure 3.12).

Figure 3.12 - Cross border Market Manipulation
Enforcement Actions by SEC 2005 to 2013
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a) Pump & Dump Schemes in Penny Stock Markets
Throughout the years from 2005 to 2013 the vast majority of cases of cross border market
manipulation were ‗pump and dump‘ schemes of illiquid securities quoted on the lightly
regulated markets or ‗penny stock‘ markets, in particular the OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB)
and the Pink Sheets.495 It was also not uncommon for the perpetrators of these schemes to
495
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use accounts or corporations located in offshore financial centres, such as the British Virgin
Islands, Anguilla, the Bahamas and Turks and Caicos presumably in an endeavour to avoid
detection by US regulators.496
These ‗pump and dump‘ schemes took a variety of forms but typically followed the pattern of
a person taking a large stake in the target company and then ‗pumping‘ the securities by way
of promoting the corporation in internet postings and/or igniting interest via wash sales and
matched orders. For example, in the case of SEC v Jessop et. al the SEC took action in
relation to the unlawful manipulation of the common stock of Cameron International, Inc.
("Cameron"), a small and thinly-traded purported marketing firm quoted on the OTCBB. The
manipulation drove the share price from pennies to $90 per share in a two month period,
even though there was no significant news concerning the company. Cameron was
described in the SEC‘s complaint as being a tiny company with virtually no assets or
business operations. Its last quarterly accounts before the complaint was filed showed that

N Lines et al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20407.htm>. In 2008, see SEC,
Complaint, SEC v Homeland Safety International et al, online : SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20645.htm>; SEC, Complaint, SEC v Simmons et al, online:
SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20572.htm>; SEC, Complaint, SEC v Absolute Future et
al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20560.htm>; SEC, Complaint, SEC v
Grossman et al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20776.htm>. In 2009, see SEC,
Litigation Complaint, SEC v Georgiou, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp20899.pdf>; SEC, Complaint, East Delta Resources Corp
et al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21395.pdf>; SEC, Litigation Release,
East Delta Resources Corp et al, online : SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22561.htm>. In
2011, see SEC, Complaint, SEC v. Ficeto et al, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21865.pdf>; SEC, Complaint, SEC v Curshen et al,
online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21862.pdf>; SEC, Complaint, SEC v
Baldassarre et al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp22182.pdf>; SEC,
Complaint, SEC v Metcalf et al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21824.pdf>;
SEC, Complaint, SEC v Narwal et al, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21861.pdf>. In 2012, see SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v
Coldicutt et al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp22445.pdf>; SEC Litigation
Release, SEC v Geranio et al, online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr201293.pdf>, SEC Complaint, SEC v Axius et al, online :
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp22410.pdf> , SEC Complaint SEC v Thomas Edward
Hunter et al, online: <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-72.pdf> . In 2013 see SEC
Complaint SEC v Randy A Hamdan et al, online:
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2013/comp22892.pdf>, SEC Complaint SEC v Carrillo Huettel LLP,
online: <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2013/comp-pr2013-39.pdf> and SEC Complaint, SEC v Colin
McCabe, online: <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2013/comp22632.pdf>.
496
See e.g. SEC v Jessop et al, supra, note 495; SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v The Rockies Funds Inc, et al,
online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/34-48590_appeal.pdf>; SEC v Garcia, supra note 380;
SEC, Litigation Release, SEC v AutoChina International Limited et al, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22326.htm>.

183

the company reported assets of $1,395 and had incurred losses of $2,396 for the previous
six month period.497
The manipulation was described in the SEC‘s complaint as follows:
From August 29, 2005 through November 3, 2005, the Defendants, whose trading comprised the
majority (and on many days all) of the retail trades in Cameron, effected the manipulation of
Cameron's stock price through a series of wash sales and matched orders designed to create a
false or misleading appearance of an active and rising market in Cameron and induce others to
purchase or sell Cameron shares. As a result of their manipulative trading, Defendants
collectively realized net proceeds totaling more than $1.5 million.

498

The defendants in this matter were Peter Jessop who was a Canadian citizen residing in
Geneva, Switzerland, Steven Wright, an accountant residing in California and Shawn
Cassius who also resided in California. This was also not the first time the SEC had taken
action against Steven Wright, the SEC noting in its complaint that ―in 2003, Wright was sued
by the Commission in connection with a similar ―shell factory‖ manipulation scheme‖.499 The
corporations used to effect the wash sales and matched orders included an entity
incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and operating out of Geneva, Switzerland, an entity
located in Geneva, Switzerland, a Belize corporation operating out of Nassau, Bahamas and
a Belize corporation operating out of Dubai.500
Although typically in such pump and dump schemes misleading information is published on
the internet via company websites, blogs and other websites which publish stock market
information, the SEC reported that in one case fraudulent information was touted by a
Canadian couple through the use of Facebook and Twitter.501
It appears that over the ten year period between 2004 and 2013 these pump and dump
manipulation schemes detected and prosecuted by the SEC gradually became more
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complex and increasingly sophisticated. For example, in 2011 the SEC took enforcement
action against Jonathan Curshen who ran a Costa Rican asset protection company called
Red Sea Management Limited (‗Red Sea‘). The SEC complaint described Curshen as ―a
recidivist securities law violator‖. In the same action, the SEC also brought proceedings
against two co-accused, David Ricci and Ronny Salazar. Ricci is a Canadian citizen who
resided in Costa Rica and was the head trader for Sentry Global Securities Ltd (‗Sentry
Global‘), a broker-dealer licensed by St. Kitts and Nevis and affiliated with Red Sea. Salazar
is a dual US and Costa Rican citizen who also resided in Costa Rica and shared trading
responsibilities with Ricci at Sentry Global.
The complaint alleged that:
On behalf of its clients, Red Sea incorporated shell corporations, established virtual offices for the
shell corporations, and opened bank accounts for the shell corporations in countries such as the
Republic of Seychelles, Cyprus, Panama and Tanzania. Another service that the firm provided
was to effect pump-and-dump schemes for its clients using a Byzantine trading and moneylaundering structure designed to avoid detection by criminal and regulatory authorities. This
structure included a labyrinth of nominee brokerage, custodial and foreign bank accounts.
To perpetrate the pump-and-dump schemes, Red Sea required its clients to obtain control over all
the free-trading stock of their issuers and to deposit it in the Red Sea nominee brokerage
accounts. Controlling the float of the stock enabled Red Sea, in the persons of Ricci and Salazar,
to dominate the market and manipulate the stock‘s price. By using the names of nominees in
opening its brokerage accounts, Red Sea concealed from the broker dealers its beneficial
ownership of the accounts. And by trading through numerous nominee accounts, Red Sea
created the false impression that unrelated parties were buying and selling the stock and that the
market was deeper than it actually was.
In October 2006, Red Sea operated approximately 54 brokerage accounts in the names of 20
nominee shell corporations with 26 brokerage firms in the U.S. and Canada. Curshen supervised
the formation of the nominees and the opening of the accounts. He changed the brokerage
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account structure as needed to hide the link between the accounts that he believed were known
to government authorities and new accounts that Red Sea had opened to carry on the business.
…
In August 2006, Curshen ordered a Red Sea employee named Joseph Francis, Jr. to open a
bank account in the name of Sentry Global at HSBC Bank in Vancouver, British Columbia.
Francis represented to HSBC that the money that would be flowing in and out of the account
would be personal trading proceeds. In reality, Red Sea used the HSBC account to wire proceeds
from the sales of client‘s stocks to locations outside of the United States…..
From November 2, 2006 through September 28, 2007, Red Sea wired $90.8 million into the
HSBC account and $91.5 million out to accounts around the world in the names of different
individuals and entities… Of the $90.8 million that was wired into the account, more than $76.8
million originated from trading in Red Sea nominee brokerage accounts… On information and
belief, most of this money consisted of trading proceeds from pump and dump schemes
perpetrated by Red Sea on behalf of its clients.

The actual subject of the complaint was a pump and dump scheme in relation to a
corporation, CO2 Tech, which was quoted on Pink Sheets. The scheme was conducted on
behalf of two clients, one of whom was a resident of Israel.

CO2 supposedly had its

headquarters in London, while its operations were purportedly based in Israel. Material false
and misleading information about the corporation was disseminated in press releases and
on its website. Ricci and Salazar then executed matched orders with Red Sea‘s nominee
brokerage accounts in order to ‗jump-start‘ the market and increase the price of the stock.
Given the international nature of the scheme the SEC noted that it had been assisted in its
investigation by the Costa Rican Police, the BCSC, the Israel Securities Authority, the FSA
and The City of London Police.502
Also in 2011 the SEC took enforcement action in another complex cross border pump and
dump manipulation scheme. In SEC v Ficeto et. al, the SEC prosecuted Todd Ficeto, Florian
Homm and Colin Heatherington for a sophisticated multi-year pump and dump manipulation
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scheme involving wash sales, matched orders and marking the close on multiple
corporations quoted on OTCBB and Pink Sheets. The manipulation was undertaken to
overstate the performance and net asset value of a number of hedge funds managed by
Absolute Capital Management Holdings (ACMH), a London based hedge fund management
company organised under the laws of the Cayman Islands. Ficeto was based in the US.
Homm was a resident of Majorica, Spain and at the time of the SEC‘s complaint his
whereabouts were unknown. Homm had previously been fined by BaFin for publishing false
statements about a company and failing to declare self interest in research reports.
Heatherington was a resident of Victoria, BC, Canada and was a trader for ACMH. He also
controlled a British Virgin Islands entity which made a number of the trades.
Ficeto and Homm were co-owners of a registered broker-dealer located in Beverly Hills,
California. Homm was the co-founder and a chief investment adviser for ACMH which
managed eight equity hedge funds, all domiciled in the Cayman Islands that purportedly had
$2.1 billion in assets under management. The scheme used clients‘ funds to conduct the
manipulative trading and caused the defendants to make at least $63.7 million in illicit
proceeds. The majority of the proceeds made from the scheme were transferred to Swiss
and Canadian bank accounts. The defendants also used a secret instant message system
that allowed the traders to freely talk without fear that their scheme would be discovered by
the SEC or FINRA. It appears that the scheme was not uncovered until 2007 when Homms
resigned from ACMH and it was discovered that ACMH investors held between $440 and
$520 million in illiquid positions in US penny stocks. Because of the involvement of Canadian
individuals, the SEC worked with the BCSC in this matter.503
b) Pump & Dump and Computer Hackers
Computer hackers also featured in relation to some of the cross border market manipulation
matters brought by the SEC in the ten year period from 2004 to 2013. From 2008 to 2012
the SEC prosecuted a number of cases where the perpetrator had hacked into online
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brokerage accounts, sold off existing securities and used the funds to conduct a pump and
dump scheme usually in illiquid securities. After the scheme was complete the online
account was left holding only illiquid securities of almost no value. The perpetrators of these
schemes were located in India, China, Russia and Latvia. 504 In one case, prosecuted in
2012, in addition to hacking into online accounts, the defendant also used direct market
access to trade securities. This case was described in the SEC 2012 Annual Report as
follows:
In late January, the SEC charged a trader in Latvia for conducting a widespread online account
intrusion scheme in which he manipulated the prices of more than 100 NYSE and Nasdaq
securities and caused more than $2 million in harm to customers of U.S. brokerage firms. The
SEC also instituted related administrative proceedings against four electronic trading firms and
eight executives charged with enabling the trader‘s scheme by allowing him anonymous and
unfiltered access to the U.S. markets. According to the SEC‘s complaint, Igors Nagaicevs broke
into online brokerage accounts of customers at large U.S. broker-dealers and drove stock prices
up or down by making unauthorized purchases or sales in the hijacked accounts. This occurred
on more than 150 occasions over the course of 14 months. Nagaicevs – using the direct,
anonymous market access provided to him by various unregistered firms – traded those same
securities at artificial prices and reaped more than $850,000 in illegal profits.
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The Latvian trader was granted direct market access through a US entity called Mercury
Capital (―Mercury‖). Whilst Mercury was not registered, it had been given direct market
access by registered brokers. Mercury also maintained an independent contractor
agreement with a Canadian entity that solicited day traders from around the world through its
website and referred traders to Mercury who then gave them direct market access. The SEC
complaint in the matter stated that approximately 100 traders who had been referred by the
Canadian entity were given direct market access by Mercury, and traded through its
account.506
c) Manipulation in larger US Markets
Detection of cross border market manipulation of larger US markets was less common but in
two cases the SEC did take enforcement action in relation to cross border manipulation of
securities listed on NASDAQ. In 2006 the SEC took action in relation to a stock manipulation
scheme whereby shares in a company called China Energy Technology Inc. were gifted to a
large number of entities to enable it to have the required number of shareholders to obtain a
NASDAQ listing. The defendants then engaged in a pump and dump scheme in relation to
the stock and issued false press releases and engaged in artificial transactions to increase
its share price. The majority shareholder was New Solomon Consultants, a corporation
formed under the laws of the British Virgin Islands but operating out of Hong Kong. After the
share price rose New Solomon proceeded to sell its shares, which generated a profit of
US$17 million. New Solomon Consultants was controlled by a number of individuals who
were resident in Hong Kong or the People‘s Republic of China. A number of other
individuals, all of whom were also resident in Hong Kong or the People‘s Republic of China,
also participated in the scheme.507
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Another matter, which involved the manipulation of securities listed on NASDAQ, was a case
in 2012 in which the SEC took action in relation to the manipulation of a company called
AutoChina International Ltd. In this matter a director of the company manipulated the price of
the stock because the corporation had been refused a loan secured by stock because of low
trading volumes. The defendant and all of the other major participants in the scheme were
based in the People‘s Republic of China. The defendants utilized accounts in their own
names and in the names of British Virgin Island companies that they controlled to conduct
wash trades and matched orders between accounts on E*Trade and accounts held at a
broker in Hong Kong.508
d) Layering & High Frequency Trading
Towards the end of the ten year period, the SEC brought two cases involving the
manipulation of markets utilizing the practice of spoofing, layering and quote stuffing by
foreign traders who had direct market access. In the matter of SEC v Biremis Corp et al the
SEC took action against Biremis Corp a registered US broker and its principals, Peter Beck
and Charles Kim. Peter Beck is the same individual who was associated with Swift Trade,
the corporation which the FSA fined for market manipulation.
Biremis Corp was originally formed as a US corporation but became a Canadian corporation
in 2011 and then an Anguillan corporation in 2012. It listed its principal place of business as
an address in Boston, but that address was a commercial business service which received
and forwarded Biremis Corp‘s mail to its actual place of business in Toronto. Biremis Corp
had no employees, operations, books or records in the United States. Biremis Corp allowed
entities to open and operate trading floors with access to securities markets worldwide,
including direct market access into the US markets. To open a trading floor, the operator
entered into a market access agreement with Opal Stone Financial Services, S.A., a
corporation incorporated in Uruguay and domiciled in Costa Rica. The SEC complaint stated
that at various times, the Biremis business had as many as 200 different trading floors in
508
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over 30 nations, including Canada, Russia, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Venezuela, and
Uzbekistan, with the majority located in China. None of these trading floors were located in
the United States. Some of the individuals who owned or managed these trading floors
recruited overseas traders who traded on the trading floors. The SEC complaint alleged that
hundreds of the overseas traders, on at least ten different trading floors associated with
Biremis, engaged repeatedly in layering manipulations on U.S. securities markets. These
orders sent false signals to the market regarding the supply and demand for such
securities.509
In similar case the SEC took action against another US registered broker dealer, Hold
Brothers Online Investment Services LLC. Hold Brothers allowed overseas traders,
principally from China, direct access into U.S. markets. These overseas traders engaged in
manipulative trading, typically layering or spoofing, in US listed and over the counter stocks.
Furthermore, the principals of Hold Brothers created and founded two foreign companies:
Alpha, which was incorporated in Nevis; and Demostrate, which was incorporated in the
British Virgin Islands. Principals of Hold Brothers shared in the trading profits of these
companies. The SEC‘s complaint alleged that during the period the subject of the complaint,
overseas traders trading for Demostrate engaged in layering by entering into more than
325,000 layered transactions, which corresponded to the entry of more than 8 million layered
orders. The two Demostrate trading groups that engaged in the most layering were also the
most profitable, cumulatively making the owners of Demostrate approximately US$1.8
million in trading revenue.510
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Detection and Investigation Methods
It seems that Market surveillance remained the principal method of detection of cross border
market abuse throughout the ten year period. However, towards the end of the period it
appears that more resources were committed to collecting and analysing voluntary reports of
suspicious transactions, including suspected market abuse. In 2010, the SEC established a
separate Office of Market Intelligence to serve as a central office for handling tips,
complaints, and referrals. This office was designed to deal with what was described as a
―huge volume of potential leads the agency receives every day‖. 511 This Office was also
designed to house the new whistleblower office created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.512
In 2012, the first full year of this paid whistleblower program, the SEC received 3001 tips.513
In 2013 it received 3238 tips.514 The 2012 SEC annual report stated that ―Enforcement is
receiving many excellent tips through the Whistleblower Program, resulting in significant
savings in investigative resources and time‖ 515 In 2013 525 tips were in relation to
manipulation and 196 were in relation to insider trading. Also in 2013 404 tips were received
from foreign countries. Of the 55 foreign countries which were the source of tips, the majority
were from the UK, Canada, Russia and China.516
In terms of investigation methods a novel investigation technique used by the SEC in relation
to cross border market manipulation was that the SEC worked with the FBI to use cooperators, that is others accused of criminal behaviour, to go undercover to gather direct
evidence of the manipulation. One such case was the case of SEC v Georgiou. Georgiou
was a Canadian national who, from 2004 through September 2008, controlled the publicly-
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traded stock of a number of companies quoted on the OTCBB and Pink Sheets. Georgiou
manipulated the market for the purpose of artificially inflating each company's stock price,
creating the false appearance of an active and liquid market. In order to do so, Georgiou
used many nominee accounts at offshore broker-dealers in Canada, the Bahamas, Turks
and Caicos, and other locations. He also used a variety of manipulative techniques,
including controlling the trading volume through promises of profits to nominees, executing
or directing matched orders, wash sales, or other prearranged trades, marking-the-close,
and paying illegal kickbacks in exchange for purchases. Georgiou realized at least $20.9
million in ill-gotten gains from his manipulation schemes.
The SEC was able to gather direct evidence against Georgiou in relation to manipulation of a
corporation called Northern Ethanol. Georgiou offered the payment of an illegal kickback to a
person Georgiou believed was a corrupt registered representative who was in reality an
undercover FBI agent.517
Similarly, in 2008 the SEC took enforcement action against a number of individuals who
manipulated the price of Guyana Gold Corp, a corporation quoted on pink sheets. One of
perpetrators was resident in Canada. In this case the SEC also used an FBI agent who
purported to have the discretion to trade on behalf of the accounts of wealthy customers.
The defendant promised to pay a 30% kickback to the agent in exchange for the purchase of
stock through the customers' accounts.518
Tackling manipulation in ‘lightly’ regulated (or penny stock) markets
As is referred to above, the majority of cross border manipulation cases undertaken by the
SEC over the period were pump and dump schemes in the lightly regulated or penny stock
markets. Some of the perpetrators appear to be repeat offenders who systematically
engaged in such schemes.
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In an effort to tackle these cases, the SEC in 2007 announced the creation of a new unit, the
Microcap Fraud Working Group, within the Division of Enforcement to lead the SEC‘s efforts
against what was referred to as micro-cap fraud. The SEC stated that it created the unit in
response to the growing threat of fraud involving small issuers whose securities are not
traded on registered exchanges. It was the intention of the SEC that the group would focus
on market manipulation and offering frauds, as well as other market violations and also liaise
with domestic and foreign authorities regarding micro-cap fraud issues.519
In 2012 the Microcap Fraud Working Group became proactive in suspending trading in the
securities of a number of dormant companies before they could be used for pump and dump
schemes. This was described as follows:
In May the SEC suspended trading in the securities of 379 dormant companies before they could
be hijacked by fraudsters and used to harm investors through reverse mergers or pump-and-dump
schemes. The trading suspension marks the most companies ever suspended in a single day by
the Commission as it ramps up its crackdown against fraud involving microcap shell companies
that are dormant and delinquent in their public disclosures. Microcap companies typically have
limited assets and low-priced stock that trades in low volumes. An initiative tabbed Operation
Shell-Expel by the SEC‘s Microcap Fraud Working Group utilized various agency resources,
including the enhanced intelligence technology of the Enforcement Division‘s Office of Market
Intelligence, to scrutinize microcap stocks in the markets nationwide and identify clearly dormant
shell companies in 32 states and six foreign countries that were ripe for potential fraud.
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country. By suspending trading in these companies, the SEC obligated the companies to provide
updated financial information to prove that they are still operational, essentially rendering them
useless to scam artists as the companies are no longer allowed to fly under the radar .
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International Cooperation with Foreign Regulators
Over the ten year period there was a steady increase in both requests made by the SEC to
foreign regulators for assistance and requests for assistance made by foreign regulators to
the SEC. In 2004 the SEC made 380 requests to foreign authorities and received 372
requests from foreign authorities. By 2013 the SEC made 717 requests to foreign authorities
and received 508 requests from foreign authorities. The increase in both of these types of
requests is shown below in Figure 3.13.

Figure 3.13 - Requests from foreign authorities for
SEC assistance and SEC requests for assistance to
foreign authorities
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Source: SEC Annual Reports 2004 to 2013, online: <http://www.sec.gov/about/annrep.shtml>

The main reason given for the increase in the number of requests to foreign authorities was
an increased need to obtain overseas documents and testimony for enforcement
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purposes.522 The SEC also noted that requests received from foreign regulators became
increasingly complex. 523 It also seems that one of the mechanisms used to make and
receive such requests was IOSCO MMoU as well as other mechanisms such as Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty procedures.524
Part 5 Australia
Cross Border Insider Trading and Market Manipulation
As is referred to in chapter 3, ASIC primarily prosecutes insider trading and market
manipulation criminally. Over the ten year period the numbers of prosecutions for insider
trading and market manipulation did increase. In 2005, ASIC obtained five criminal
convictions and two civil penalty orders for market abuse offences.525 For the twelve months
ending on 31 December 2013 ASIC obtained thirteen criminal convictions for insider trading
and one criminal conviction for market manipulation. It also brought one disciplinary action
and negotiated an enforceable undertaking in relation to another manipulation matter. At
year end, ASIC had eleven pending criminal insider trading matters, one pending civil insider
trading matter and three pending criminal market manipulation matters.526
ASIC increasingly committed more resources to the detection, investigation and prosecution
of insider trading and market manipulation over the ten year period. The 2006 report notes
that:
While we have had successes in deterring insider trading and market manipulation, we intend to
do more. A taskforce is being established to determine what additional actions ASIC, in
cooperation with the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), can take in the areas of continuous
disclosure, market manipulation and insider trading.
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As a result of this taskforce, in 2007 ASIC increased resources to improve the detection,
investigation and prosecution of market abuse offences.527 ASIC also reported an increase
in resources committed to this area again in 2010.528
Over the ten year period, ASIC brought only three cases of cross border insider trading and
only one case involving cross border market manipulation. In relation to insider trading, two
cases were in relation to persons outside of Australia who became aware of inside
information about corporations whose securities were traded on Australian exchanges and
subsequently traded using this information.529 Another related to an Australian resident who
was a portfolio manager for an Australian Bank. In this matter the defendant obtained inside
information of the trading intentions of the Bank in relation to a number of securities and
purchased contracts for difference in these securities on the Singapore Stock Exchange.
ASIC obtained the assistance of the Singapore authorities in this investigation.530 In relation
to cross border market manipulation, ASIC also brought criminal proceedings against a
director of a corporation whose securities were listed on both Australian and German
exchanges for making false statements over the internet to increase the price of the
securities.531 This was the same case referred to by BaFin in its 2005 Annual Report where a
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BaFin employee gave expert evidence in Australia to assist ASIC.532
Detection Methods
It appears that market surveillance is the main detection method used by ASIC to detect
market abuse. Until August 2010, the ASX conducted surveillance of its own markets. From
1 August 2010 ASIC took over the supervision and surveillance of all licenced equity
derivatives and futures markets and the ASX surveillance staff were transferred to ASIC. In
its 2010 Annual Report ASIC noted that it believed that having only one market supervisor
would streamline supervision and enforcement.‖533 Two years later, it reported that:
ASIC‘s responsibility for market supervision has delivered numerous benefits from a market
integrity perspective.
We bedded down processes relating to identifying and investigating possible misconduct, and
how misconduct is referred to ASIC‘s enforcement groups. This has halved the average number
of days involved from identifying misconduct to starting investigations, resulting in more timely
and better outcomes. We are also refining the parameters for real-time surveillance to ensure
analysts can concentrate their time on genuine market misconduct issues.
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ASIC reported that market abuse was also detected by way of complaints from the public. In
2013/14 ASIC reported that it received approximately 630 reports in relation to market
integrity matters which included insider trading, continuous disclosure, misleading
statements and market manipulation.535
International Cooperation with Foreign Regulators
Like the other regulators ASIC also received a substantial number of requests from foreign
authorities each year and also makes a significant number of requests to foreign authorities
for assistance each year. In 2013/14 it reported that it had received 116 requests for
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assistance from foreign authorities for assistance in enforcement related matters.536 It also
appears that some of these requests utilized the IOSCO MMoU.537
Part 6 Some common themes
As the above analysis of the material published by securities regulators demonstrates, over
the ten year period from 2004 to 2013, most of the securities regulators took enforcement
action in a number of instances of cross border market abuse. The number of such
investigations appears to have been influenced by such factors as the size of the markets,
the resources available to undertake investigations and the priorities of the regulator.
Certainly in some cases priorities appeared to shift over time. For example, BaFin spent
most of the years giving preference to investigating market manipulation in its lightly
regulated markets. In 2013 as the level of instances of detected manipulation in that market
declined, BaFin increased insider trading investigations.
Furthermore, it does seem that over the ten year period instances of cross border market
abuse that were detected and investigated by each of the regulators steadily increased in
complexity. This is consistent with the comments by the regulators referred to in Chapter 3.
Complexity seems to be a particular feature of market manipulation matters. This may due to
a combination of factors including fragmentation of the markets, the use of different
jurisdictions by perpetrators in an effort to avoid detection and the possibility that complex
matters are increasingly being detected.
Changes in Detection Mechanisms
In terms of improvements in detection mechanisms, certainly most regulators reported
increasing investment in surveillance technology and other detection mechanisms over the
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ten year period. There also appears to be an increase in the reporting of market abuse to
regulators from tips and whistleblowers.
In the case of the two European regulators, BaFin and the FCA, the system in Europe of
obtaining reports of suspicious transactions and exchanging such reports between European
securities regulators seems to have become an important detection method of market
abuse. By way of contrast in the US, Canada and Australia reports of transactions suspected
to be market abuse is relatively less important.538 This may be because in these jurisdictions
there is no specific requirement that market intermediaries report suspected market abuse
directly to the securities regulator. In Canada for example, brokers and banks are not
required to report instances of suspected market abuse directly to the provincial securities
regulators. They are, however, required to report breaches of the law to IIROC,539 and report
instances of suspected money laundering to the Financial Transactions and Reports
Analysis Centre of Canada.540 In the US broker dealers are required to have compliance
systems in place and report suspicious activity to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN) as a result of requirements in the Bank Secrecy Act and FINRA rules. A FinCEN
report is required if the firm has ―reason to suspect‖ or has knowledge of facts that suggest
that the transactions are not legitimate, may be related to unlawful activity, or do not make
economic sense. 541 This includes possible money laundering transactions as well as
suspected market abuse.542
In relation to encouraging reporting by whistleblowers, the SEC stands alone in offering
monetary rewards for information leading to successful prosecutions. Whilst it is probably too
early to determine the success of the program, it does appear to be generating additional
information about possible fraudulent conduct. In addition the fact that a significant number
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of tips are coming from foreign sources is of note, perhaps also suggesting that this might
become a source of information in relation to cross border market abuse which would not
have otherwise have been available.
Market Manipulation in the lightly regulated or ‘penny stock’ markets
A significant proportion of the increase in enforcement actions in cross border market abuse
over the ten year period can be attributed to pump and dump market manipulation schemes
in lightly regulated or penny stock markets. The two securities regulators with responsibility
for the supervision of relatively large lightly regulated markets, BaFin and the SEC, devoted
significant resources to these matters and detected a disproportionately high number of
instances of these schemes in their markets. Furthermore, the majority of the cross border
market manipulation schemes investigated by Canadian securities regulators were matters
in which Canadian individuals and entities were involved in schemes conducted on US
markets. At least some of these schemes appear to be highly organised and very profitable.
It also appears that some schemes operated out of several jurisdictions and utilized
accounts and corporations in a number of jurisdictions, and in particular, offshore financial
centres, in an attempt to conceal the schemes from securities and other enforcement
agencies. It also appears that over time these schemes may be becoming more
sophisticated and as a result increasingly complex to investigate.
Lightly regulated or penny stock markets exist because they benefit small to medium
enterprises. This is because they facilitate the ability of such enterprises to attract funds from
the issue of securities without incurring the high costs associated with listing those securities
on a large exchange. However there seems to be a significant disadvantage to such markets
in that they seem particularly prone to manipulation, including by individuals and entities
located outside of the jurisdiction. One of the reasons seems to be that securities traded on
such markets are generally illiquid and accordingly prices can be manipulated using few
trades of low volumes.
Because of the large number of these types of schemes on these markets a significant
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amount of investigative resources was allocated to these matters during the ten year period.
As a result both BaFin and the SEC implemented changes with a view to ending these
schemes.

However the changes made by each regulator varied. In Germany initially

Deutsche Börse increased its listing requirements and delisted entities which did not comply
with these increased requirements. However this did not seem to satisfy BaFin which
agitated to close the First Quotation Board of the Open Market, most lightly regulated
market. BaFin succeeded and this market was closed. Incidences of detected manipulation
declined as a result.
In contrast the SEC formed a designated unit, Microcap Fraud Working Group, to investigate
such matters. This unit then deregistered a large number of corporations which could
potentially have been high jacked for these nefarious purposes. The SEC also worked with
the FBI to covertly infiltrate the schemes with a co-operator in order to gather direct evidence
about the scheme and those running them.
It appears therefore that the SEC is willing to allow these lightly regulated markets to exist
based, apparently, upon a cost benefit analysis. The SEC endeavours to supress fraud in
these markets rather than eliminate the market altogether as this would have the effect of
limiting the ability of small enterprises to raise funds via such markets. BaFin however
appears to have taken the position that the resources required to tackle the level of
manipulation in very lightly regulated markets is too high compared to the benefit of allowing
small enterprises to raise funds on such markets.
New Market Participants – Hedge Funds
In terms of the impact of new participants in the market during the ten years, although there
were some instances in the US of hedge funds participating in insider trading and market
manipulation, no identifiable pattern emerged suggesting widespread systematic schemes of
cross border market abuse by such funds. This is of note given that over that time the SEC
formed a special unit to investigate insider trading by hedge funds. Investigations by this unit
led to some highly publicised prosecutions of networks of persons involved in generating
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profits for hedge funds by insider trading. However most of these prosecutions were cases in
which all of the participants were within the US.543
Direct Market Access and High Frequency Trading
In relation to the participation of high frequency (or algorithmic) traders in cross border
market abuse, from 2011 to 2013 both the SEC and the FCA detected instances where
direct market access was used as a gateway by traders in foreign jurisdictions to engage in
large scale instances of layering, spoofing and quote stuffing. In particular the case of
Canadian Peter Beck and companies he controlled is of note. In 2011 the FSA fined Swift
Trade Inc, controlled by Beck, £8m for market manipulation by its network of traders. In 2012
the SEC made a cease and desist order against Biremis Corp, also controlled by Beck, and
fined him $250,000 for failure to properly supervise its traders who had engaged in
manipulation. Also in 2012 the OSC took action against Beck, Biremis, Swift Trade and three
other entities he controlled for failure to properly supervise its traders. This action was
settled by an agreement to pay an administrative penalty of $100,000, costs of $300,000
and by Beck being prohibited from being a registrant or a director of a registrant for a period
of 2 years.544
In these matters the SEC, the FSA and the OSC took action against those facilitating the
traders access to the markets. As is referred to in Chapter 2, since 2010 there has also been
a strengthening of compliance and supervision obligations on brokers who allow clients
direct access to the markets. These two initiatives may work to dissuade those operating
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direct market access gateways from allowing these facilities to be used for manipulative
purposes.
Nevertheless it is perhaps of some concern that the SEC, the OSC and the FSA did not take
action against the traders themselves. Of course this would have been very difficult, if not
almost impossible, given the disparate jurisdictions in which they were situated. However
this does leave open the very real possibility that these traders may penetrate other markets
if the opportunity presents itself. It is also possibly of concern that the penalties levied on
Beck and the companies he controlled consisted only of monetary penalties and cease and
desist orders. Given the suspected significant profits made from the activity and the potential
profits available for others who facilitate these types of activities, these kinds of monetary
penalties may simply not be sufficient to deter individuals from engaging in such misconduct
in the future if they apply a simple cost benefit analysis.
It is also perhaps of note that despite the fact that comments by regulators referred to in
Chapter 2 demonstate that they are aware that high frequency traders are engaging in
manipulative techniques such as spoofing and layering, there does not seem to be a
significant number of manipulation cases brought by regulators, at least in relation to
manipulation that crosses borders. This may be because there are only a small number of
such cases. Alternatively it may be that such cases are significantly resource intensive to
investigate and perhaps, given that the victims of such manipulation are usually other high
frequency traders, they are simply not a top priority for investigations. Perhaps regulators are
more likely to target ‗pump and dump‘ schemes in relation to their manipulation
investigations because these are less complex to investigate and also because they directly
target small and usually unsophisticated investors.
Another possible reason for the lack of prosecutions of manipulation by high frequency
trading may be that that such manipulation has only started to be detected relatively recently
and the investigations are time consuming. Furthermore there is often a significant time lag
between detection and prosecution. Perhaps these cases will not be reported in significant
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numbers by regulators for several years. In this respect it is relevant to note that, as referred
to in Chapter 2, it was not until 2015, some five years after the 2010 ‗flash crash‘, that the
SEC brought charges against a person resident in the UK whom it alleges is responsible for
this event.
Cross Border Insider Trading
A significant number of the cases of cross border insider trading were cases of persons who
lived within the jurisdiction and tipped friends or family in another jurisdiction, or traded in
their names. The cross border aspect to this insider trading may have been coincidental, in
that the friends or family possibly just happened to live outside of the jurisdiction.
Alternatively it may have been done intentionally in an effort to try and avoid detection or
make attempts at prosecution more difficult.
Another category of cases were situations where there were suspicious purchases of call
options in a foreign jurisdiction in relation to a corporation the subject of takeover. It appears
therefore that securities regulators do monitor the markets for unusual call option purchases
of takeover targets and views such purchases as a likely indicator of insider trading.
There were also a significant number of cases of cross border insider trading where use was
made of accounts and corporations in offshore financial centres, presumably in an attempt to
disguise from the authorities the connection between the insider and the trader. It is
significant that in most of the reported cases the regulator was able to determine the name
of the beneficial owner. This seems to signal that in the case of some of these countries
financial secrecy laws are becoming weaker or enforcement authorities are more readily
complying with requests from foreign regulators for information. For example, the number of
such cases where use was made of corporations in the British Virgin Islands strongly
suggests that the authorities in this country will disclose information to foreign securities
regulators much more readily than had previously been the case.
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However it is unclear from publically available reports by securities regulators if there are still
some offshore financial centres which will still not provide the information required for
investigations into alleged market abuse. If so this is of concern given that the reported
cases frequently feature perpetrators using offshore financial centres in an attempt to hide
their activities. This suggests that it is critically important that efforts be made to ensure that
securities regulators are able to obtain information from all nations as any gap in this
capacity to obtain such information can be predicted to be exploited by those involved in
cross border market abuse.
International Cooperation with Foreign Regulators
Most regulators also reported increasing their requests for information to foreign authorities
along with a reciprocal increase in requests received from foreign authorities for information.
Although clearly not all of this increase can be attributed to cross border market abuse, it can
reasonably be suggested that at least some of this increase is in relation to enforcement
actions taken in relation to these matters. Such increases in requests also suggest that over
time closer connections are developing between securities regulators in terms of their
enforcement activities and it seems that securities regulators are increasingly willing to reach
out to foreign regulators to obtain the information they require. It may also indicate that the
IOSCO MMoU is having a real impact in bridging the gap that regulators may have in
obtaining evidence required to complete an investigation where the activity which is the
subject of the investigation does not solely take place within their own jurisdiction.
In addition, perhaps also demonstrating the development of closer links between regulators,
the FSA and the SEC have reported being engaged in an increased number of ‗parallel
investigations‘. Whilst not a joint investigation, a parallel investigation is where the regulators
work more closely together rather than merely sharing information. One of the advantages of
such parallel investigations seems to be that all of perpetrators of the market abuse are
prosecuted, as was the case in relation to the parallel insider trading investigation
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undertaken by the FSA and the SEC in 2011 where the tipper was prosecuted in the US by
the SEC and the DOJ and the tipper was prosecuted by the FSA in the UK.
Protecting Integrity of Foreign Markets?
Most cases of cross border market abuse reported by securities regulators were related to
activity which impacted on the integrity of markets situated within their own jurisdiction. This
seems to indicate that securities regulators focus their enforcement activities on matters
which impact upon the integrity of their own markets, rather than taking action against
individuals and entities that are situated within the jurisdiction but who engage in market
abuse which also impacts upon the integrity of markets in other jurisdictions. One exception
to this was Canadian regulators who regularly took enforcement action in relation to activity
which impacted upon the integrity of markets in the US, perhaps pointing to the close
networks between securities regulators in these two countries.
Towards the end of the ten year period there appeared to be the emergence of a few
matters in which regulators worked together and initiated enforcement action against
perpetrators of market abuse even when the integrity of their home market was not in
jeopardy. For example, the enforcement action taken by the SEC in 2012 in relation to a US
hedge fund manager who had used inside information to trade on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange.
Part 7 Possible Strategies to improve the success of Regulators
Over the last few years there have been significant improvements in the detection and
investigation of cross border market abuse which seems to have led to more enforcement
action being taken in such cases. In addition it seems regulators are increasingly instituting
investigations in more and more complex cases. Nevertheless it seems that there may be
additional ways in which this kind of progress could continue to evolve.
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Suspicious transaction reports
Market surveillance remains, and is likely to continue to remain, the key detection method in
relation to market abuse, including cross border market abuse. However an important
development in the detection of market abuse within Europe has been the introduction of the
requirement that market intermediaries must mandatorily report any instance of suspected
market abuse without delay directly to regulators via a suspicious transaction report. In
addition, if the report concerns a market outside of a particular regulator‘s jurisdiction, the
regulator is required to send the report to the authority responsible for that other market. As
referred to in the preceding chapter, MAD II strengthens this requirement by extending this
requirement to all OTC transactions and even suspicious unexecuted orders. It also requires
that countries enact effective penalties for a failure by a market intermediary to make such a
report.
Since the introduction of this requirement the number of such reports has increased and
significantly it has become an important detection mechanism of market abuse and cross
border market abuse for European securities regulators. The relative importance of
suspicious transaction reports for European securities regulators may be due to the lack of
cross market surveillance in Europe. However it is probable that this is not the only reason in
that one advantage of this European system of suspicious transaction reports over that
which exists in the US and Canada is that the report is filed directly with the regulator and is
specifically targeted at transactions suspected to constitute market abuse. This may result in
the regulators becoming aware very early of the matter enabling them to quickly instigate an
investigation and take enforcement action.
Given what appears to be the success of the European system of requiring the making of
suspicious transactions reports of market abuse directly to the regulator, perhaps other
countries should consider adopting a similar system. Introducing such a requirement, with
significant penalties attached may also increase the awareness of their legal obligations
within organisations and their compliance departments. Furthermore, as in Europe, perhaps
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a system could also be developed to send the report to all other regulators whose markets
could be potentially impacted by the report. IOSCO is arguably the most appropriate
organisation to develop such a system.
Case Selection
As the primary mandate of regulators is to protect the integrity of their own markets it is
understandable that regulators are inclined to focus their investigative resources on matters
which potentially compromise the integrity of their home markets. However this could
possibly lead to matters in which no action or only a low level of enforcement action is taken
against the real perpetrators of market abuse. For example, if the trading takes place in one
jurisdiction, but the perpetrators are located in another, neither regulator may decide to bring
a case against the perpetrators of the market abuse. It appears that in such a matter often
the only action that may be taken is that a case is brought against the broker who allowed
the foreigner access to the market. Alternatively, or in addition, the matter may be referred to
the foreign regulator only to result in little follow up and, in any event, little or nothing that can
be done if the foreign regulator decides to take no action. The critical problem of course is
that if no action is taken against a perpetrator there will be very little to deter the perpetrator
from engaging in similar misconduct in the future.
Mindful perhaps of the failure of foreign regulators to take action, the SEC seems to be
particularly aggressive in ensuring that at least some action is taken in all matters it has
detected even when there is a foreign element. For example, as is referred to in Chapter 3, it
may put a foreign perpetrator on a watch list at US airports or freeze funds in the US.
Compared to other regulators, the SEC also seems to most aggressively pursue cross
border market abuse and take action when their markets are only indirectly affected by the
market abuse. For example it has pursued matters where contracts for difference are traded
in relation to US stocks on markets outside of the US, even if there is no other connection in
the activity to the US.
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However despite these efforts by the SEC it seems likely that some perpetrators are still
escaping prosecution because the market abuse is not confined to one jurisdiction. As such
this is another area in which perhaps IOSCO could take the lead. IOSCO could encourage
regulators to firstly work together to ensure that perpetrators of market abuse do not ‗fall
through the cracks‘ of enforcement and secondly by encouraging regulators to work together
to ensure that all of the key perpetrators of market abuse are prosecuted.
Ensuring access to telecommunications data
In relation to the investigation of market abuse, as referred to in Chapter 3, there seems to
be inconsistent requirements concerning regulators‘ abilities to access telecommunications
and other data as well as inconsistent requirements about how long such data has to be
stored. This can adversely impact upon regulators own investigations as well as their ability
to assist foreign regulators.
The importance of this information to the investigation of market abuse offences was
recently set out in the Market Abuse Regulations of the European Parliament (MAR):
Existing recordings of telephone conversations and data traffic records from investment firms,
credit institutions and financial institutions executing and documenting the execution of
transactions, as well as existing telephone and data traffic records from telecommunications
operators, constitute crucial, and sometimes the only, evidence to detect and prove the existence
of insider dealing and market manipulation. Telephone and data traffic records may establish the
identity of a person responsible for the dissemination of false or misleading information or that
persons have been in contact at a certain time, and that a relationship exists between two or more
people.
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data traffic records where a reasonable suspicion exists that such records may be relevant
to prove market abuse.546
Given the importance of this data to securities offences, including market abuse offences,
this is an area in which securities regulators may need to pressure their legislators for
stronger regulations. This could include regulations that would extend the length of time that
data must be stored and enhanced powers to access such information quickly along with
broad powers to share this information with foreign regulators in appropriate cases.
Developing closer connections between regulators
It seems that in recent years securities regulators worldwide have become a more tightly knit
community which has facilitated closer cooperation. Significantly, the work of IOSCO in
developing the MMoU and ESMA in developing its MoU seems to have increased the ability
of regulators to obtain information needed for investigations from a broader range of
countries, including those formally known for their secrecy provisions. Such increased
cooperation may have also reduced the reluctance of regulators to take action against cross
border market abuse on the basis that they are aware that they should be able to obtain the
information they need to complete the investigation within a relatively brief period of time.
However despite the progress that has been made the responses by regulators to the
author‘s questions suggest that much more could be done. In particular delays still
sometimes occur which can hinder investigations. Such delays may be caused by an
imbalance in resources between regulators and, as such, IOSCO could consider expanding
its MMoU to include providing a system whereby a smaller regulator is given financial
support from a larger regulator if the larger regulator requests information and requires this
information quickly. It may also be that the system developed by the IOSCO MMoU is still
too bureaucratic and as such more needs to be done to streamline the process.
Furthermore, IOSCO could perhaps also consider specifying the time period in which a
regulator should aim to respond to a request.
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Another issue that may assist the success of cross border market abuse investigations is
that, over the long term, IOSCO could work towards the development of more consistent
definitions of what constitutes market abuse across jurisdictions, as well as more consistent
penalties for those who commit such market abuse. Some work has already been done in
this regard as, because of the MAD and MAD II, securities regulators in Europe are
developing similar definitions of what constitutes market abuse as well as broadly consistent
laws regarding the applicable penalties. 547 Over time this should result in a common
understanding between regulators in the EU of the parameters of market abuse offences,
foster cooperation and reduce the potential for miscommunication. Taking its lead from the
EU, IOSCO could perhaps take some steps to developing a similar policy.
Eliminating manipulation in penny stock markets
Lightly regulated or penny stock markets seem to be particularly susceptible to cross border
market abuse. There appear to be groups of individuals in the world actively looking for
opportunities to engage in systematic pump and dump manipulation schemes. It also seems
that these individuals are not reluctant to structure their activities across jurisdictions and use
accounts and corporations located in offshore financial centres in order to attempt to avoid
detection by the authorities.
It remains to be seen whether the steps taken by BaFin, FINRA and the SEC will
significantly reduce manipulation in the penny stock markets. However, even if successful,
there is likely to be continuing demands on governments and regulators to allow the
operation of such markets. This is because of the advantages such lightly regulated markets
offer for small to medium enterprises, together with pressures on governments and
regulators to work towards fostering such enterprises in the interests of economic growth
generally.548
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From one perspective, perhaps the fact that these lightly regulated markets seem to
generate a relatively high level of market abuse is an unavoidable trade-off for giving smaller
companies the capacity to access equity funds. However, this seems to be an unacceptable
situation from the point of view both of the victims of such manipulation, as well as the
markets themselves, which need to work towards improving market integrity in order to
encourage confidence in investment in such enterprises. Given the clear susceptibility of
such markets to manipulation it is likely that any lightly regulated market established in the
world may become a target for individuals tempted to engage in market abuse. As such, it
may be appropriate for regulators in countries which have such markets to more frequently
work closely together to ensure that strong and quick enforcement action is taken against
perpetrators of market abuse in those markets and, in particular, recidivist offenders who
look for opportunities to engage in such activities on a more or less predatory basis.
Furthermore it may also be appropriate for regulators to cooperate so that much more
severe penalties are imposed upon those who are found to have engaged in market abuse
in these markets, again particularly for recidivist offenders, to deter them from finding other
penny stock markets to exploit using such schemes. In other words the cost benefit analysis
that will be undertaken by such market predators needs to be much more weighted towards
the higher cost of being detected and subject to significant penalties, including prison.
Conclusion
The transformation of the markets over the last few decades has altered the landscape upon
which those charged with the responsibility to enforce laws and regulations against market
abuse must operate. As a result cases have become more complex and this has presented
new challenges for them in terms of their enforcement activities.

be allowed to operate in Germany in the future and BaFin would have limited control in preventing this from
occurring. This is because it does not set the listing rules which are set by the exchanges and approved the
exchange supervisory authorities of State in which the exchange is situated. Furthermore efforts by larger
exchanges to facilitate access to equity markets for small to medium companies, such as the Toronto Venture
Exchange, are subject to relatively high levels of regulation and, as such, impose costly listing and continuous
disclosure requirements on listed enterprises, for example see TMX Group ―TSX and TSX Venture Exchange
Listing Costs‖, online: <http://tmx.com/en/listings/listing_with_us/costs/index.html>.
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These challenges have been met in a number of ways, including new detection
mechanisms, upgrading existing detection methods as well as improved channels to
exchange information between securities regulators. However it is arguable that there is still
more that could be done to improve regulators‘ efforts in this regard.
Going forward it is likely that the role of IOSCO may be critical in developing policies that
foster coordination and cooperative efforts between regulators as they attempt to respond to
the growing sophistication and globalization of markets. IOSCO has emerged as the main
organization involved in the development of international securities regulation policy. In
addition it also plays a pivotal role in the coordination of enforcement efforts of securities
regulators via the IOSCO MMoU. This has proven to be a very useful mechanism in
enhancing the abilities of securities regulators to obtain information and evidence required in
relation to securities offences which do not take place wholly within their own jurisdiction. As
such the significance of the IOSCO MMoU and its increasing importance is the subject of the
next chapter. Chapter 6 then moves on to consider the future of the IOSCO MMoU as well
other areas in which IOSCO could work towards the improving the success of regulators
efforts to address cross border market abuse.

214

Chapter 5

IOSCO AND THE IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding
Concerning Consultation and Cooperation

The SEC, ASIC and many other signatories use the MMOU thousands of times every year. In the
SEC‘s last fiscal year, for example, we made more than 700 requests for assistance to our fellow
regulators, and ourselves responded to more than 500 requests for assistance, the majority of
which were made pursuant to the IOSCO MMOU.
Former SEC Chair Mary Jo White
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The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is now the foremost
international

organisation

utilized

by

securities

regulators

internationally

to

work

cooperatively to solve problems which cannot be addressed at the national level. In
particularly, as referred to in the previous chapters, regulators are increasingly turning to
IOSCO for assistance as they work to investigate and prosecute securities offences where
not all of the activity takes place within their national borders.
IOSCO is an international network of securities regulators. Although it has no formal status
in international law, over the last three decades it has emerged to become established as
the world‘s central organisation responsible for the coordination of securities regulation. Its
growth has been spurred on by increased links between securities markets, the growing
sophistication of the markets, cross border flow of investment funds and shocks to the world
financial systems, such as the Global Financial Crisis. These factors have led governments
and securities regulators to increasingly recognize that effective domestic regulation and
stability cannot be achieved solely by action and policy formation at an exclusively national
549
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or bilateral level. Rather it seems that stability is best achieved by attempting to find global
solutions to such problems.
A central part of IOSCO‘s mission is to formulate and have implemented universal standards
of securities regulation and secondly to assist regulators to cooperate on enforcement.
Specifically this is set out in its key goal:


to cooperate in developing, implementing and promoting adherence to internationally
recognised and consistent standards of regulation, oversight and enforcement in order to
protect investors, maintain fair, efficient and transparent markets, and seek to address
550

systemic risks.

IOSCO‘s other key goals are related to this objective.


to enhance investor protection and promote investor confidence in the integrity of securities
markets, through strengthened information exchange and cooperation in enforcement against
misconduct and in supervision of markets and market intermediaries; and



to exchange information at both global and regional levels on their respective experiences in
order to assist the development of markets, strengthen market infrastructure and implement
appropriate regulation.

551

In furtherance of these goals, and in particular with a view to promoting effective
enforcement and exchange of information, in 2002 IOSCO formulated the Multilateral
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the
Exchange of Information552 (the ‗MMoU‘). This MMoU standardizes the process by which
securities commissions who are members of IOSCO can obtain information from other
member securities commissions for enforcement purposes. It provides a simple framework
of procedures by which securities regulators request and receive information they need to
enforce of their own domestic laws. IOSCO views this MMoU as one of its greatest
550
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achievements to date as 105 members of IOSCO have become parties to the MMoU and
most of the remaining member commissions have made a commitment to take steps to sign
this MMoU.553 Furthermore the frequency with which its members are using this MMoU is
increasing. IOSCO promotes this MMoU as a crucial weapon in the arsenal of securities
commissions to tackle securities offences which increasingly are no longer confined to a
regulator‘s jurisdictional boundary.
Given the growing importance of the IOSCO MMoU to the enforcement of securities
offences across international borders, the focus of this chapter is on this MMoU. The history
and contents of the MMoU is examined as well as its impact both on the parties to the
MMoU and on IOSCO in its role as the world‘s coordinator of securities regulation. In
particular it becomes apparent on closer examination that this MMoU is working as more
than just a mechanism for exchanging enforcement related information. IOSCO is using this
MMoU as a lever to realize its other main goal that is to reach worldwide convergence of
securities regulation.
Part 1 IOSCO History and Governance
Establishment and structure
IOSCO was formed in 1983 from an inter-American regional organisation of securities
regulators which had been established in 1974.554 As such its membership consisted of just
eleven securities regulatory agencies from North and South America. 555 In 1984 IOSCO
expanded its membership beyond America when the United Kingdom, France, Indonesia
and South Korea joined.556 The pressure to expand membership beyond the Americas came
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initially from market institutions who wanted the development of common standards for
prospectuses in response to the increasing globalisation of markets.557
IOSCO is not the subject of any international treaties and has no formal status in
international law.558 As an organization, originally it was incorporated by a bill of the Quebec
National Assembly.559 In 2001 it changed its domicile to Spain and now operates as a nonprofit organization funded by members.

560

IOSCO now has 124 ordinary members

comprising over 95% of the world‘s capital markets.561 Ordinary members of IOSCO consist
of national securities commissions or a similar governmental body with significant authority
over securities or derivatives markets.562
IOSCO also has 17 associate members and 64 affiliate members.563 Associate members are
regulatory bodies within a jurisdiction where the national regulatory body is already an
ordinary member, other bodies responsible for securities regulation, supranational bodies
with responsibility for securities regulation and intergovernmental international organizations
and other international standard-setting bodies. 564 Affiliate members consist of SelfRegulatory Organisations (‗SRO‘s), securities exchanges, financial market infrastructures
(including clearing and settlement agencies), international bodies other than governmental
organizations with an appropriate interest in securities regulation, investor protection funds
and compensation funds and any other body with an appropriate interest in securities
regulation that the IOSCO Board may decide for the purpose of furthering the objectives of
the Organization. 565 For example the European Commission and the International Monetary
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Fund (IMF) as well as organisations such as the Canadian Investor Protection Fund and the
UK CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market Integrity are affiliate members. It is unclear
from what the IOSCO board would accept as an ‗appropriate interest‘ in securities
regulation, however it appears that the organization must be concerned with the broader
public interest of securities regulation, above and beyond purely a private business
interest.566
Governance of IOSCO
IOSCO‘s constitution is such that each ordinary member of IOSCO is entitled to one vote on
the Presidents Committee which meets once a year at IOSCO‘s Annual Conference.567 Until
2012 IOSCO was governed by an Executive Committee comprised of the Chairmen of the
various IOSCO Committees and 13 members who were elected by the ordinary members.568
In 2012 IOSCO changed its governing structure to a governing Board. The governing Board
consists of 36 members, 18 of which are from the countries with the largest markets.569
This change was made to more accurately reflect the make-up of IOSCO‘s changing
membership base which has now expanded far beyond developed nations. In addition the
change is intended to reflect IOSCO‘s growing importance in the setting of global standards
for securities regulation. The IOSCO 2011 Annual Report noted that:
This structural reform is intended to enhance IOSCO‘s presence in global discussions by
enabling it to express its views with a single voice that is clear, coherent and forward-thinking.
It also seeks to improve the quality and timeliness of IOSCO‘s standard setting by
strengthening its communication with members and stakeholders. A priority is to ensure
566
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IOSCO‘s inclusiveness through increased engagement with its broad membership, in
particular with members from emerging markets.

570

In 2012 IOSCO also increased its membership fees, no doubt because of its growing
international significance and the needs for funds to support these operations. Whereas
previously it was a flat fee of €15,000 per annum, it is now set by a sliding scale of up to
€30000 for members from high income/high GDP nations.571
IOSCO maintains a small secretariat in Madrid however most its work is carried out by
Committees. These committees are allocated particular responsibilities and are comprised of
a number of persons employed by IOSCO members. Up until 2012 the main committees
were the Technical Committee and the Growth and Emerging Markets Committee (―GEM
Committee‖) (formally called the Emerging Markets Committee). Also up until 2012 the
Technical Committee undertook most of the policy work of IOSCO and made most of the
recommendations to the President‘s Committee for the adoption of new policies.572 This work
was undertaken via five permanent Standing Committees and specific Task Forces which
report to it. When it was established, the Technical Committee was intended to represent the
world‘s largest more developed internationalized markets and its membership was biased
towards IOSCO‘s roots in the Americas. The 15 members of this committee were two
members from the United States (the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)) two members from Canada (the Ontario
Securities Commission and Auto rite des marches financiers of Quebec) and Mexico had
one. The other members were Australia, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and, from 2009, Brazil, China and India.573 Since 2012 the
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newly constituted Board has absorbed the functions of the Technical Committee. There are
now seven Standing Committees and a number of Task Forces reporting directly to it.574
The other main IOSCO Committee is the GEM Committee. This Committee is focused on
improving the efficiency of emerging markets by providing assistance to such markets via
the establishment of principles and standards, training programs and transfer of technology
and expertise.575 IOSCO has also formed four regional committees for Africa/Middle-East,
Asia-Pacific, Europe and the Americas. Like the GEM Committee the focus of these
committees is not primarily on policy formation but to discuss problems specific to their
region.576
Currently 80% of IOSCO‘s membership consists of emerging markets. Accordingly, unlike in
past when developed nations had a dominant role, emerging markets are likely to play an
increasingly important role in IOSCO both in terms of governance, direction and the
development of policy and standards.
Part 2 The Development of the MMoU
History of cooperation leading up to the MMoU
a) Early attempts at cooperation
Cooperation and the exchange of information have been at the forefront of IOSCO‘s mission
almost since its inception. One of the first resolutions passed by IOSCO‘s members
concerned the exchange of information. In 1986 the then members passed a very brief
resolution calling upon members:
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to the extent permitted by law, to provide assistance on a reciprocal basis for obtaining information
related to market oversight and protection of each nation's markets against fraudulent securities
transactions.

577

This resolution also asked members to designate a contact who would be responsible to
process any requests. The preamble to this resolution makes it clear that that IOSCO
foresaw that further mechanisms for the exchange of information would be developed over
time.578
Initially it was envisaged that cooperation and the exchange of information between
members would take place primarily via bilateral and multilateral memoranda of
understanding negotiated by individual members with other members, rather than negotiated
by IOSCO. As such in 1989 IOSCO passed a further resolution which referred to the 1986
resolution and called on the members of IOSCO to consider negotiating bilateral and/or
multilateral memoranda of understanding. This resolution also stated that such cooperation
and exchange of information should be without regard to whether the matter under
investigation would be a violation of the law of the requested member. This resolution also
called upon members to make recommendations to their legislature to implement laws to
facilitate such memoranda of understanding.579 The main champion of this resolution was
the United States which, as a result of problems in its international enforcement efforts, had
issued a ‗Policy Statement on Regulation of International Securities Markets‘ in 1988. This
Policy Statement, inter alia, called on regulators to ―forge a network of... information sharing
arrangements that are effective from an enforcement standpoint and sensitive to national
sovereignty concerns‖.580
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Following the 1989 resolution in 1991 the IOSCO Technical Committee released a document
setting out ten principles which should be included when members were negotiating
Memoranda of Understanding with their foreign counterparts. 581 This drew upon a 1990
report which considered the difficulties members were encountering while negotiating and
implementing Memoranda of Understanding.582
Problems in relation to exchanging information clearly continued to be a significant issue as
observed by the IOSCO Technical Committee in 1994 when it conducted a study of the
problems experienced by securities regulators in obtaining access to information located in a
foreign jurisdiction relevant to an enforcement action. The resulting report, ―Report on Issues
Raised for Securities and Futures Regulators by Under-Regulated and Uncooperative
Jurisdictions‖583, found two key reasons why such information was not available. First, some
jurisdictions did not require sufficient records to be maintained to, for example, identify the
beneficial owners of securities. Second, there were barriers to transmitting information to
foreign securities regulators. These barriers consisted of first, legal provisions protecting
privacy or individual rights. Second, authorities lacked the power to compel the production of
documents and/or testimony, the authority to provide information to a foreign regulator
and/or resources to conduct the investigations on behalf of the foreign authorities.584
As a result of this report the President‘s Committee passed a further resolution asking
members to evaluate their own laws, regulations and procedures, considering the existence
of requirements to create and maintain records and also obstacles to the transmission of
information. The resolution asked members to provide IOSCO with an assessment of each
member's abilities in this regard and stated that IOSCO intended to monitor these
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assessments. To the extent that members lacked the legal ability to maintain records and
transmit information, members were asked to use their best efforts to obtain it.585
Following this resolution IOSCO sent its members a detailed questionnaire which contained
information about this self-evaluation exercise. The results were the subject of a further
IOSCO report in November 1997. Although not all IOSCO members completed the
questionnaire the report found substantial shortcomings in record keeping requirements and
the ability of regulators to share information with foreign regulators.586 This report resulted in
further resolutions by the Presidents Committee asking IOSCO members to:


Ensure that records were kept of all securities and futures transactions to identify the relevant
parties behind the transactions;



To ensure that they have the power to collect such information and that domestic secrecy
laws should not prevent such collection;



Ensure that they are capable of obtaining statements and documents that may be relevant to
investigating and prosecuting potential violations of laws and that such information can be
shared with other IOSCO members;



Work with domestic governments to identify and remove any impediments to such
cooperation.
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b) IOSCO’s key policy statement – the Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation
In 1998, as part of its goal to promote high standards of securities regulation throughout the
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world, IOSCO formulated what has become its key policy statement being its Objectives and
Principles of Securities Regulation.588 In this document IOSCO set out the two objectives of
securities regulation, namely the protection of investors and ensuring that markets are fair,
efficient and transparent. 589 In addition IOSCO initially laid out 30 principles of securities
regulation which it advises should be incorporated within a country‘s system of securities
regulation.590
A number of these principles reflect the problems found by IOSCO in relation to the sharing
of information for enforcement purposes. In particular principles 13-15 which provide:
13 The regulator should have authority to share both public and non-public information with
domestic and foreign counterparts.
14 Regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms that set out when and how they
will share both public and non-public information with their domestic and foreign counterparts.
15 The regulatory system should allow for assistance to be provided to foreign regulators who
need to make inquiries in the discharge of their functions and exercise of their powers.

591

c) The Shift to a Multilateral Approach to the Exchange of Information
In 1999 the predecessor of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the
Committee of European Securities Regulators, formulated its own Multilateral Memorandum
of Understanding on exchanging information between its members (the ESMA MoU). 592
However at that time it seems that IOSCO members were satisfied with the process of them
continuing to negotiate bilateral or multilateral memoranda of understanding without the
direct involvement of IOSCO. In particular the US had pursued the policy of directly
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negotiating bilateral/multilateral memoranda of understanding 593 and by the end of 2000 had
negotiated and signed bilateral memoranda of understanding with 22 countries and a
memorandum of understanding with the Commission of European Communities.594
However the events of September 11, 2001 resulted in an important shift in approach,
particularly by the US. These events triggered a concern that financial markets may have
been used for terrorist financing.595 In October 2001 IOSCO announced the formation of a
special Project Team to ―explore actions that securities regulators should take in view of the
events of 11 September and their aftermath.‖596 Specifically this Project Team was asked to
consider three areas, Contingency Planning, Expanded Cooperation and Information
Sharing and Client Identification. In relation to the latter two areas the Project Team was
asked to ―examine the capacity and willingness of securities regulators to implement high
quality standards on information sharing and the expansion of the standards to include other
financial regulators and law enforcement authorities‖ and ―explore the components of a
robust identification regime, taking into account practical implications for the industry.‖597
The Chairman of this Project Team was the President of the French Commission des
Operations de Bourse. It appears that the Project Team was formed at the instigation of the
Technical Committee and so probably its membership reflected the then membership of the
Technical Committee.598 It was this Project Team that formulated the MMoU which was then
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put before the Annual Conference of IOSCO in May 2002599 and endorsed by the Presidents
Committee.600
Adoption of MMoU by IOSCO members
Following the endorsement of the Presidents Committee, IOSCO members were asked to
sign the MMoU. However the initial response by members to becoming signatories was
lacklustre. By the end of 2004 only 25 members were signatories, another five had made a
commitment to seek the legal authority to become signatories and seventeen applications
were in process.601
In February 2005 the Technical Committee of IOSCO produced a report titled ―Strengthening
Capital Markets against Financial Fraud‖ prepared in response to uncertainty as to the
integrity of the capital markets as a result of the large financial collapses, in particular the
collapse of Enron Corporation and WorldCom in the US, and Parma at Spa. in Italy.602 Part
of this report considered cross border enforcement cooperation. In this report the Technical
Committee recommended that the Presidents Committee resolve that the MMoU be the:
Benchmark for enforcement cooperation among IOSCO members, with the goal of eventually
making the ability to sign on to the IOSCO Multilateral MOU a primary benchmark for continued
IOSCO membership, particularly for historically uncooperative jurisdictions.
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However the form of the resolution adopted at the next Presidents Committee was ultimately
not as strong as this recommendation of the Technical Committee because the President‘s
Committee resolution did not require the ability to sign the MMoU a condition of continued
membership. Rather, in April 2005 the President‘s Committee passed a resolution that all
members would have to become a full signatory to the MMoU by 1 January 2010 or would
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have to commit to becoming a full signatory to the MMoU. In addition resources would be
allocated to assist members become signatories.604 The IOSCO Presidents committee also
passed a resolution that IOSCO would not accept new members who did not sign the
MMoU.605
From April 2005 IOSCO committed significant resources in a push for members to become
signatories to the MMoU. This comprised not just specialized workshops, but also individual
consultation between member regulators and IOSCO.606 Much of this work was done via the
Emerging Markets Committee of IOSCO, presumably because members from those markets
were perceived to require the most assistance.607
In addition the Technical Committee started a process of identifying jurisdictions which did
not exchange information either because they were under-regulated or uncooperative. It
commenced a dialogue with these jurisdictions with a view to resolving problems and
establishing ―roadmaps to foster communication.‖608 This was referred to as the IOSCO
Contact Initiative.609
It appears that IOSCO also put pressure indirectly on under-regulated/uncooperative
jurisdictions via the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
In 2000 the FSF had published a list of under-regulated/uncooperative jurisdictions, also
known as Offshore Financial Centres (‗OFC‘s).610 This list was removed in 2005 in response
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to assessments by the IMF and reforms in these jurisdictions.611 However at the same time
the FSF said that:
problems remain in several OFCs with respect to compliance with international standards, notably
in the areas of effective cross border cooperation and information exchange and adequacy of
supervisory resources.

612

To deal with these problems, in 2005, the FSF adopted a number of measures including
endorsing IOSCO‘s efforts in

identifying

and

working with

under-regulated and

uncooperative jurisdictions so that they could meet IOSCO‘s requirements to sign the
MMoU.613 In 2006, in turn, the IOSCO Technical Committee delivered a status report to the
FSF concerning under-regulated and/or uncooperative jurisdictions and briefed the FATF
International Co-operation Review Group concerning under-regulated and/or uncooperative
jurisdictions.614
IOSCO continued to add signatories to the MMoU throughout 2007-2009. On its selfimposed deadline of January 2010 IOSCO announced that of the 115 securities regulators
that were then are members of IOSCO, 64 had signed the MMoU and that most of the
remaining member regulators had met the requirements needed to become signatories or
had made a commitment to seeking national legislative changes to allow them to do so in
the near future.615 Notwithstanding the fact that this deadline had passed, IOSCO continued
to push its members to sign the MMoU. In July 2010 IOSCO passed a further resolution
creating a new deadline of January 2013 for all members to sign and resolved to create a
‗watch list‘ of those members who had not signed the MMoU. It also resolved that IOSCO
would make a greater effort to provide assistance to those members who had not signed to
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enable them to make the necessary legislative changes to enable them to sign. In addition
the resolution resolved to provide greater assistance to enable non-applicants to apply to
become signatories.616
In May 2012, when it presumably became clear all members would not be signatories by
January 2013, IOSCO approved a further resolution said to ―allow it to take tougher
measures to encourage compliance by IOSCO members who have not yet signed the
MMoU‖ 617 This resolution called on the IOSCO Board to first, ―ensure that a program of
technical assistance and political support is made available to non-signatory members to
enable them to make the changes necessary to become signatories.‖ Second the IOSCO
Board was required to closely monitor progress towards complying with the 1 January 2013
deadline and, from 1 January 2013, disclose on the IOSCO website the names of those
members who had not become signatories to the MMoU. Third after 1 January 2013
deadline, the transitional IOSCO Board was requested, if necessary, to propose to the
Presidents Committee ―graduated additional measures to encourage those members who
have failed to become MMoU signatories‖. Finally this resolution called on its members to
take into account, from 1 January 2013, ―when exercising their responsibilities, the more
limited enforcement co-operation that regulators who are non-signatories to the MMoU are
able to provide.‖618
In June 2013 the Presidents committee passed a further resolution aimed at compelling
members to become signatories to the MMoU. It ask members to ―take precautions when
exercising their authorization or supervisory and enforcement responsibilities in respect of
entities or individuals linked to non-signatory jurisdictions.‖ It also requires that all members
who are not signatories are restricted from nominating candidates for leadership positions
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and from serving on leadership positions or on policy committees. Furthermore it also
provides that the voting rights of members who are not signatories to the MMoU are
suspended from 30 September 2014 until those members become signatories.619
Part 3 The Impact of the MMoU
The express terms of the MMoU
The influence of the United States is readily apparent in the express terms of the MMoU.
The preamble of the MMoU specifically makes reference to events of September 11, 2001
said to ―underscore the importance of expanding cooperation among IOSCO members.‖
Furthermore throughout IOSCO‘s history the US has been at the forefront of the push for
international cooperation and the exchange of information. In 1988, at the behest of the
SEC, the US Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act 620
which amended the Securities Exchange Act 1934 in relation to enforcement cooperation
and information sharing. These amendments provided that:


when the SEC provides information it is not to distinguish between the use the foreign
regulator can make with the information. That is the foreign regulator can use the
information for administrative, civil or criminal purposes;



that the SEC could withhold assistance if it prejudiced the ―public interest‖; and



that the SEC could provide information to foreign regulators even if the same activity
would not breach the law in the US. That is, the SEC was not subject to a ‗dual
criminality‘ requirement. This in contrast to the requirements of many Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties between countries which contain such a requirement.621
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The MMoU makes specific reference to dual criminality not being a condition of a regulator
providing assistance. Article 7(c) of the MMoU makes it clear that a party to the MMoU
cannot deny assistance based on the fact that the type of conduct under investigation is not
a violation of the laws of that country. This lack of a dual criminality requirement was also a
feature of the 1989 IOSCO resolution, championed by the US, following the 1988
amendments to the Securities Exchange Act 1934.
The scope of the information that can be requested under the MMoU is framed in quite
broad terms. It provides that the following assistance can be provided:
The assistance available under this Memorandum of Understanding includes, without
limitation:
(i) providing information and documents held in the files of the Requested Authority regarding
the matters set forth in the request for assistance;
(ii) obtaining information and documents regarding the matters set forth in the request for
assistance, including:
• contemporaneous records sufficient to reconstruct all securities and derivatives
transactions, including records of all funds and assets transferred into and out of bank
and brokerage accounts relating to these transactions;
• records that identify: the beneficial owner and controller, and for each transaction, the
account holder; the amount purchased or sold; the time of the transaction; the price of
the transaction; and the individual and the bank or broker and brokerage house that
handled the transaction; and
• information identifying persons who beneficially own or control non-natural Persons
organized in the jurisdiction of the Requested Authority.
(iii) In accordance with Paragraph 9(d), taking or compelling a Person‘s statement, or, where
permissible, testimony under oath, regarding the matters set forth in the request for
assistance.
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Accordingly, although it must be directed towards the enforcement of member‘s securities
and derivatives laws,622 the type of information that can be requested is not limited. However
while the information is not limited, the key focus of the MMoU seems to be the obtaining of
information in relation to the identity of persons behind a transaction.623
The MMoU provides that a requested party can deny providing assistance on ―public
interest‖ or ―essential national interest‖ grounds. These terms are not defined. If a denial is
made on these grounds then reasons must be provided to the regulator that requested the
information.624
Once the information is handed across it can be used for a broad range of purposes without
referring back to the securities regulator from which it obtained the information. In additional
to the purposes set out in the request it can be used for ―a purpose within the general
framework of the use stated in the request for assistance‖ including for civil, administrative or
criminal proceedings and for ―assisting a self-regulatory organisations surveillance or
enforcement activities‖.625 Although the information is subject to confidentiality provisions it
can be disclosed in certain limited circumstances or in accordance with a legally enforceable
demand.626
Importantly, the MMoU also specifically provides a signatory to the MMoU ―represent that no
domestic secrecy or blocking laws or regulation should prevent the collection or provision of
the information.‖627 Secrecy laws have been the source of frustration for the SEC in their
enforcement efforts and have resulted in the failure of some actions taken by the SEC.628
Given the Chairman of the French Securities Commission was the Chairman of the Project
Group in charge of preparing the MMoU, it is likely that the 1999 ESMA MoU may have been
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influential.629 In fact a comparison between the documents appears to demonstrate some
similarities. However the scope of the MMoU is somewhat narrower. For example, the ESMA
MMoU states that in some circumstances the authority making the request for assistance
and the authority receiving the request should consider joint investigations.630 However the
IOSCO MMoU contains no mention of joint investigations. The IOSCO MMoU merely
provides that a representative of the regulator requesting information may be present during,
for example, the taking of statements.
One notable absence from the express terms of the MMoU is that there is scant mention of
the sharing of costs of complying with requests. The only mention is a provision requiring the
authorities to consult where ―it appears that responding to a request will involve substantial
cost‖.631 It seems therefore that authorities receiving the request for information are expected
to meet the costs of complying with the requests. This is somewhat surprising given the
substantially different size of securities regulators around the world and that IOSCO‘s own
guidelines for members negotiating a bilateral MMoU state that a Memorandum of
Understanding should provide a process whereby the requesting authority share the costs of
providing assistance that are incurred by the requested authority.632
Impact beyond the express terms of the MMoU
The express terms of the MMoU belies the fact that the MMoU is not just concerned with
regulators agreeing to share information. Rather the MMoU is inextricably linked to IOSCO‘s
agenda of having countries incorporate into their own laws the Objectives and Principles of
Securities Regulation promulgated by IOSCO. This dual purpose of the MMoU was, in fact,
acknowledged by the IOSCO Technical Committee in 2005:
…the IOSCO Multilateral MOU is more than just an information-sharing mechanism. Signing the
agreement involves a review process through which prospective signatories must demonstrate
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they have the legal authority to provide the kinds of assistance the Multilateral MOU describes.
Signing the IOSCO Multilateral MOU necessarily entails an extensive assessment of the
prospective signatory‘s implementation of IOSCO‘s Core Principles in this area.

633

Securities regulators cannot sign the MMoU until they have undergone a screening process
by IOSCO.634 A member wishing to sign the MMoU must be assessed by a screening group
of other members to ensure that they have in place laws which comply with Principles 11-13
of IOSCO‘s Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation. If the member lacks laws
reflective of these principles IOSCO will provide assistance to these countries to achieve the
necessary changes.
This process ensures that IOSCO is satisfied that the domestic laws of the regulator wishing
to sign the MMoU are such that they can comply with their obligations under the MMoU. So,
for example, as is referred to above, the MMoU requires that a party ―represent that no
domestic secrecy or blocking laws or regulation should prevent the collection or provision of
the information.‖ 635 Therefore countries which have such secrecy laws cannot become
parties to the MMoU and their only option is to pressure the legislature of that country to
change the laws to comply with the requirements of the MMoU. Removing blocking laws and
increasing the regulators access to information aligns the laws of that country with Principle
13 of IOSCO‘s Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation which provides:
The regulator should have authority to share both public and non-public information with domestic
and foreign counterparts.
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The MMoU also provides that the Regulator must be able to provide a range of information
to foreign regulators, including banking records and information about the beneficial
ownership behind transactions. In addition the regulator must also be able to take or compel
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a person‘s statement. 637 Accordingly, to become a party to at MMoU the powers of the
regulator in that particular country may need to be strengthened. This would in turn align the
powers of the regulator with Principle 10 of IOSCO‘s Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation which provides:
The regulator should have comprehensive inspection, investigation and surveillance powers.
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Accordingly IOSCO is using the process of having parties sign the MMoU to coerce
members to have in place domestic legislation which reflects some of principles contained in
IOSCO‘s the Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, its key policy statement.
Therefore the MMoU is being used by IOSCO as a tactic to work towards the global
convergence of the principles governing the regulation of securities.
This link between the MMoU and changes to domestic legislation is a significant
achievement by IOSCO. Through the use of the MMoU IOSCO has managed to cause
changes domestic laws, including the domestic laws of countries such as Switzerland, the
Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands who are all signatories to the MMoU. These
countries were once known for their banking secrecy laws and perhaps thought of by those
engaging in violations of securities laws as places which were beyond the reach of
investigations undertaken by securities regulators such as the SEC. However as referred to
in chapter 3, information as to the beneficial owners of companies and bank accounts can be
now be obtained from these and many other similar countries via the IOSCO MMoU.
Part of IOSCO‘s success in causing the changes to the domestic laws is the detailed nature
of the screening process adopted by IOSCO. As is referred to above this involves not just
assessing if the laws are compatible with IOSCO principles, but also providing assistance in
making the necessary changes. This process involves an initial analysis of the member‘s
laws, in some cases in some detail, as to whether or not the member‘s laws are such that
they would be able to comply with the obligations under the MMoU. If there are deficiencies
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this list of deficiencies is sent back to the member to draft complying legislation. The
member then drafts legislation to put before its legislative body. IOSCO then follows up as to
whether these changes have become law. If the member cannot get the government to
make the necessary changes to its laws, IOSCO will do everything within its financial
constraints to get the changes enacted. This includes the Secretary General of IOSCO
speaking to or visiting government officials. On occasion the changes have been blocked by
the opposition or even the political party in power. In such cases IOSCO has worked with the
member securities regulator and, on occasion, has developed some creative solutions such
as incorporating the changes in packages of legislation designed to tackle fraudulent
activities such as money laundering.639
Apart from furthering the success of the MMoU, this process in achieving change in
domestic laws is a significant development in the importance of IOSCO as an organization
as well as its role in global governance. It also perhaps signals an important development in
the importance of transnational regulatory networks. The last few decades have seen the
establishment and growth of a number of transnational regulatory networks, such as IOSCO.
These networks are characterised by their members not being states but national regulatory
agencies. They also tend to have no international status beyond that conferred by the
national law of their host countries. 640 In relation to global financial regulation, other
transnational regulatory networks exercise similar functions to IOSCO in that they seek
standardization of laws, coordination and cooperation. For example the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) seeks to ―promote effective and globally
consistent supervision of the insurance industry in order to develop and maintain fair, safe
and stable insurance markets‖.641 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a
forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters and setting international banking
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standards. 642 But transnational regulatory networks are not limited to global financial
regulation. There are such networks in relation to competition law,643 environmental law644
and international criminal law.645
One of the key reasons why these networks have grown in importance is because of
problems with the bilateral and multilateral treaty process to solve global problems. The
treaty negotiation and subsequent ratification process is time consuming and complex and
may not result in a resolution. It can be particularly inappropriate to problems which require
more immediate or comprehensive solutions.646
However the main difficulty with the use of transnational regulatory networks such as IOSCO
to solve global problems is that their agreements, guidelines, policy statements, etc. have no
international legal status and impose no binding obligations. As such, generally these
networks are limited to relying upon ‗soft law‘ techniques such as networking, socialization,
discussion and persuasion to have members adopt their recommendations. Soft law
however creates a ‗compliance challenge‘, compliance often being dependent upon
coercion, self-interest and the legitimacy of the proposed law.647 As such, some question the
effectiveness of networks as the solution to the need for global governance.648
However, as the MMoU demonstrates, perhaps transnational regulatory networks such as
IOSCO can effectively achieve compliance not by relying on the ‗stick‘ of international law
but by using a ‗carrot‘. If networks can develop a valuable tool, like the MMoU, which is
needed by regulators and it can make the obtaining of this ‗carrot‘ conditional upon domestic
legislative reform, this may in turn successfully coerce regulators to approach their domestic
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legislature to undertake such reform. As a result, over time, domestic regulation in such
jurisdictions will accord with the standards promulgated by the network. This may, in turn,
work towards strengthening the power and influence of the network.
The use of the MMoU
a) Frequency of use
Requests under the IOSCO MMoU have been increasing exponentially rising from just 56
requests in 2003 to 2658 requests in 2013 (Figure 5.1).649 As such it seems clear that the
MMoU is becoming used more frequently over time and has become an important
mechanism which securities regulators use for their investigations.
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It also appears that the MMoU is becoming important in tackling cross border market abuse
as the majority of requests made are for information related to insider dealing, market
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manipulation, misrepresentation of material information and other fraudulent or manipulative
practices.650
Some of these increases in requests can no doubt be attributed to the increased number of
signatories to the MMoU which has allowed IOSCO members to obtain information from a
larger number of countries. However some of this increase in requests must also be due to a
growing awareness by enforcement staff of individual members that this option is available
to them to obtain information where the investigation trail leads outside of the jurisdiction. As
the MMoU is used more frequently by enforcement staff and they become familiar with the
process this may, in turn, lead them to use it again.
The MMoU is also less complex and has a broader reach than alternative mechanisms
available to enforcement staff to obtain this information, for example Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties. For example, some countries are signatories to the Inter-American
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. However obtaining information
pursuant to this treaty is more cumbersome and information that can be obtained is limited to
the investigation, prosecution and proceedings that pertain to criminal offences and then
only criminal offences which are punishable by one year or more of imprisonment.
Furthermore this Convention was adopted in 1992, it was not ratified by the US until 2001
and 7 of the 34 states comprising the Organisation of American States have still not ratified
it.651
The increase in the number of requests under the IOSCO MMoU may also indicate that
IOSCO members are now more willing to take action and commit resources to matters which
cross international boundaries. In a newspaper article published in 2010 Jane Diplock, the
former chairman of IOSCO and the former Chairman of the New Zealand Securities
Commission opined that the MMoU had changed the dynamics of international
investigations. She commented that before the MMoU the situation was very different and
650
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that ―There were some jurisdictions where we would write a letter asking for information and
we wouldn‘t hear back for months,‖ but that ―now the response is almost instantaneous.‖652
In the same article Martin Wheatley, chief executive of Hong Kong‘s Securities and Futures
Commission supported this view and said ―The structure of trading and market access has
changed so much that this process that we have set up is integral to doing our job.‖653
The prevalence of the use of the MMoU also appears to be reducing the necessity for
securities regulators to negotiate additional bilateral Memorandums of Understanding in
relation to the exchange of information required for investigations. For example, the SEC has
negotiated only a further 3 bilateral enforcement Memoranda of Understanding since the
signing of the MMoU.654 Furthermore where new bilateral Memorandum of Understanding
have been negotiated, these tend to build on, rather than replace the IOSCO MMoU. 655 This
suggests that the US, at least, is mostly satisfied with the effectiveness of the MMoU.
b) Who is using the MMoU?
As the MMoU was instigated primarily by policies promulgated by the Technical Committee,
it is perhaps no surprise that the countries with the largest capital markets appear to be
benefiting the most from the MMoU. A survey conducted by IOSCO in April 2007 of
regulators in 32 ‗emerging markets‘ found that the traffic of incoming requests compared to
outgoing requests in those countries is not equal and that they receive more requests for
information than they make. 656 Nevertheless it does seem that these countries with less
developed markets are still making a significant number of requests. Furthermore the survey
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found that these regulators reported that their requests for information were increasing each
year. 657 This suggests that although the formulation and implementation of MMoU was
driven by developed countries for their own enforcement needs it is becoming a valuable
instrument for all countries in tackling securities violations.

It seems that the MMoU is

something that all countries interested in promoting fair and efficient markets and attracting
investment need and want.
Conclusion
IOSCO has gradually become the leading international organisation working towards
improving the enforcement capacities of its members to tackle cross border market abuse
and its MMoU has become the most important way in which it is making progress towards
this goal. The MMoU has increased the ability of securities regulators to obtain information
from other countries for enforcement purposes and has thereby increased their ability to take
action against securities violations notwithstanding the fact that evidence needs to be
obtained from outside of their jurisdiction.
Furthermore the effect of the MMoU on cross border market abuse may be more significant
than just the direct impact it has on the success of investigations where information is
obtained pursuant to a request. As enforcement staff become more familiar with the process
they may be more likely to pursue investigations of cross border market abuse which they
may have otherwise not pursued due to the difficulties involved in completing the
investigation. If this leads to more investigations of cross border market abuse, this may
eventually act as a deterrent to those considering engaging in such violations if they become
aware that structuring a transaction across borders does not reduced the likelihood that they
will be pursued by the authorities.
Moreover the MMoU has shown that, despite being merely a network of securities regulators
IOSCO can significantly influence the content of domestic laws. Through the MMoU, IOSCO
has shown that even though it cannot resort to international law to enforce its policies, is not
657
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thereby limited to the ‗soft law‘ tools such as negotiation socialization and persuasion.
IOSCO has shown that it can exercise real power and insist that members change their
domestic law in order to gain the advantage of valuable tools such as the IOSCO MMoU.
Perhaps over time IOSCO may be able to increasingly use what it has learnt in the
development and implementation of the MMoU to work towards convergence of securities
regulation, not just the area of enforcement of securities laws, but also in other areas. Rather
than just setting the discourse of securities regulation and formulate ‗soft law‘ policies, it may
be able to use incentives such as access to enforcement tools such as the IOSCO MMoU as
a ‗carrot‘ to members to change their domestic laws to comply with IOSCO policies. This
may increase the possibility that the ‗soft law‘ policies of IOSCO change into the ‗hard‘ law of
domestic statutes. This may also signal the beginning of a trend by which transnational
regulatory networks, such as IOSCO, can have significant influence and thereby wield
significant power globally.658
Yet although the MMoU and IOSCO have been largely successful to date, going forward a
number of questions arise in relation to the MMoU and the role of IOSCO generally in the
enforcement of cross border market abuse. For example, can IOSCO achieve its aim of
having all members sign the MMoU? What will happen if this does not occur? Will
signatories continue meet their obligations under the MMoU? In other words, as the use of
the MMoU expands it is likely that conflicts will arise. How will IOSCO address these
conflicts?
Furthermore it seems clear that IOSCO does not intend to rest on its achievements to date
and aims to continue to work towards achieving its goals, including its goal of strengthening
the enforcement capacities of its member regulators to tackle market misconduct. Given the
success of the MMoU this may take the form of expanding the scope of the MMoU or
developing another Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding. For example, the MMoU is
focused on assisting regulators obtain information in relation to the investigation and
658
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enforcement of securities offences which cross international boundaries. Exchange of
information which may assist in the detection of such offences appears to be largely outside
its scope as presently drafted. Alternatively or in addition to expanding the MMoU IOSCO
may try other strategies to further its enforcement goals. The possible expansion of the
MMoU and IOSCO‘s future role in the enforcement of cross border market abuse is the
subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 6

THE ROLE OF IOSCO GOING FORWARD
IOSCO also has a proud record in promoting cooperation between regulators. The Multilateral
Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation and information sharing, now with 95
members as full signatories, has been an important support for cooperation in enforcement
matters that span multiple jurisdictions. There are opportunities for us to extend this same level
of cooperation to investigations, to promote better supervision of global market players and
solving global issues.
Chair of the IOSCO Board, David Wright, IOSCO Annual Report 2012

659

As links between securities markets have increased, the complexity of the cases nationally
based securities regulators are required to investigate and prosecute has also increased. As
highlighted in previous chapters, this has increasingly resulted in them turning to the IOSCO
MMoU to assist them in that task.
IOSCO has become the main international organisation dedicated to the advancement of the
coordination of securities regulation and enforcement, its rise to prominence driven partly by
the success of the MMoU which appears to have increased the likelihood that securities
regulators will undertake cross border investigations. Another factor which has contributed to
its profile is that it has become one of the key organisations to which international bodies,
such as the G20, delegate responsibility for the development the policies needed to
strengthen and stabilise securities markets.660
In 2010 IOSCO formulated its goals and priorities for the years 2010-2015. These were to:
1. identify and address systemic risks to the fair and efficient functioning of markets;
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2. Maintain and improve the international regulatory framework for securities markets
by setting international standards; and
3. Strengthen IOSCO‘s role within the international financial community in order to
advance the implementation of high-level objectives and principles of securities
regulation.
Within the second goal IOSCO articulated that it intends to build regulatory capacity through
the systematic implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation. In addition it intends to work towards this goal by:
Supporting the development of the enforcement and surveillance framework, through full
implementation of the IOSCO MOU by asking all IOSCO ordinary members and associate
members, with primary responsibility for securities regulation in their jurisdictions to become
signatories to the IOSCO MOU, possible enhancements to the IOSCO MOU, and working
661

with uncooperative and/or under regulated jurisdictions.

Mindful of IOSCO‘s stated goals, this chapter considers IOSCO‘s future role in relation to the
enforcement of cross border market abuse. Given the fact that the level of sophistication and
interconnectedness of the markets is likely to continue to increase, can IOSCO do more to
assist regulators as they endeavour to detect, investigate and prosecute cross border market
abuse?
In evaluating IOSCO‘s future role this chapter considers whether IOSCO should be proactive
in relation to three possible areas. First, given that IOSCO has stated that it will pursue ‗full
implementation‘ of the MMoU, the initial part of the chapter considers the future of the MMoU
including how this full implementation can be achieved. In addition this part also considers
the future of the MMoU generally and how IOSCO should seek to develop it and capitalize
on its success to date. The second part of this chapter moves on to set out possible policy
initiatives IOSCO could consider developing with a view to assisting securities regulators in
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their cross border enforcement actions. As such, this section draws upon shortcomings in
regulation suggested by the analysis of the previous chapters.
The third part of the chapter considers what role IOSCO could or should have beyond the
MMoU and policy development. This part concludes that although it is unlikely that IOSCO
could have an operational role, IOSCO could develop systems and mechanisms to assist
securities regulators detect, investigate and prosecute market abuse. Finally I consider
whether these other systems and mechanisms could, like the MMoU, be used as leverage
by IOSCO as it continues to work towards its goal of achieving global convergence of
securities regulations.
Part 1 Building upon the Success the MMoU
It seems that the MMoU has had a largely positive impact on the enforcement capabilities of
IOSCO members as well as IOSCO‘s status as an organization. For this reason, and as
indicated in its goals for 2010-2015, IOSCO will continue to champion its use by its members
and will continue to press its members to become signatories. However in continuing its
progress in this regard IOSCO may find that it may have to confront certain challenges. First,
it may not be able to coerce all jurisdictions to sign the MMoU. If that is the case this may
leave a gap in its enforcement framework. Second as regulators receive and make more and
more requests for information under the MMoU, and regulators become more reliant on the
MMoU for the success of their investigations, tensions and conflicts may arise. In such
circumstances will members continue to meet their obligations? Third, the MMoU is now
over a decade old and IOSCO and its members have had time to consider their experiences
with it and perhaps discover its shortcomings. Do these experiences suggest that changes
should be made to attempt to improve its effectiveness and, if so, how can these changes be
made?
Persuading all jurisdictions to sign the MMoU
Since the creation of the MMoU, IOSCO has stressed the need for all of its members to
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become signatories. Recently IOSCO stated:
30 members have yet to become signatories. As long as these jurisdictions remain outside the
international enforcement regime, they offer potential safe havens for wrong doers and create gaps
in IOSCO‘s international enforcement network.
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Accordingly, the rationale for insisting that members sign the MMoU is that as long as some
countries have not signed there will be gaps in the enforcement capacity of members who
are signatories. Without all members signing other members of IOSCO may not be able to
obtain information they require for their investigations. As such perpetrators of securities
violations could potentially escape investigation and enforcement action. Indeed this may
even embolden such persons to continue and possibly even expand their fraudulent
activities.
IOSCO is also aiming to set high standards globally for securities regulation and
enforcement and the MMoU seems to be a key part of achieving this objective. Without the
setting of such high standards there is the risk of a ‗race to the bottom‘ for securities
regulation due to the temptation for countries set lax standards of regulation and
enforcement as a way of attracting corporations which issue securities to their jurisdictions.
Given this goal of having all members sign the MMoU, over the last few years IOSCO‘s
rhetoric in relation to those that have not signed has become increasingly robust as each
self-imposed deadline for all members to sign passes without this goal being achieved. In
addition, as was outlined in the preceding chapter, IOSCO has also increasingly ratcheted
up its actions to pressure members to sign. Initially these actions consisted only of providing
what was called ‗technical assistance‘ to help non signatories make the necessary legislative
changes required as a prerequisite to allowing the member to sign the MMoU. Next IOSCO
moved to establish a public watch list on its website of members who had not signed.
Presumably this was designed to ‗name and shame‘ those members and thereby pressure
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them into signing. Following this action, IOSCO restricted the ability of non-signatories to
vote, serve on leadership positions or nominate persons for leadership positions.
In 2012 IOSCO also called for its members to take precautions in dealing with entities or
individuals linked to non-signatory jurisdictions.663 Again this action is calculated to pressure
members who are not signatories to sign. Some members of IOSCO are already acting on
this recommendation. IOSCO has reported that India now requires that foreign investors in
Indian mutual funds and equity shares must be resident in a country that is a signatory to the
MMoU or a signatory of a bilateral MoU with India‘s securities regulator, the Securities and
Exchange Board of India. The Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission also requires
that a company seeking a listing on an exchange that it supervises be incorporated in a
jurisdiction where arrangements are in place to ensure reasonable regulatory cooperation. 664
In Canada the BCSC is considering imposing a condition upon Investment Dealers who
trade in the US Over the Counter Markets requiring that they not engage in any activity
involving a security of an OTC issuer with any financial institution which is located in a
jurisdiction that is not a signatory to the MMoU.665
Although the majority of IOSCO members have signed the MMoU but there are still 21
regulators who have not. Twenty of these have taken some steps to signing the MMoU, for
example have expressed a commitment to having their laws changed so that the laws will
become compliant with the obligations of signatories under the MMoU, a precondition to
IOSCO allowing a member to sign. 666 However the remaining three, namely Bolivia,
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Uzbekistan and Venezuela, have not yet even made this commitment.667 There are also a
small number of countries in the world that are not yet members of IOSCO including
Monaco, Liberia, the Marshall Islands and Vanuatu. Each of these countries is considered
an under-regulated, uncooperative jurisdictions or offshore financial centre. As it is now a
condition of new members of IOSCO that they sign the MMoU, if these countries wish to
become members each will also have to ensure that their laws are consistent with the
obligations of signatories of the MMoU, and sign the MMoU, before IOSCO will allow them to
join.
One problem for IOSCO may be that, as the ability to become a signatory often requires a
change in the domestic laws of a jurisdiction, it may be that in some cases this simply cannot
be achieved. Accordingly, despite the best efforts of IOSCO, some regulators may never be
able to become full signatories if they cannot convince their domestic legislative body to
make the necessary changes. Other reasons why regulators may be reluctant to sign the
MMoU emerged in a survey conducted by IOSCO in April 2007 of 32 regulators who were
classified as from ‗emerging markets‘. Apart from an inability to meet the IOSCO MMoU
requirements, this reluctance was due to:


a concern about the confidentiality of shared information;



there was a belief that the MMoU was irrelevant due to a lack of cross border activity;
or



a concern that entering into the MMoU was unnecessary because they engaged in
effective information exchange via bilateral Memoranda of Understanding.668

A particular focus of IOSCO has been offshore financial centres (OFCs).669 In 2005 a report
of the IOSCO Technical Committee stated:
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Financial regulators in OFC jurisdictions are not unique in their abilities (or inabilities) to
cooperate with their foreign counterparts in enforcement cases. However, the significant role
OFCs play in the global capital market means that their inability to provide enforcement-related
information to other regulators may pose greater systemic risks to financial stability than might
similar inabilities in other jurisdictions with less of a nexus to the global financial system. Further,
because the financial sector frequently makes up a significant portion of the economies of many
OFCs, more cooperative jurisdictions may feel competitive pressures if other, less cooperative,
OFCs ―market‖ themselves as offering a more ―anonymous‖ or ―less bureaucratic‖ legal
670

system.

The same report commented that these OFC jurisdictions have caused significant difficulties
in enforcement:
Many recent financial scandals have focused attention on OFCs and their abilities to share
enforcement-related information with other jurisdictions. Many of the subsidiaries and SPEs
(Special Purpose Accounting Entities) implicated in these cases in efforts to disguise issuer debt
were incorporated in OFCs and, in some cases, regulators were unable to collect information
essential to an investigation from the supervisors based in these jurisdictions. Further,
historically, regulators in several prominent OFC jurisdictions have been unable or unwilling to
cooperate with their foreign counterparts.
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In 2005 an IOSCO Technical Committee report stated that it was ―mindful of the competitive
pressures OFCs face‖672 and its work has involved engaging in persuasion to ―emphasize to
OFCs the benefits to be gained through greater cross border enforcement cooperation, as
well as the costs that a continued lack of cooperation may entail‖.673 Another focus has been
the provision of technical assistance through its GEM Committee to enable OFC‘s to achieve
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the required legal capacity and infrastructure.674 As discussed in the preceding chapter, to
date IOSCO has made significant progress in terms of persuading a number of OFCs to sign
the MMoU in the sense that the number of uncooperative members and countries is now
relatively small.
However, it is quite possible that some OFCs are refusing to sign the MMoU and are not
applying for IOSCO membership because they perceive that there may be a competitive
advantage in protecting the privacy of their residents. For example, Monaco‘s securities
regulator, the Commission de Contrôle des Activités Financières states that it will only
provide information to a foreign authority if first, the authority is bound by professional
secrecy offering the same level of guarantees as in the Principality and second, the
675

information is exclusively used for the purposes for which it has been disclosed.

In 2008

the International Monetary Fund produced a report critical of this restrictive privacy
requirement and recommended that it be changed reflect the terms of the IOSCO MMoU. 676
However despite this recommendation it appears that nothing has changed.
As a mere network of securities regulators IOSCO has no power to take any formal action
against countries under international law. Nevertheless IOSCO has demonstrated that it is
willing to take very robust action within the limitations of its power to coerce members to sign
the MMoU. Its latest measure, namely encouraging members to restrict the ability of persons
and entities resident in non-signatory jurisdictions from engaging in securities transactions,
has the potential to have the greatest influence thus far in pressuring countries to sign the
MMoU. This is because if many IOSCO members introduce such restrictions, this could
severely constrain some of the activities of investors and entities resident in those nonsignatory jurisdictions. For example, it may restrict investors resident in Monaco from
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accessing investment opportunities in some of the world‘s largest capital markets. This could
in turn lead to such investors pressuring the securities authority of Monaco to sign the
MMoU.
In addition, there are other measures that IOSCO could consider introducing with a view to
putting pressure on countries to sign the MMoU. For example, apart from publishing the
names of members who are not signatories on its website, IOSCO could also consider
publishing on its website the names of all jurisdictions that are not IOSCO members and
therefore also not signatories to the MMoU. Furthermore an education campaign designed to
inform investors and financial advisers of the hazards of dealing with persons or entities
resident in these jurisdictions is a strategy IOSCO could also consider.
However there are some risks for IOSCO as an organisation in moving towards these
stronger coercive measures. What has contributed significantly to IOSCO‘s growth and
strength as an organisation has been its broad and inclusive membership policy and
assistance to regulators from emerging markets. The introduction of policies designed to
isolate certain countries may paradoxically serve to weaken its organisation and influence,
particularly if other nations who are already members align themselves with the recalcitrant
nations for perhaps political reasons.
One issue for IOSCO may be that much of the momentum for the MMoU came from the US.
As such, it largely reflects a US approach to enforcement cooperation and enforcement
generally. Aggressive enforcement of securities laws is a key component of SEC policy and
the US stands apart in terms of the greater amount of funding it spends on enforcement, the
sheer number of enforcement actions brought and the magnitude of the sanctions
imposed.677 In fact some, like Kal Raustiala, argue that organizations such as IOSCO are
essentially exploited by the SEC to spread the ‗regulatory gospel‘ of US securities law:678
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...the transgovernmental securities network is active and growing, with the SEC playing a critical
and active role. For the SEC, networking with foreign regulators is a conscious strategy aimed at
enhancing its enforcement powers in a globalizing economy while at the same time promoting the
institutionalization of U.S.-style securities laws abroad through its technical assistance programs.
The SEC‘s unwavering approach is to bring other jurisdictions to the U.S. model, not to modify the
U.S. model. This is even true of the SEC‘s cooperative efforts with regulators from other
advanced industrial states.
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Up until the global financial crisis in 2008 many nations appeared to be anxious to copy the
US model of securities laws and enforcement in an effort to emulate the US‘s enviable
capital markets and associated economic growth.680 Post the global financial crisis, this push
for economic growth through fostering larger and more efficient capital markets continues,
although countries may not so slavishly follow the US model. In particular, some countries
envisage a broader role for government intervention, for example by placing restrictions on
high frequency trading.681
The risk for IOSCO in taking more stringent action against uncooperative jurisdictions is a
possible backlash against the US hegemony reflected in MMoU and IOSCO‘s policies
generally. There is, however, currently no sign of such a backlash as the march by members
of IOSCO to sign the MMoU continues, with most members seemingly able to bring about
changes to their domestic laws so that they can become signatories. IOSCO‘s recent
changes to its management structure by broadening the representation of its governing
Board to include stronger representation of countries which are not part of the developed
world should also reduce the possibility of a backlash. However it is possible that over time
this more representative Board may also weaken IOSCO‘s resolve to continue to push for
signatories as a broader management base may include members who might conceivably
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have political or other reasons for not taking strong action against countries that do not
become signatories to the MMoU.
Will the signatories to the MMoU continue to meet their obligations?
It is critical to the overall success of the MMoU that members comply with requests that they
receive under the MMoU. The MMoU, like other bilateral memoranda of understanding, is
ultimately a form of ‗soft law‘ as they are not binding on the parties. However, as noted by
Roberta Karmel, in practice bilateral memoranda of understanding have proved to be quite
effective:
But sometimes soft law acts like hard law prior to codification... MOUs are not legally binding
instruments. They are negotiated between the SEC and foreign regulators. Despite their
nonbinding status, however, these agreements are followed. As previously noted, in 2007, the
SEC made 556 requests to foreign regulators for assistance and information under MOUs and
responded to 454 requests.
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Because of the multilateral nature of the MMoU and the procedures incorporated in MMoU to
resolve conflicts, the MMoU seems to be proving to be even more successful than bilateral
memoranda of understanding, having the effect of virtually compelling a response to a
request for information. These procedures to ensure compliance contained within the MMoU
provide that in the event of non-compliance the matter is referred to the ‗Monitoring Group‘
which can consider and recommend a range of possible options including:
providing a period of time for the signatory to comply; full peer review of a signatory that may not
be in compliance; public notice of non-compliance; suspension of a signatory from MOU
participation; or termination from MOU participation as provided in the MOU.
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makes the for a final decision on the action to be taken after it has provided notice to the
non-compliant member and given this member the opportunity to be heard.684
Furthermore, despite the increase in requests for information via the MMoU and the fact that
IOSCO members represent the full array of political and legal systems, to date there seems
to have been little in the way of conflict in relation to member‘s obligations in complying with
requests. IOSCO attributes this lack of conflict to its procedures to ensuring that member
countries have the laws which allow them to exchange information prior to signing the MMoU
as well as the fact that members are arguably strongly motivated to comply in order to
preserve their reputations and credibility. 685 IOSCO usually receives 2 or 3 informal
notifications each year in relation to potential non-compliance and, while these can be
reported to the MMoU Monitoring Group in accordance with the terms of the MMoU, IOSCO
has found that most often the problem results from a misunderstanding and can be resolved
informally with the assistance of the IOSCO General Secretariat.686
One dispute reported in the press however perhaps shows the first break from the universal
cooperation that has so far been characteristic of cooperation under the MMoU. Since 2010
the SEC has been trying to obtain information from the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC) in relation to allegations involving what have been called Chinese
‗concept stocks‘ listed on US exchanges. These were Chinese companies which were
floated in the US via reverse-mergers of existing listed companies, thereby avoiding the SEC
disclosure rules for new listings.687 Many US investors lost their investment in these stocks
when it became known that some of these companies had falsified their financial statements.
As a result the SEC launched an investigation. As part of that investigation the SEC sought,
via the MMoU, the audit working papers prepared by the auditors of these companies.
However the CSRC claimed that under CSRC rules domestic auditors are prohibited from

684

IOSCO MMoU, supra note 268 article III(d ) and (e).
Cunha, supra note 649 at 682.
686
Interview with IOSCO.
687
See generally, Katherine T. Zuber, ―Breaking down a great wall: Chinese reverse mergers and regulatory
efforts to increase accounting transparency‖ (2014) 102, Geo. L.J 1307.
685

256

sending audit working papers on Chinese companies listed overseas to anyone outside of
China and that the MMoU did not obligate them to share these audit working papers. It was
reported that this issue was not resolved when SEC and CSRC representatives met in May
2012 in Beijing at an annual IOSCO conference. At this meeting SEC and CSRC officials
exchanged retorts, the SEC arguing that is not looking to assert itself globally whereas
CRSC officials argued China has the sovereign right not to cooperate with U.S.
investigators.688
This failure of the SEC in gaining access to these audit working papers demonstrates three
possible limitations of the MMoU. First, the MMoU may not be specific and/or broad enough
in terms of the information that must be provided and consideration may have to be given to
expanding its terms. Second it illustrates that the provision in the MMoU that allows a
signatory to refuse to comply with a request on ―public interest‖ or ―essential national
interest‖ grounds could be exploited if an IOSCO member is lobbied by political or business
groups not to comply. Finally it perhaps also indicates that tensions can arise if a signatory
aggressively utilize the MMoU to investigate the activities of persons who are not its own
nationals.
Another possible issue that may lead to members not complying with their obligations under
the MMoU is the lack of procedures to deal with sharing of the costs associated with
processing requests that are received. This could conceivably cause regulators from smaller
countries with limited resources to renege on their obligations under the MMoU. Even for
larger regulators the work required to process requests could be seen to be taking resources
away from what may be more pressing domestic concerns, for example assisting new
688
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enterprises. Indeed it was reported that one reason for the tension in relation to the Chinese
concept stocks dispute is that only about 200 of CSRC‘s 1,200 staff are specifically assigned
to investigations compared to one third of SEC‘s 3,700 staff.689
Another possible area of concern is the manner in which information that is obtained via the
MMoU can be used. The MMoU provides that information disclosed can be used for a broad
range of enforcement purposes. This could result in inappropriate release and use of
information putting the media spotlight on the MMoU and focus domestic political pressures
on securities regulators. It is also not difficult to envisage a scenario whereby information is
released by a regulator and it is then used to impose harsh punishment in a country which
has little concern for due process. For example, China, who is a member of IOSCO and a
signatory to the MMoU, has in the past imposed severe penalties, including the death
penalty, for some economic crimes.690
There are therefore various issues that may result in members not complying with requests
they receive. However it is likely that these will remain in the minority of cases and that most
requests will be complied with. It also seems unlikely that such tensions will lead to a
widespread non-compliance and or a breakdown in the operation of the MMoU. This is
because of the interconnectedness of markets and the fact that the MMoU seems to be
fulfilling a need of securities regulators to quickly and easily obtain information to enforce
their domestic securities laws.
Changes to the MMoU going forward
The MMoU is now over ten years old and has not undergone a substantial revision during
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that time. To date only relatively inconsequential changes have been made. 691 Given its
success and the experiences of those who have used the MMoU there appear to be areas in
which it could be improved and expanded.692 These changes could include increasing the
range of organizations which are able to sign the MMoU, broadening the range of
information which can be requested pursuant to the MMoU, improving the confidentiality
provisions and specifying a mandatory timeframe within which information requested be
provided.
a) Expanding the signatories
One possible change that it appears might be considered is to expand the organizations who
can sign the MMoU to include non-government not for profit self-regulatory bodies (SROs)
such as FINRA and IIROC. As discussed in Chapter 4, at present when such an SRO needs
to obtain material for regulatory purposes from a foreign securities regulator the request
must go via the government regulator who is the signatory to the MMoU. This requirement
could delay an investigation. Allowing SROs to sign the MMoU and thereby allowing them to
obtain information directly from foreign regulators could eliminate any such delay. It may also
enhance the enforcement capabilities of all other signatories to the MMoU in that they could
seek information directly from these SROs.
b) Increasing the range of information that can be obtained
As referred to in the preceding chapter the MMoU sets out categories of the types of
information that should be provided, the focus being on providing information in relation to
the identity of persons behind a transaction. However the information that can be provided is
not limited to this type of information. The introductory statement in the MMOU before these
categories are listed provides that the assistance that can be provided ―includes, without
limitation‖ these items. However, despite this relatively broad wording, given the conflict that
691
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arose when the SEC requested audit papers from the CRSC, it seems that some members
may be interpreting its terms narrowly in such a way that will restrict the information
provided.
The limitations of the documents that can be obtained via the MMoU is also perhaps
demonstrated by the fact that the SEC has entered into 3 bilateral arrangements seeking the
exchange of an expanded list of information beyond what is available via the MMoU. For
example in 2008 SEC and ASIC signed such a bilateral agreement, even though both were
already signatories to the IOSCO MMoU. This bilateral agreement provides that, in addition
to bank, brokerage and beneficial ownership records, each regulator agrees to provide to the
other audit work papers, internet service provider records, travel histories, credit card and
phone records.693
Another possible area that could form the basis for expanding the MMoU is in relation to
providing assistance in relation to the freezing of assets that constitute the proceeds of the
violation of securities laws or comprise investor funds that have been defrauded. The
bilateral SEC ASIC agreement provided for this type of assistance.694 Further still the MMoU
could provide for assistance in relation to the recovery of funds to satisfy penalties or fines
that have been imposed by requesting members and/or compensation orders that have been
made by requesting members.
One problem with seeking such substantial amendments to the MMoU is that it can only be
changed by a unanimous recommendation of its signatories.695 As the number of signatories
to the MMoU increases, obtaining such a unanimous agreement may become increasingly
problematic. If IOSCO wishes to make substantial amendments and such agreement cannot
be obtained, IOSCO may need to develop additional MMoU or MMoUs containing the
amendments and then ask members to sign onto these.
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c) Reducing delays in responding to requests
One issue with the MMoU is that it does not provide any guidelines to regulators as to how
quickly the information requested needs to be provided. Although the requesting member
can specify when the information is needed, there is no obligation to actually provide it within
this timeframe. As a result, and as is referred to in chapter 4, the experiences of some
securities regulators is that sometimes information is not provided in a timely manner, which
has the predictable effect of delaying the investigation. This is a concern as the success of
enforcement action is often linked to how quickly the investigation was concluded and delay
in an investigation can lead to its failure, as was also discussed in Chapter 4.
Nevertheless the reality is that it may be difficult to specify exact timeframes for the provision
of information under the MMoU. This is because what is a ―reasonable time‖ to respond to a
request depends upon variables such as the intrinsic urgency of the request, the complexity
of the response required and the resources available to the responding regulator to satisfy
the request. As such, although IOSCO is aware that delay caused by failure to respond to
requests in a timely way might be a problem, it is struggling to develop a possible
amendment to the MMoU to address this issue. 696 Perhaps a better way to proceed would
be for IOSCO to provide a mechanism whereby funding could be provided by the regulator
asking for the information to pay for processing costs, particularly if the assistance sought is
urgent or resource intensive.
IOSCO is also streamlining the procedures for resolving disputes between regulators for
failure to respond to requests for assistance which may go some way to addressing the
problem of delay. As set out above, at present the MMoU prescribes that disputes in relation
to the operation of the MMoU are to be considered by the Monitoring Group. As constituted
the Monitoring Group comprises all of the signatories to the MMoU.697 Given the number of
signatories to the MMoU, this group is too large to effectively and quickly resolve disputes.
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As such IOSCO has established an informal Monitoring Group process to resolve disputes
and is considering setting up a Monitoring Group Steering Committee to support the
Monitoring Group.698
d) Improving confidentially
The MMoU provides that a request for information is to be kept confidential and only
disclosed after consultation with the authority and then only if disclosure is required to carry
out the request.699 However, as discussed in chapter 4, in some circumstances it appears
that parties under investigation have become aware that they are under investigation by the
foreign authorities, particularly when information is sought from a financial institution and the
institution informs its client that it is under investigation. It is arguable therefore that the
confidentiality provisions in the MMoU may need to be tightened. Specifically the MMoU may
need to be amended to require signatories to have in place laws which ensure that financial
institutions and other market intermediaries are prohibited from disclosing to clients that they
have received a request for information.
Part 2 Policy Development
Since its inception IOSCO has been involved in the formulation of policies in relation to
securities regulation which can then be used as a guide by members to formulate their own
laws and policies. This policy work has involved both the development of an outline of what
should be included within the general framework of securities regulation in a country as well
as more targeted policy recommendations to address specific issues.
The general framework of securities regulation formulated by IOSCO is contained in its key
policy statement, the Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation. 700 As was
discussed briefly in chapter 5, these objectives and principles were originally formulated in
1998. Since that time these objectives and principles have remained relatively constant with
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only infrequent modifications. The most dramatic change occurred after the global financial
crisis in 2008 which exposed gaps in the framework of securities regulation in many
countries. As such IOSCO added one objective and 8 more principles.701 In addition to the
Objectives and Principles IOSCO has also published a detailed methodology document
setting out how these principles should be interpreted and what kinds of factors need to be
considered in relation to whether each of these principles have been met.702
In addition, IOSCO is constantly promulgating multiple detailed and specific policy
statements to address particular issues. These more targeted policy statements are
formulated and developed through IOSCO‘s committee structure. Such policy statements
are also designed to be consistent with the overall framework contained in the Objectives
and Principles and provide more details as to the exact type of rules which should be
adopted.
This policy development work by IOSCO will undoubtedly continue and probably also
expand as it seems to have widespread support from both IOSCO members as well as from
international organisations such as the G20. In developing its policies IOSCO fulfills the
need to formulate consistent global policies to deal with issues in securities regulation which
cannot be effectively addressed at a national or even bilateral level. Furthermore IOSCO can
use these policy statements to encourage countries to adopt more stringent standards for
securities regulation.
However, although IOSCO can develop specific policy recommendations it cannot force
countries to actually adopt these recommendations. The ultimate decision as to whether a
particular policy is adopted by a particular country is determined by the body in that country
which sets the rules for securities regulation. That could be the legislature or perhaps the
securities regulator if it has been delegated this power. As such, on one view, IOSCO‘s role

701

Ibid.
IOSCO, ―Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation‖, September 2011, online: IOSCO <http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD359.pdf.>.
702

263

in setting the system of global securities regulation can be viewed as relatively weak. For
example Roberta Karmel states:
IOSCO's harmonization efforts tend to be at a level of generality that may be an insufficient prod
to regulatory reform. When national interests are at stake, securities regulators follow those
interests rather than IOSCO directives. Since IOSCO has no enforcement mechanisms aside
from peer pressure, and its members are so numerous and varied, it is unrealistic to expect
rigorous and detailed harmonization of new standards of conduct or regulation. Nevertheless,
IOSCO can play a useful role in highlighting critical emerging areas where securities regulation is
in need of reform, and it has done so with regard to a number of systemic risk issues in the
703

trading markets.

However this perspective arguably too readily devalues IOSCO‘s power and influence in the
harmonization of securities regulation. In particular IOSCO can influence in the setting of
securities regulation in two important ways. First, IOSCO has had and continues to have an
important role in setting the discourse of securities regulation. IOSCO‘s numerous policy
statements often become a first reference point to guide policy makers within a particular
country who have been tasked with developing rules and policy for that country in relation to
a particular issue. As such many of the ultimate rules that are adopted are likely to contain at
least some elements which reflect the policy set by IOSCO. This is particularly likely as
IOSCO policy is formulated by actual employees of securities regulators through its
committee structure.
Second, as is demonstrated by the MMoU process, IOSCO may be able to exert significant
pressure on countries to adjust their laws to fit within the policy framework it has developed.
As such IOSCO could perhaps adopt a similar methodology in the future in order to pressure
countries to make other adjustments to their laws.
Possible IOSCO Policies in relation to Cross Border Market Abuse
In relation to cross border market abuse the analysis contained in the preceding chapters
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suggests there are five areas in which IOSCO could consider developing policies which, if
adopted by countries, would enhance the detection, investigation and prosecution of these
offences. First IOSCO could work towards building consistency in definitions of market
abuse and the applicable penalties. Second IOSCO could develop a policy in relation to
improving access to telecommunication information and other data. Third IOSCO could build
upon its existing policies to improve market surveillance capabilities. Fourth IOSCO could
highlight the issues for regulators as to the vulnerability to market abuse of lightly regulated
or penny stock markets and work to develop a more consistent policy framework to address
this problem. Finally IOSCO could develop a policy to encourage regulators to take action
against cross border market abuse even when the integrity of their own market is not
threatened.
a) Building consistency as to what constitutes market abuse and the applicable
penalties
As highlighted in chapter 3, success in relation to cross border market abuse often depends
upon fostering good and open lines of communication. Differences between countries in
what constitutes market abuse and the applicable penalties for market abuse violations can
complicate the ability of regulators from different countries to work together and share
information. Such differences increase the possibility of misunderstandings and could
potentially lead to the misuse of the information that is provided. If those differences were
reduced and regulators were all ‗working off the same page‘, cooperation is likely to become
more intensive and more effective. It may also lead to improvements in how quickly
information is exchanged if regulators were familiar as to how this information would be used
by their foreign counterpart.
At present, because of variations in laws as to what constitutes insider trading and market
manipulation, facts which may be market abuse in one jurisdiction may not constitute market
abuse in another. There are also currently significant differences between countries in the
kind of enforcement proceedings that can be brought against those who are alleged to have
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committed market abuse as well as the type and magnitude of the penalty faced by the
perpetrator if the contravention is proven.
In Europe the EU has been standardizing what constitutes insider trading and market
manipulation. The first Market Abuse Directive (MAD) in 2003 required countries within the
EU to prohibit insider trading and market manipulation and specified what this comprised.
The second Market Abuse Directive (MAD II) and the Market Abuse regulations (MAR) in
2014 continued this process and sets out in more detail exactly what member states are to
include within their laws as to what precisely constitutes market abuse. It also expands the
definition to capture activity which was shown to not be captured by the previous definition,
such as manipulation of LIBOR.704 MAR and MAD II specify that insider dealing is when a
person possesses inside information and uses that information by acquiring or disposing of,
for its own account or for the account of a third party, directly or indirectly, financial
instruments to which that information relates. In addition, member states are to include within
their insider trading laws that it will also be a contravention if inside information is used in
cancelling or amending an order concerning a financial instrument to which the information
relates. Furthermore insider trading laws are also to capture the use of inside information in
relation to submitting, modifying or withdrawing a bid in relation to auctions of emission
allowances or other auctioned products.705
In terms of what constitutes ―inside information‖, MAR and MAD II set out that it should
comprise information of a precise nature, which has not been made public, if it were made
public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices and that it relates to the price
of related financial instruments, the price of related spot commodity contracts, or the price of
related derivative financial instruments.706
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Similar to the EU, Australia‘s prohibition against insider trading casts the net broadly and
also has a relatively expansive prohibition in relation to what constitutes insider
information.707 By way of contrast in the US what is caught within the offence of insider
trading is more limited. It is also not defined in any single statute but the scope of the
prohibition has developed as a result of a series of cases interpreting Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act 1934 and Rule 10B-5 promulgated under this provision.708
There are also significant differences between countries in terms of enforcement options and
penalties. For example, in Australia, unless the market abuse involves a market
intermediary, there is no capacity to impose an administrative penalty. Although a civil
penalty can be imposed for market abuse, as has been referred to previously, market abuse
is usually pursued criminally and thereby a higher standard of proof is required. As a criminal
offence the maximum penalty is 10 years imprisonment.709
In the US market abuse can be pursued criminally, by way of a court imposed civil penalty or
administratively and it appears that all three remedies are used liberally. As a criminal
offence the maximum penalty is 20 years imprisonment.710
In Canada market abuse can be pursued administratively, as a regulatory offence under the
Securities Acts or as a full criminal offence under the federal Criminal Code. 711 As a
regulatory offence market abuse carries a maximum 5 year penalty. As a criminal offence
under the Criminal Code the maximum criminal penalty is 10 years imprisonment.712
In the EU when MAD II and MAR have finally been implemented by member states there will
be greater consistency across Europe in terms of enforcement options and penalties for
market abuse. All member states will be required to have laws allowing the imposition of
administrative remedies for market abuse. Furthermore all member states are to prescribe
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that insider trading and market manipulation constitutes a criminal offence when committed
with intent.713 MAD II also requires that criminal sanctions must be ―effective proportionate
and dissuasive‖ and that the maximum penalty for insider trading and market manipulation
must be at least 4 years imprisonment.714
The rational given by the EU for prescribing specific enforcement options and penalties was
that the EU had commissioned a report which found that EU sanctioning regimes for market
abuse were ―in general weak and heterogeneous‖ and that this was proving to be
―insufficient to ensure compliance with the rules on preventing and fighting market abuse‖.715
The EU report appears to be aimed at encouraging common standards and penalties with
the objective of enhancing market integrity. This focus on market integrity is set out in the
preamble to MAD II which states:
A genuine internal market for financial services is crucial for economic growth and job creation in
the Union. An integrated, efficient and transparent financial market requires market integrity. The
smooth functioning of securities markets and public confidence in markets are prerequisites for
economic growth and wealth. Market abuse harms the integrity of financial markets and
confidence in securities and derivatives.

716

In addition, the EU report anticipates that common minimum rules for market abuse will
make it possible to use more effective methods to investigate market abuse and as such will
enable more effective cooperation within and between Member States in relation to their
efforts to enforce market abuse laws.717
IOSCO has recently foreshadowed that it is considering developing principles in relation to
what it has called ―credible deterrence frameworks‖ and called on the IOSCO committee on
enforcement to ―identify the core elements of a credible deterrence framework for securities
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regulation, including strategies and good practices‖. The press release making this
announcement stated that the reason for this move was that:
It responds to public demand for tougher sanctions to deter market misconduct. The failure to
punish wrongdoers during the current financial crisis has eroded public confidence in capital
markets.

718

Due to the importance of prohibitions against market abuse in maintaining market integrity
IOSCO should perhaps consider the development of such a ―credible deterrence framework‖
in relation to market abuse. This would necessarily have to include a policy which would set
out:


what constitutes the elements of insider trading;



what constitutes the elements of market manipulation;



the range of appropriate enforcement options which should be available to a
regulator seeking to take action against market abuse; and



appropriate penalties which should be prescribed for violations.

Of course, as already noted, IOSCO cannot force individual countries to adopt any such
framework for its market abuse laws. Political differences and the way in which laws are
introduced in individual countries are such that the laws in relation to market abuse will likely
vary between countries for the foreseeable future. However having such a framework which
is continually evolving as new forms of market abuse arise should hopefully, over time, lead
to more consistency of market abuse regimes throughout the world. Furthermore this may
also lead to more effective cooperation between regulators in taking action against cross
border market abuse.
b) Improving access to telecommunications information and other data
As discussed in chapter 3, data records and records of telecommunications often contain
critical evidence of market abuse in prosecutions of market abuse. There are however
718
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currently inconsistent requirements between countries as to the ability of regulators to
access this type of information as well as inconsistent requirements as to how long those
responsible for storing this type of data are required to keep the data.
Given the often critical importance of this type of information to market abuse investigations,
as part of MAR, the EU requires member states to introduce laws which will allow authorities
to require telecommunication operators and investment firms to produce data traffic records
where a reasonable suspicion exists that such records may be relevant to help prove market
abuse. Because of the importance of this type of evidence IOSCO perhaps should follow the
lead of the EU and consider producing a policy encouraging members to seek broad powers
to have access to these types of records and to share such records with other securities
regulators. In addition such a policy could also mandate that these laws prescribe that data
is stored and maintained for a sufficient period to enable it to be accessed by regulators for
their investigations.
Furthermore in order to prove market abuse to a criminal standard, regulators will frequently
be required to prove not just that there was communication between two parties but also the
actual content of that communication. The content of communications might be proved by a
direct confession or by the agreement of one of the participants to give evidence against the
other. Frequently such cooperation will be obtained in exchange for a reduced sentence.719
This is investigative technique has often been used successfully by the SEC in market abuse
prosecutions.720
Absent a confession or cooperation another way to potentially prove the content of
communication is by way of telephone intercepts. The problem is however that there are
currently inconsistent laws in different countries in regard to if and how securities regulators
719
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can obtain warrants to intercept telecommunications in relation to market abuse. In some
instances market abuse offences are not even in the category of offences for which a
warrant to intercept communications can be obtained, perhaps a reflection of an belief that
market abuse is not regarded as a serious offence. In other cases it may be possible to
obtain a warrant to intercept communications but the power to seek such a warrant is vested
in another agency. As such the securities regulator is necessarily compelled to obtain the
assistance of that other agency to obtain the warrant. Such arrangements can conceivably
add to the delay and complexity of an investigation. This could be because, for example, the
other agency may have an enforcement culture so that white collar crime, such insider
trading, is not viewed as a priority compared to other types of crimes such as murder or
terrorism.
In Australia, for example, legislation has recently changed to enable authorities to obtain a
warrant to intercept communications in relation to suspected insider trading or market
manipulation.721 However ASIC still has to obtain the involvement of the Australian Federal
Police and convince it to make an application for a warrant. In Canada, a warrant to intercept
communications can be obtained in relation to suspected market manipulation but not for
suspected insider trading.722 If the Ontario Securities Commission wishes to obtain such a
warrant it also has to obtain the involvement of the police to make the application.723
In the UK, the FCA has powers to conduct surveillance but not to intercept communications.
The FCA can seek the involvement of another agency with the power to obtain a warrant
and subsequently intercept communications. However, any information obtained as a result
can only be used as intelligence in the investigation, not as evidence.724 In Germany market
abuse is not within the class of offences were a warrant can be obtained to intercept
electronic communications.725 MAD II and MAR will not assist the FCA and BaFin in this
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regard as they do not change the status quo of member countries in relation to the power to
seek warrants to intercept communications.726
Given the impact upon market integrity of market abuse, arguably IOSCO should consider
promulgating a policy stressing the importance of eliminating market abuse in relation to
market integrity and, at the same time, recommend that a warrant to intercept
communications be available for these offences. Furthermore IOSCO should perhaps
recommend in such a policy that securities regulators should be able to directly apply for
such warrants. In addition, although perhaps more controversial, IOSCO could also
recommend laws allowing a sercurities regulator to apply for such a warrant and obtain
evidence on behalf of a foreign regulator when there is sufficient evidence to form a
reasonable suspicion that cross border market abuse has occurred or is continuing to occur.
c) Improving market surveillance capabilities
As is apparent from previous chapters market surveillance remains, and is likely to continue
to remain, the main way in which market abuse, including cross border market abuse, is
detected. Although those responsible for market surveillance, being either regulators, selfregulatory organizations or trading venues, have made continuous investment in improving
their market surveillance capabilities, it seems that these capabilities may not have not fully
kept pace with the changes that have occurred to the markets over the last decade. As
highlighted in chapter 2, in order to increase the efficiency of markets, globalization,
fragmentation of markets and the speed of trading have been allowed to proliferate while
maintaining and improving the integrity of markets has been has been less of a focus until
relatively recently.
A 2013 report by IOSCO highlighted major issues with market surveillance brought about
because of the transformation of the markets in recent years. IOSCO surveyed regulators,
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self-regulatory organisations and trading venues responsible for surveillance and 42
respondents replied reporting two major challenges. First the respondents reported
challenges concerning:
maintaining an effective market-surveillance regime within their jurisdictions. In particular, a
large number of respondents, including those from the U.S. and the EU, cited the challenges
in monitoring effectively trades occurring on a cross-market or cross-asset class basis. They
727

also stated that there was a major challenge in achieving effective cross-border surveillance.

The second challenge stems from ongoing technological developments which make it more
difficult to effectively monitor the markets:
The two primary challenges identified were the need to: (1) collect data, including the potential
inadequacy of current content and the related collection and storage costs for a vast amount
of trade information; and (2) develop a process to use effectively such information for
surveillance purposes, particularly for the purpose of identifying customers. One Statutory
Regulator also highlighted the increasing amount of trading noise produced by the proliferation
of fully automated program trading and order execution systems, which has made it a
728

challenge to distinguish bona fide orders and trades from manipulative activities.

The report noted that that cross-market and cross-asset surveillance seem to present the
greatest challenges and are potentially the areas where there are substantial regulatory
gaps.729
As a result of its survey, the IOSCO report contained a number of recommendations. In
summary these were that:
1. The statutory regulator, SRO or the operator of a trading venue responsible for
conducting and/or overseeing market surveillance efforts (referred to as ―Market
Authorities‖) should have the organizational and technical capabilities to monitor the
trading venues they supervise effectively. In particular, where a market has
727
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dispersed trading venues, or where trading can take place across asset classes,
this necessitates cross-asset surveillance.
2. It is critically important that Market Authorities review and update their surveillance
capabilities, including systems, tools and surveillance staff skills, particularly with
respect to technological advances.
3. Market Authorities should have the capability to access data in a way that enables
them to conduct their surveillance obligations effectively. This may include
developing a central reporting point within a domestic jurisdiction for all data.
4. Market Authorities should have the capability to associate the customer and market
participant for each order and transaction.
5. Market Authorities should require that data be reported for use and storage in a
useable format and should take steps to standardize the format of the data which is
collected.
6. Market Authorities should establish and maintain appropriate confidentiality
safeguards to protect surveillance data that is reported to them.
7. Market Authorities should consider requiring trading venues within their jurisdiction,
to synchronize, consistent with industry standards, the business clocks they use to
record the date and time of any reportable event.730
In relation to cross-border surveillance, IOSCO recommended that such Market Authorities
should, as a minimum, map and be aware of the extent of their cross-border surveillance
capabilities. In addition IOSCO recommended that Market Authorities should also work
collectively and take any steps that would be appropriate to strengthen their cross border
surveillance capabilities. 731 This would include encouraging and facilitating quick, efficient
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and flexible cooperation between regulators and market operators, regardless of
jurisdictional boundaries.732
Full adoption of all these recommendations by those responsible for market surveillance
could be anticipated to greatly enhance surveillance capabilities and should make it much
easier to detect market abuse, particularly cross market, cross asset and cross border
market abuse. However, many, if not most, of these recommendations appear to be
somewhat ambitious and it will probably be many years before these recommendations are
fully incorporated within the surveillance capabilities of those responsible for market
supervision. Fully implementing the IOSCO recommendations will be costly and those costs
are likely to fall primarily on market participants. As such, there is likely to be resistance by
the financial industry to incurring these costs particularly as it is difficult to measure the
benefits in terms of improvements in market integrity that may accrue as a result.
Furthermore, it also seems likely that because many markets are a long way from fully
implementing these recommendations IOSCO may have moderated its recommendations to
reflect this fact. This is because it can be argued that improvements in surveillance
capabilities should go beyond these recommendations. For example, in relation to
recommendation 4, the IOSCO report recommended only that Market Authorities should
have the capability to associate the customer and market participant with each order and
transaction. The IOSCO report did not go further as it might have to recommend that Market
Authorities should ensure that each customer be allocated an individual customer identifier
and mandate that this unique customer identifier be used every time that customer made an
order wherever that order was made. This is despite the fact that the IOSCO report notes
that there was near unanimous consensus from commentators on its draft report that there
should be such individual customer identifiers.733
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It should perhaps be noted that few countries currently require that each customer be
uniquely identified across all markets and their unique identifier be used when an order is
placed. Some countries, for example Canada, now require that each broker be identified with
a unique identifier along with clients who have been allowed direct electronic market access.
In the US, once the Consolidated Audit Trail has been fully implemented, FINRA should
have the capacity to access a database to link customers to orders and trades. Ensuring that
customers use one identification marker across all their trading, irrespective of what market
is used, which all authorities responsible for surveillance could see in real time would greatly
assist detection of market abuse. This is because that information now has to be collected
manually from brokers, a time consuming process. Individual customer identifiers should
allow authorities to very quickly and cost effectively identify manipulative trades and take
appropriate action. It should also deter those who contemplate undertaking market abuse if
they know that such misconduct with be more immediately transparent to the authorities and
likely to result in swift intervention.
However notwithstanding these perceived benefits, if implemented, there would be
significant challenges in requiring the use of unique client identifiers even within a single
jurisdiction, let alone across jurisdictions. For example, there will inevitably be privacy
concerns in requiring identifying information, such as social security numbers, to be
produced before a unique customer identity number is allocated. In its report IOSCO noted
that although commentators on its draft report were nearly unanimous in supporting the
concept that customer identifiers should be used, there was at the same time a recognition
that there were practical difficulties in achieving this, particularly in a cross-border
scenario.734 The report did note that there is currently a project, being conducted by the
Financial Stability Board at the instigation of the G-20, to establish a unique global identifier
for every legal entity to use in financial transactions. However although the Financial Stability
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Board has done some work on this project it is still in its infancy.735 The future success of this
project will also depend upon robust support by governments, who may face resistance from
industry because of the increased scrutiny it will focus upon their activities.
Nevertheless, despite the difficulties inherent in introducing such a system, over the long
term, efforts should arguably be made to work towards unique customer identifiers. This is
because it should enhance the detection of market abuse as well as result in significant cost
savings for the authorities charged with the detection and investigation of market abuse.
Furthermore, such a system is also likely to contribute to the success of any matters that are
detected because of a likely reduction in the time lost between detecting and initiating an
investigation of such matters.
Moreover IOSCO‘s report has identified a number of other issues in relation to market
surveillance capabilities. Given the importance of these capabilities to the detection of
market abuse, cross border market abuse and the preservation of market integrity, IOSCO
should continue its policy development work in this area. In particular IOSCO could consider
developing more specific guidelines in relation to each of its recommendations and
monitoring progress by countries in meeting each of these recommendations.
d) Addressing market abuse problems with lightly regulated markets
As identified in chapters 3 and 4, lightly regulated markets seem to be particularly prone to
market abuse. For those countries which have such lightly regulated markets, securities
regulators seem to have to devote a disproportionate amount of resources to combat these
markets being exploited for the proliferation of pump and dump schemes.
Such schemes have existed for many years. Indeed the South Sea Bubble scheme in 1720
was essentially a pump and dump scheme.736 What has changed, however, is that now the
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perpetrators can be outside of the jurisdiction conducting wash sales and matched orders by
virtue of entities being spread over a number of countries. In addition, the ‗pumping‘ – that is
the spreading of false information - can take place outside of the jurisdiction via the internet
or even by using Facebook or Twitter.
In relation to the issue of obtaining evidence, the IOSCO MMoU appears to be successfully
assisting regulators obtain evidence from outside of the jurisdiction. However the impact of
the IOSCO MMoU in combating such schemes could perhaps be further strengthened. In
particular, perhaps other regulators should consider following the lead of the BCSC and its
proposed restriction on investment dealers not being permitted to trade in the US Over the
Counter Markets involving a security of an OTC issuer which is located in a jurisdiction that
is not a signatory to the MMoU. If it became common practice to impose a similar condition
upon market intermediaries who trade in lightly regulated markets, this might deter
individuals from instigating such schemes or at the very least make them easier to
investigate.
Furthermore, as outlined in chapter 4 more could be done to take more robust and rapid
enforcement action against such schemes by better coordination between regulators and
with the aid of stronger penalties. In this respect IOSCO could assist by devising a policy
statement highlighting the problems with such schemes in lightly regulated markets. Such a
policy statement could, for example, recommend the need for higher penalties. It could also
recommend closer coordination of enforcement efforts in such markets and perhaps also
encourage the sharing of intelligence as to the types of schemes operating.
e) Taking Action to Protect the Integrity of Foreign Markets
As discussed in chapter 3 and 4, case selection policies of some securities regulators seems
to result in regulators giving preference to investigating those matters which impact upon the
integrity of their own markets. This is perhaps understandable given the mandate of the
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regulator is usually to protect the integrity of their own markets and the added complexity in
investigating cases which have a cross border dimension.
However as a result it seems that some perpetrators may be escaping prosecution, or at
least escaping the imposition of serious penalties, because the market abuse is not
contained within one jurisdiction. Such policies also may encourage perpetrators to structure
their offences across jurisdictions to minimise the possibility of enforcement action and move
their activities to another jurisdiction when they are detected.
As such IOSCO should develop policies to ensure that perpetrators of market abuse do not
escape enforcement action because of these policies of securities regulators which give
preference to protecting the integrity of local markets. In addition IOSCO could facilitate
cooperation between regulators to ensure that matters that are referred by one securities
regulator to another are pursued.
One way it which IOSCO could start to address this issue is to add to its Objectives and
Principles of Securities Regulation. Currently these provide that securities regulators should
have contained within their mandate the following:
13. The Regulator should have authority to share both public and non-public information with
domestic and foreign counterparts.
14. Regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms that set out when and how they
will share both public and non-public information with their domestic and foreign counterparts.
15. The regulatory system should allow for assistance to be provided to foreign Regulators who
need to make inquiries in the discharge of their functions and the exercise of their powers.
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To encourage regulators to work together to prosecute perpetrators of market abuse
consideration could be given to introducing another principle of cooperation. This would be
that regulators should take action, where practicable, against perpetrators of securities fraud
when requested to do so by a foreign regulator and when the perpetrators reside within their
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jurisdiction. IOSCO could also develop more detailed guidelines as to which regulator should
be principally responsible for taking action against securities offences which are not confined
to one jurisdiction.
Part 3 IOSCO’s role in relation to cross-border market abuse going forward
It seems clear that IOSCO‘s role will continue to expand as it works towards pursuing
standardization of principles of securities regulation and improving the enforcement
outcomes of its members. To this end IOSCO will probably continue to develop policy in
relation to problem areas of securities regulation and perhaps also develop the MMoU. What
is open to debate is whether it should have a role beyond these two areas and, if so, what
this role could be.
The impetus for change
The momentum for an expanded role for IOSCO is likely to come not from its prominence
now as the world leader in the coordination of securities regulation alone. The push for an
expanded role for IOSCO will continue as closer links are forged between governments,
securities regulators and securities industry participants over the next few decades. As such
there will be continued pressure for more consistent global regulation and problems in
securities regulation are likely to continue to emerge for consideration by global political
bodies such as the G20.

Although this may suggest that there is a need for a global

securities regulatory body to set, coordinate and enforce compliance with consistent
standards of securities regulation, the likelihood of such a global regulator is small to
nonexistent. As summarized succinctly by Chris Brummer it is difficult to envisage that there
would be the political will to create such a regulator:
First, and perhaps most obvious, it would be almost impossible to generate sufficient
international support for the creation of a single, global regulator that would carry with it, for
individual states, the relinquishment of national sovereignty and autonomy. Establishing a global
authority would require countries to delegate authority to a supranational authority, an act
involving a ―dynamic‖ delegation of authority such that any decision made by that authority would
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create de facto changes in the domestic laws of member regulators. It is unlikely that national
legislatures would agree to compromise their domestic powers of policymaking and governance
738

in that way, especially in relation to large domestic financial institutions and firms .

For these reasons it is very likely that it will fall to IOSCO to defacto fulfill the role as a global
securities regulator to the extent that is possible within the limitations of its mandate. This is
particularly the case as the G20 to date has no permanent secretariat. Whilst establishing a
permanent secretariat has been suggested, at present there is no consensus as to whether
this should be established, how it will be staffed and where it will be located. 739
An operational role in relation to detection, investigation and enforcement?
IOSCO currently does not play an operational role in the detection, investigation and
prosecution of cross border market abuse nor does it play an active role in coordinating
current investigations by members. The closest it comes to assuming such a role is by
assisting members in resolving disputes which may arise in the process of requesting
information under to the MMoU.740 As connections between regulators develop there may be
a need for IOSCO to take a more operational role, for example by helping conduct or
coordinate investigations that cross international boundaries. IOSCO‘s links with other
international organisations and networks, such as Interpol, could possibly be used to
facilitate such investigations.741
However it is unlikely that IOSCO would obtain or even seek such an operational role. Again
this is because of the substantial jurisdictional hurdles that would have to be overcome for
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IOSCO to be able function in such a position. This would include the challenges of different
legal systems as well as the fact that it may require sovereign nations conceding powers to
IOSCO. Even more established organizations under international law, such as the
International Criminal Court, have difficulties in persuading countries to concede jurisdiction
to them.742
Nevertheless, although IOSCO is unlikely to have an operational role in investigations in the
foreseeable future, as the MMoU has demonstrated, it is nevertheless possible that IOSCO
can have an impact beyond the mere formation of policy. As such it could potentially develop
other mechanisms or tools which its members might utilize in relation to their regulation and
enforcement functions.
Indeed IOSCO has signalled that it is considering developing new tools for members.
However to date the main focus appears to be not on deterring cross border market abuse
but rather upon ways in which it can facilitate the mutual recognition of market intermediaries
across borders. IOSCO has set up a taskforce to develop just such a mutual recognition
regime. This taskforce has been directed to:
develop a tool box of measures in regulating securities markets that cross borders. If appropriate,
it will then develop principles to guide the coordinated use of these tools. The tools to be
considered may include substituted compliance, mutual recognition and supervisory co-operation.
The Task force‘s work is intended to help policy makers and member regulators in addressing the
challenges they face in regulating cross-border activity.

743

Although the details have yet to be developed it appears that such a mutual recognition
regime will likely comprise a system that would allow a market participant registered in one
country, and subject to the supervision of that jurisdiction‘s securities regulator, to easily
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obtain recognition in another country. In devising such a system it seems inevitable that
IOSCO will set universal standards which will have to be met by securities regulators in
relation to the supervision of their market intermediaries.
Such a mutual recognition system may operate to deter and detect market abuse depending
upon the breath and comprehensiveness of the requirements imposed upon the market
intermediaries. For example such a system could work towards deterring and detecting
market abuse if it contained comprehensive requirements mandating that market
intermediaries:


undergo regular inspections and audits;



report transactions which they suspect to be market abuse and;



have in place compliance mechanisms to detect such suspicious transactions.

Development of other systems to improve enforcement of cross border market abuse
Although such a system of mutual recognition may assist to detect and deter market abuse
there is also scope for IOSCO to go further and develop other systems which could assist
securities regulators in their role to detect and take action against cross border market
abuse. IOSCO recently resolved that:
With regard to building on the IOSCO MOU after 1 January 2013, the Executive Committee is
asked to consider if a further standard beyond the existing IOSCO MOU should be developed,
taking into account developments in markets and supervisory and enforcement practices.
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There are a number of such standards or systems which could be developed by IOSCO.
First these could include taking its lead from the EU and developing a system to exchange
suspicious transaction reports between regulators. Second, in a similar manner to the
MMoU, IOSCO could develop a system to share information between regulators in relation
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to market surveillance. Third IOSCO could develop a system or systems designed to
facilitate the sharing of intelligence information of possible market abuse.
a) A system to exchange suspicious transactions reports.
Similar to the system that exists in the EU, IOSCO could consider developing a
Memorandum of Understanding to facilitate the exchange of reports of transactions
suspected to constitute market abuse. Securities regulators who signed this MOU would
have to have laws in place whereby suspicious transaction reports of market abuse are
communicated directly to them by brokers and others involved in the securities industry.
Again similar to the system that exists in the EU, securities regulators could be required to
immediately send any report to any other regulator whose markets are potentially impacted
by the report. In addition, IOSCO could also consider developing a database of such reports
for securities regulators who had signed the MOU. Such a database could potentially prove
to be a valuable source of intelligence for IOSCO members.
As referred to in chapters 3 and 4, the number of such reports exchanged between
securities regulators in the EU has dramatically increased over the last few years.
Furthermore, as reported by BaFin these reports are proving to be valuable and, in some
cases, the ultimate trigger for an investigation. A system developed by IOSCO has the
potential to be similarly effective. Such a system would possibly also have the advantage
that it could be relatively cheap to implement compared to the substantial investment needed
to improve market surveillance capabilities.
b) A system to share data in relation to cross border market surveillance
Currently most organisations responsible for market surveillance share information about
possible market abuse via the Intermarket Surveillance Group (ISG). In fact the sharing of
such information is ISG‘s stated primary function.745 The ISG‘s other functions are to assist
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with the coordination of regulatory efforts and to provide a forum for discussing common
regulatory concerns with a view to enhancing members' ability to efficiently fulfill their
regulatory responsibilities.746 As reported in chapter 3, for self-regulatory organisations such
as FINRA and IIROC the ISG plays an important role in facilitating the exchange of
information and thereby assists in the detection and investigation of market abuse. In
addition, its ability to share intelligence about the activities of market participants and
schemes that may constitute market abuse may be useful in facilitating the detection of new
schemes as they arise.
ISG is able to facilitate the sharing of information as each member is under ―an obligation to
cooperate with other ISG members in the acquisition and sharing of regulatory information
on an "as needed" basis.‖"747 It is surmised that this obligation comes from the terms of an
agreement each ISG Member must sign, although this is only supposition as the terms of
this agreement have not been made public.748
However, as highlighted in chapter 2, as markets become increasingly global and trading
becomes more dispersed there are some real concerns if it is the ISG that continues to be
the organisation charged with facilitating the exchange of surveillance information. First
these concerns stem from firstly its membership limitations. Membership of the ISG is
currently limited to self-regulatory organizations and certain non-governmental associations
that provide regulatory services to home markets. The ISG currently does not allow
government securities regulators to become members, and, accordingly, BaFin, FSA, OSC,
ASIC and the SEC are not members. This is despite the fact that ASIC, a government
regulator, has sole responsibility for conducting market surveillance in Australia. Because it
is carrying out the same functions as other members of the ISG, logic would suggest that it
should be able to join this organization. However currently this is not possible.

to address potential intermarket manipulations and trading abuses‖, Intermarket Surveillance Group,
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A second concern is that the ISG does not allow members to share information to any third
party, including any government entity, without the specific written permission of the
information provider. It is not clear how, or even if, this requirement is hindering the provision
of information to government securities regulators. Nevertheless it potentially could frustrate
an investigation of market abuse if information necessary to an investigation was to be
withheld. At the moment it appears that securities regulators may have to resort to obtaining
surveillance information on an ad hoc basis from other regulators, via bilateral MOUs or, in
Europe, via the ESMA.749
Finally, as was pointed out in chapter 2, the control and management of the ISG is not
transparent. It does not publish accounts so it is unclear as to how it is funded, how any such
funds are spent and the extent of its operations. This is of concern in that first market
surveillance is the main form of detection of market abuse. Second the detection of market
abuse is critical to market integrity and third there is a strong public interest in preserving
market integrity.
Given that ISG‘s sole function seems to be to enhance the regulatory capacities of its
members to fight market abuse, it seems paradoxical that government regulators cannot be
members and that information can be withheld from government regulators. Furthermore,
given ISG‘s regulatory mandate, it also seems anomalous that the work done by the ISG is
somewhat opaque, particularly in relation to its governance structure and the terms of the
information sharing agreement between members.
Whist comments made by enforcement personal from IRROC and FINRA suggest that the
work undertaken by the ISG appears to be valuable, at present it does not seem that it is the
ideal organisation to be charged with sharing surveillance information. Reforms are
necessary so that government regulators can become members and for there to be more
transparency in relation to ISGs governance and funding structure. In the absence of such
reforms, given the importance of this work to the preservation of market integrity, IOSCO
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should perhaps take a more active role in the enabling the sharing of this type of information
between securities regulators and those responsible for market surveillance. Given the
success of the MMoU, perhaps this could take the form of a new MOU to quickly and easily
facilitate the sharing of this type of information.
c) Sharing intelligence
One major deficiency with the MMoU is that its focus is on the investigation and enforcement
of securities violations that have already been detected by the requesting member. It was
not designed to share other types of information. The MMoU does provide that:
Each Authority will make all reasonable efforts to provide, without prior request, the other
Authorities with any information that it considers is likely to be of assistance to those other
Authorities in securing compliance with the Laws and Regulations applicable in their
jurisdiction.

750

This paragraph could possibly lead members to share other types of less precise
information, commonly referred to as ‗intelligence‘. This could include, for example,
information as to possible market abuse schemes or the names of persons and
organizations under investigation. Yet given the imprecise nature of this paragraph in the
MMoU, it is unlikely that this does, in reality, lead regulators to proactively assist each other
with the sharing of intelligence information. As such the MMoU could be strengthened and
expanded by providing more specifics of the intelligence information to be shared. However
given the complications inherent in amending the MMoU, as outlined earlier in this chapter, it
may be more effective to develop an alternative system to share such information.
If such a system was to be developed the types of intelligence that would be shared would
have to be delineated. Most securities regulators maintain one or more databases of
information. For example, as is referred to in chapter 4, FINRA maintains a list of possible
market abuse matters and mines that information for possible connections as new possible
cases arise. Regulators also maintain databases of information they have collected such as
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complaints received from the public. They may also have access to further intelligence
databases such as databases maintained by other law enforcement agencies.
Of course many regulators may not be comfortable with sharing such information generally
with other regulators. The concern might be that information may be imprecise or even
wrong and as such there would be legitimate concerns with releasing it in that it might be
used inappropriately and could therefore expose the regulator who released it to liability if it
was misused. However, notwithstanding such concerns, it may be something which IOSCO
could at least explore as a possibility as there may be some information that regulators are
willing to share.
Furthermore most regulators publically publish information in relation to the names of
persons and organisations that have been banned or prosecuted. Often this is accompanied
by information in relation to the nature of their activities and penalties imposed. It is likely
that there would be little resistance to more effectively sharing this type of information.
Therefore IOSCO could, as a minimum, develop a way to facilitate the sharing of this type of
information by, for example, establishing a database requiring members to provide
information about persons and organizations that had been banned or prosecuted for
securities violations. Having access to such a database may assist members select cases
for investigation.
Part 4 Replicating the MMoU Methodology to obtain Regulatory Convergence
A key part of IOSCO‘s mission is to work towards the worldwide harmonization of securities
regulation. This is reflected in the fact that it in 2010 it changed one of its aims from
―cooperation to promote high standards of regulation‖ to ―developing, implementing and
promoting adherence to internationally recognised and consistent (my emphasis) standards
of regulation.‖751 As is set out at the beginning of this chapter this is also referred to in its
goals for 2010-2015 as it seeks to ―maintain and improve the international regulatory
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framework for securities markets by setting international standards‖.752
The push to harmonize Securities Regulation
Part of IOSCO‘s strategy to date in terms of working towards achieving harmonization of
securities regulation has been an evaluation process in relation to the level of
implementation by each country of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation.753 Initially IOSCO‘s instigated this process by way of a self-assessment exercise.
This self-assessment exercise asked each member to answer a list of questions in relation
to each principle and to reach a conclusion as to whether the principle was fully
implemented, broadly implemented, partly implemented or not implemented. Alternatively a
member could elect to have the International Monetary Fund (the IMF) assess its
compliance through what is called its Financial Sector Assessment Program.754
In 2011 IOSCO established an Assessment Committee to develop and deliver programs to
identify and assess implementation of both IOSCO‘s Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation as well as other standards and polices contained in IOSCO reports or
resolutions.755 Although self-assessment will continue IOSCO is moving from a focus on selfassessment to IOSCO assessing each of its members. The Assessment Committee will
conduct assessments of individual members and will also conduct thematic reviews of
particular IOSCO principles across members. The rationale for the establishment of the
Assessment Committee is to systematically monitor the implementation of IOSCO standards
and to help build members regulatory capacity through this systematic implementation.756
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Using the MMoU Methodology to achieve harmonization
At present IOSCO envisages the assessment process as key to working towards
harmonization. It has stated:
The assessment is not an end in itself. Rather, assessment should be viewed primarily as a tool
for identifying potential gaps, inconsistencies, weaknesses, and areas where further powers or
authorities may be necessary, and as a basis for framing priorities for enhancements or reforms
to existing laws, rules and procedures. This Methodology specifically contemplates that the
assessment process will involve a dialogue in which the regulator will explain the details of its
market structure, laws, and regulatory program and how, in view thereof, the regulator believes its
regulatory program addresses the Key Questions and Key Issues so as to meet the objectives of
the Principles.

757

IOSCO therefore appears to expect that once a member identifies gaps in its framework of
securities regulation it will take steps to adopt new laws to bring its securities regulation into
line with IOSCO‘s Objectives and Principles.
Despite this intention, it is likely that this assessment process methodology will not, of itself,
be sufficient over the longer term to persuade members to harmonize their securities
regulation to conform to the IOSCO framework.

However as has been referred to in

previous chapters IOSCO may have been able to effectively work towards compliance in
other ways. IOSCO has successfully increased convergence of domestic regulation by
holding out the ability to access the MMoU as a ‗carrot‘ to encourage members to change
their laws to bring them into line with some of IOSCO‘s Objectives and Principals.
Given this success IOSCO could perhaps consider trying to replicate this methodology with
a view to working towards convergence in relation to some of the other Objectives and
Principles. As referred to above, there appears to be potential for IOSCO to develop other
systems which are needed by securities regulators. Giving securities regulators access to
these systems could be made contingent upon securities regulators making changes to their
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laws and, in turn, this could be used as a lever to bring about further convergence of
securities regulation. As such IOSCO could work towards hardening its ‗soft law‘ policies by
having them incorporated into domestic statutes.
The success of such a strategy may depend upon the area in which IOSCO is seeking
convergence. Critics of the capacity of transnational regulatory networks (TRNs) like IOSCO,
to secure global cooperation, such as Pierre-Hugues Verdier, contend that there are limits to
obtaining convergence. He argues that securities regulators will cooperate where
preferences are aligned. However where there are divergent domestic preferences
agreement is unlikely to take place.758 In 2009 Verdier predicted that IOSCO would not be
able to continue to have OFCs cooperate under the umbrella of the IOSCO MMoU:
OFCs have incentives to renege, and it is doubtful that sustained compliance can be obtained
759

through TRNs.

However, despite Verdier‘s predictions, IOSCO has been able to obtain significant
cooperation from some OFCs. IOSCO has managed to have some jurisdictions change their
domestic laws from that which may have given them a competitive advantage. For example,
countries previously known for their secrecy laws, such as Switzerland, have signed the
MMoU indicating that in some circumstances domestic preferences are giving way to
considerations of international cooperation.
As an example of a situation where domestic preferences diverged Verdier points to the fact
that in early 1990s IOSCO failed to reach agreement on capital adequacy rules for securities
firms, despite the fact that this would have reduced global systemic risk. IOSCO failed to
reach agreement principally because US banks, concerned about their international
competitive position, pressured US regulators to resist agreeing to the proposed rules.760
It is true that cooperation in relation to market abuse and fraud prevention is something that
would be attractive to most countries. IOSCO may not experience the same level of
758

Verdier, supra note 640.
Ibid at150.
760
Ibid.
759

291

cooperation in relation to some areas of securities regulation. There may be more diverse
domestic preferences in relation to other areas, such as disclosure standards required for
companies engaging in public fundraising, and countries may perceive a competitive
advantage in keeping their securities regulations distinct.761 However even in those areas, as
markets become more global, pressure for international cooperation is likely to come not just
from increased and repeated interactions between governments and their officials but also
from corporations that operate globally who are seeking consistent standards. This is likely
to result in an increased likelihood that, over time, domestic agendas may yield to
international pressures for convergence of securities regulations. The impact of the GFC and
the spotlight it brought on global financial stability no doubt has contributed to these
developments and will continue to do so.
Furthermore, whilst divergent national preferences may limit IOSCO‘s capacity to employ the
methodology it used in relation to the MMoU in respect to some areas of securities
regulation, it has proven that it can work, at least with regard to the investigations and
enforcement of securities violations. Therefore it seems there is scope to employ other
systems that assist securities regulators in eliminating market abuse as levers to work
towards further convergence of securities regulation.
Conclusion
Over the last two decades IOSCO has evolved to become an important organisation for
securities regulators, improving, via the MMoU, their ability to enforce cross jurisdictional
securities offenses. The importance of the MMoU it is likely to continue to grow as the
number of requests increase and the number of countries that have not signed continues to
decline as IOSCO‘s initiatives to coerce countries to sign the MMoU take effect.
IOSCO has also emerged as an important organisation in setting global standards for
securities regulation through its Objectives and Principles as well as by way of more specific
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policy recommendations. This standard setting role is also likely to continue to develop as
governments and corporations recognise the advantages associated with universal
standards. As set out in this chapter, IOSCO could use this policy setting role to improve
enforcement outcomes in relation to cross border market abuse by, for example, setting
standards as to what should come within the definition of market abuse and assigning
appropriate penalties for such conduct.
Moreover, as described in the final part of this chapter, in addition to policy work and the
MMoU it seems that there is further scope for IOSCO to increase its influence. Whilst this is
unlikely to take the form of operational role in investigations, IOSCO does seem to have
capacity to develop systems and other multilateral MoUs to improve the detection,
investigation and enforcement of cross border market abuse. Such systems and multilateral
MoUs could, in turn, be used by IOSCO as a lever as it works towards its mission of
harmonizing of securities regulation. If IOSCO proceeds along such a path it is likely to
further increase in importance. Whilst this will not result in it being a supranational regulator
this will, to at least some extent, enable it to play an increasingly significant part in the global
governance of securities regulation and securities regulators.
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CONCLUSION

In short, this past decade has seen a tectonic shift in how securities regulators combat crossborder financial crime. In a sense, what we have now is a philosophy of collective security for
regulators—we have the authority to view a threat to the integrity of foreign markets as a threat to
our own. Those who commit financial crimes can run across borders, but they cannot hide.
Ethiopis Tafara, Director of the Office of International Affairs, SEC
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The above statement was made by Ethiopis Tafara in 2003 however as the insights gleaned
from the preceding chapters have demonstrated, this comment appears to be more a
expression of aspiration than reality. While it is true that regulators are working more
cooperatively in relation to cross border market abuse than they did in the past there are still
impediments hindering truly effective action.
This dissertation set out to investigate whether the integrity of the markets has been
threatened by the increased globalization and sophistication of the markets. Specifically its
focus has been on cross border market abuse and the threat that this could pose to market
integrity and the capital markets if effective action was not taken to address it. Initially an
analysis was undertaken in regard to the changes to the markets. The focus then shifted to
consider first whether there has been a transformation in the nature of cross border market
abuse from the perspective of securities regulators and second, if there had been, how
regulators had responded to it. Finally the role of IOSCO was examined to determine if and
how it could assist regulators in responding to this threat.
The restricted nature of the research conducted for this dissertation necessarily limits the
nature of the conclusions that can be drawn. Measuring changes to market integrity and the
exposure of markets to market abuse presents a significant challenge and further research
arguably needs to be undertaken in this area. However what is clear is that the changes to
the markets have been dramatic and one effect of this is increased avenues for those who
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engage in market abuse to exploit the global nature of trading and information exchange.
This becomes apparent from the nature of the cases of market abuse which securities
regulators are increasingly detecting, investigating and prosecuting and is reinforced by the
comments made in interviews by enforcement staff of securities regulators. In particular,
securities regulators are detecting more market abuse which straddles jurisdictions and
those cases tend to be complex and resource intensive to investigate.
This dissertation has also sought to outline some of the responses to market developments
in terms of both changes to regulation as well as the methods employed to detect and
investigate cross border market abuse. It identified that there have been tangible advances
in detection methods, such as investment in technology in relation to market surveillance
and systems to analyse data obtained from voluntary reports of market abuse. In addition it
demonstrated that the suspicious transaction report system in Europe seems to be detecting
otherwise unobserved instances of market abuse. In terms of developments in investigatory
techniques, this dissertation illustrated that securities regulators are tending to work more
cooperatively in exchanging the information they need to complete investigations and that
this is in no small part due to the operation of the IOSCO MMoU.
However it also appears that in some respects the capacity of securities regulators to detect,
investigate and effectively enforce laws against market abuse has lagged, and continues to
lag, behind the evolution of the markets. In particular there seems to be a growing need for
significant investment in cross border and cross market surveillance in order to detect
market abuse yet only a handful of securities regulators have developed or are developing
this capacity. In addition currently the capacity to engage in such cross border market
surveillance is largely facilitated by the ISG, a relatively opaque organisation whose
regulatory mandate is seemingly at odds with its self-imposed restriction on providing
information to government regulators. This suggests that the appropriateness of the ISG
undertaking this function demands further and closer academic analysis. It seems that it may
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be more appropriate for IOSCO to take over and improve the exchange of surveillance
information between exchanges and regulators.
Furthermore, whilst the MMoU has improved the ability of securities regulators to obtain the
information they need from other regulators, it appears that more could be done to improve
the cooperation between regulators from different jurisdictions with a view to enabling them
to more quickly bring enforcement actions and to improve enforcement outcomes. As noted
by a number of the regulators, enforcement success tends to be related to the speed of an
investigation just as enforcement failure is related to delay. Improving cooperation is
important not just to the success of investigations but may also be important to deterring
further offences and ensuring that perpetrators, particularly recidivist offenders, are
appropriately punished. The deterrence impact of cooperation is also reinforced by the
empirical study by Cumming et al, referred to in chapter 2, which showed that formalized
cooperation agreements between supervisory authorities was associated with a decrease in
fraud, as well as the study by Madura which suggested that there may be less insider trading
across borders if regulators enter into bilateral enforcement agreements with the SEC.763
In relation to improved cooperation and enforcement across borders it seems that IOSCO
could take a more proactive role in working with regulators to improve their enforcement
outcomes. IOSCO has proved through the development and use of the MMOU that it can
significantly contribute to the enforcement capacity of its members. It has developed as a
broadly based representative organisation and its objectives are focused on standardizing
securities regulations and enforcing those regulations. In relation to cross border market
abuse IOSCO could develop specific polices targeting cross border market abuse, such as
developing standardized penalties and more standardized enforcement options. Arguably it
also needs to also push its members to commit more resources to enforcement, given the
findings of Jackson & Rowe of the impact of such resources to capital market outcomes.764

763
764

See Chapter 2
See Chapter 2
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IOSCO should also build on the momentum it has achieved from the MMoU by continuing to
work towards all countries signing this MMoU. This is important given how, as shown in
chapters 3 and 4, perpetrators of market abuse can utilize different jurisdictions in an attempt
to avoid prosecution. IOSCO should also expand or further develop this MMoU to include,
for example, expanding the range of material that can be requested. IOSCO could also
develop other tools or systems, such as a system for regulators to exchange suspicious
transaction reports, which might work both to assist securities regulators in their enforcement
efforts and, at the same time, be used by IOSCO to achieve better global harmonization of
securities regulations.
Overall this dissertation raised questions about whether securities regulators, focused upon
efficiency concerns and their mandate to maintain the integrity of their own markets, have
been too slow to adjust to global market developments. As Ethiopis Tafara‘s statement
makes clear, there needs to be a shift towards securities regulators altering their approach
so that they will come to view a threat to the integrity of foreign markets as a threat to their
own and act accordingly. It seems that securities regulators need to commit more resources
to enforcement and work to improve the integrity of all markets by driving cooperative efforts,
very possibly via IOSCO, in order to ensure that those who engage in market abuse have no
place to hide. This emphasis on market integrity is important not just to ensure the market is
fair, but also to improve capital market outcomes, and in turn, the economies of all countries.
While such a focus on the integrity of global markets, along with securities regulation
generally, will need to be a process of adaption and re-adaptation as markets develop, such
an approach would appear to be essential in order to instil and secure market confidence
and stability in world that has become increasingly interconnected.
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